Manipulation of landscape as an Exercise of Unfair Power: the Case of Qalqiliya in the Occupied Palestine by Halawani, A.
  
 
 
 
  
 
Dottorato di Ricerca in Analisi, Rappresentazione, e Pianificazione 
delle Risorse Territoriali Urbane e Storche- Architettoniche e Artistiche 
Indirizzo Pianificazione Urbana e Territoriale 
Dipartimento di Architettura 
SSD: ICAR 21 
 
Manipulation of landscape as an Exercise of Unfair Power: 
the Case of Qalqiliya in the Occupied Palestine 
 
La Manipolazione del paesaggio come esercizio di un potere 
illegittimo: il caso di Qalqiliya nella Palestina occupata 
 
 
 
      IL DOTTORANDO      IL COORDINATORE 
Abdelrahman Halawani                                                      Prof.  Arch.  Francesco Lo Piccolo 
 
 
         IL TUTOR          CO TUTOR 
Prof.  Arch.  Francesco Lo Piccolo                                    Prof. Marco Picone 
 
CICLO XXV  
2015 
 i 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Written By: 
Abdelrahman Halawani 
 
Manipulation of landscape as an Exercise of Unfair Power: 
 The Case of Qalqiliya in the Occupied Palestine 
 
 
University of Palermo 
Department of Architecture 
PhD in Urban and Regional Planning 
 
 
To the Department of Architecture at the University of Palermo in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Co- Supervisor 
      Prof. Marco Picone        
 
PhD Coordinator: 
      Prof.  Arch.  Francesco Lo Piccolo 
 
 
Supervisor: 
      Prof.  Arch.  Francesco Lo Piccolo 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
Dedication 
 
To all martyrs who fall on the land of Palestine 
 
To those who suffer from oppressive and unjust regimes 
 
To my dear parents Mohammad Atiya & Widad 
 
To my beloved wife Rana and sons Basel & Sara 
 
To my dear brothers and sisters 
 
 
 iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
  
 
It is my pleasure to thank my supervisors Arch. Prof. Francesco Lo Piccolo and Prof. Marco 
Picone for valuable support. This study would not get to light without their help.  
I would like to thank Prof. Gerait Ellis from Queen’s university/ Belfast with whom I 
discussed my work especially the Case Study of Qalqiliya.Special thanks go to prof. 
Brendan Murtagh and prof. Gehan Selim from Queen’s University who read the theoretical 
part of the study. 
My special thanks to Mohammad Abo EL Sheik (director of health and environmental 
issues in Qalqiliya governorate), who facilitated the field work in the Qalqiliya district, 
without his help I am quite sure I would never have done the field work.   
Finally, I would like to thank my brothers, Abdullah and Abdelmalek, for their support and 
encouragement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
Abstract 
Planning, as emphasized by planning theories, is supposed to contribute to the progress of mankind 
through always developing policies, regulations, methods, and concepts, to support the welfare of 
individuals and their communities. Therefore, themes such as ethic of planning and the issue of just 
city have been discussed intensively in planning theories and the main dominated question is: what is 
the good planning? Many planning theorists answer this question by addressing various types of 
planning such as collaborative, deliberative, radical planning and so on as good tools to achieve 
progress and prosperity. However, Palestine is a case where the contradiction between theory and 
practice is obvious, because planning is used as an oppressive tool and not as a progressive one.  
No sign is needed to indicate well-developed Jewish colonies’ urban spaces from neglected built-up 
environment inhabited by people of Palestine; that specific difference reveals that planning may have 
the role in changing place identity, and demography of the land. In this sense, planning is often 
incomplete and misleading, advancing the interest and agenda of the occupiers at the expense of those 
who have been occupied. Planning is a ‘double-edged weapon’; on one side it can be a progressive 
tool, while on the other hand it can be a tool for repression, consolidating fragmentation and control 
on a group of people. 
Consequently, the landscape of Palestine is constantly being changed by means of planning, including 
new fabricated laws used as pretext of land confiscation. In addition, the occupying power deploys the 
model of exception (emptiness of laws and suspension of norms) to produce urban and regional 
confinements (prisons) in which people of Palestine experience land confiscation, restriction of 
movement, and exclusion from their private lands. This transformation results in disorder of 
spatialization process that led to a clear gap between spaces of oppressor and oppressed, exploiter and 
exploited, and occupier and occupied.  
This thesis focuses on the transformation of the landscape of Palestine starting from the British 
occupation in 1917, highlighting the role of planning and laws as instruments of this transformation. 
This study approaches the spatial knowledge specifically landscape planning as a way of control 
rather than an aesthetic improvement, and also it criticizes frameworks and domains such as (laws 
invented by the occupation) which are used to neutralize and normalize the landscape of control. This 
thesis offers both conceptual and empirical contributions about the way in which the landscape can be 
manipulated to have the role of exercise unfair and illegitimate power.   
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Abstract Italiano 
 
La disciplina della pianificazione, come sottolineato dalle sue basi teorie, dovrebbe contribuire al 
progresso del genere umano attraverso lo sviluppo di politiche, regolamenti, metodi e concetti e, allo 
stesso modo, sostenere il benessere dei singoli individui e delle loro comunità. Per tali ragioni, temi 
come l’etica nella pianificazione e la questione delle “just cities” sono stati oggetto di intensi dibattiti 
all’interno della disciplina con la finalità di dare risposta alla seguente e ricorrente domanda: cosa si 
intende per  “buona” pianificazione? Molti teorici del campo hanno tentato di dare risposta a questa 
domanda, contrandosi su vari approcci alla disciplina pianificatoria come quello collaborativo, 
deliberativo, radicale visti come potenziali strumenti utili per raggiungere progresso e prosperità.  
A tal proposito si è ritenuto interessante analizzare il caso della Palestina in cui la contraddizione tra 
teoria e pratica diventa evidente nell’uso che si fa della disciplina pianificatoria, spesso utilizzata più 
come strumento repressivo, che per il progresso. 
Risulta molto semplice distinguere la buona qualità’ dello spazio urbano delle colonie ebraiche dal 
trascurato ambiente costruito delle aree abitate dalla popolazione palestinese. La radicale ed evidente 
differenza rivela come le politiche pianificatorie possano avere un ruolo importante nel trasformare le 
identità dei luoghi, le loro caratteristiche e influenzare la crescita o decrescita demografica. In questo 
contesto, la pianificazione è risultata spesso incompleta e fuorviante, promuovendo gli interessi e il 
programma dei colonizzatori a scapito della popolazione indigena. La pianificazione rappresenta 
quindi “un’arma a doppio taglio”: da un lato strumento utilizzato per il progresso, dall’altro per la 
repressione, che contribuisce alla frammentazione della società e al suo controllo. 
In merito a tali osservazioni possiamo osservare come lo stesso paesaggio della Palestina, dal 1948 a 
oggi, sia stato trasformato sistematicamemte attraverso l’uso dello strumento pianificatorio, compresa 
la creazione ad hoc di numerose disposizioni legislative utilizzate come pretesto per la confisca di 
immobili e terreni. In aggiunta, gli occupanti hanno utilizzato il modello dell’ “eccezione” (nei 
termini della creazione di un vuoto legislativo e sospensione delle norme vigenti) per dar vita a zone 
di “cofinamento” (reclusione) urbane e regionali, in cui il popolo Palestinese ha subito 
l’espropriazione delle proprie terre, la limitazione della libertà di movimento e l’esclusione dalle 
stesse proprietà private. Queste trasformazioni spaziali, risultanti dall’utilizzo della pianificazione 
come uno strumento di oppressione, esprimono tutta le loro contraddizioni in quelle aree territoriali in 
cui il conflitto si sta verificando tra oppressori e oppressi, sfruttatori e sfruttati, occupanti e occupati. 
Questa tesi analizza la trasformazione del paesaggio della Palestina a partire dall'occupazione 
britannica, agli inizi del XIX secolo, mettendo in evidenza il ruolo della pianificazione e delle sue 
 vi 
 
leggi come strumenti fautori di questa trasformazione. Il presente studio è caratterizzato da un 
approccio spaziale e in particolar modo da quello caratteristico delle disciplina della geografia e della 
pianificazione del paesaggio. Lo studio fa una disanima delle strutture e dei domini, come quelle leggi 
emanate per permettere l'occupazione che sono utilizzate per neutralizzare e normalizzare il 
“paesaggio del controllo”. Questa tesi vuole offrire sia un contributo concettuale che empirico 
riguardo il modo in cui il paesaggio può essere manipolato per esercitare un potere illegittimo. 
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  Prologue  
In this prologue, I would like to write about several main points of interest which led me to write and 
develop this doctoral research. My attention was directed towards the gradual vanishing of indigenous 
landscape in Palestine as a result of occupation. Indeed, with the passage of time the landscape of 
Palestine has been changing at a rapid rate through a variety of mechanisms. Palestine has a beautiful 
landscape and a large variety of nature from seashores to desert and hills covered with olive trees. 
During the last century the original landscape of Palestine has been vanishing and losing its 
indigenous character.  
  
Generally, the production of space is influenced by various factors; socio-economic, politics, power 
relations …etc, but the production and reproduction of space in Palestine are accompanied with 
strategies of territorial colonization. In Palestine, the occupation is not just a matter of control over 
physical geographical land and exploitation of natural resources, but a matter of production of new 
paradigm (models) in which knowledge has been manipulated and misrepresented in many various 
levels. It is also a matter of making contexts and realms to produce a “new culture”, narratives, system 
of laws, devices, and tools for the desire of colonization, resulting in subjection of people of Palestine. 
Accordingly, this study argues that the landscape planning (which is a branch of spatial knowledge) 
has been manipulated to subjugate and control Palestinians. 
In Al-Quds, no sign is needed to indicate the well-developed Jewish colonies built-up environment 
and the negligence in the part inhabited by people of Palestine. The inequity in ‘built-environment’ in 
terms of services and quality of spaces forced me to think about the production and reproduction of 
landscape and the dark side of planning. Personally, as a planner and as a lecturer of planning courses 
in Palestine Polytechnic University, I began to think about the gap between the theory and the practice 
which I experienced in Al-Quds –Jerusalem- where I grew up and live. 
 
This approach was addressed by Oren Yiftachel who published in 1998 an article titled “Planning and 
Social Control: Exploring the ‘Dark Side” in the Journal of Planning Literature. In which he shows 
that planning is a double-edge sword. However, the article did not address two important questions; 
why planning is used as a control tool? What is the relation between the occupation and deployment 
of planning as a repressive tool?. Therefore, I decided not to limit my thinking under the framework 
of the misuse of knowledge, instead I started thinking about domains and frameworks that planning as 
a field of knowledge has been produced. 
This gap in planning theory pushed me to critically approach geography, landscape, and planning and 
also to criticize frameworks and models in which disciplines of spatial knowledge such as planning 
and geography is produced and reproduced. This critical approach will lead to conceptualize new 
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interpretations of planning and landscape disciplines that focus on structure of things, rather than 
accepting things as it exists.  
Despite that through this approach, I highly criticize “borders”, knowledge, contexts, and domains, it 
is an appropriate approach for explaining the context of the occupied Palestine that I am searching and 
studying. Therefore, I began to read the work of Michel Foucault who approached the relation 
between knowledge and power not as homogeneous parts but as contradictory parts. Then I started to 
read Critical Geopolitics book which was written by Gearóid Ó Tuathail who highlighted the way in 
which colonial powers seek to manipulate geography for the desire of control.   
Reading about the relation between knowledge and power helped me to understand how geography, 
landscape, and epistemology may be incrementally reformulated to invent new narratives, new image, 
new laws, new maps, and new structure of power relations which serve the occupying power in 
Palestine. I kept reading about the relation between knowledge and power, until a meeting with my 
co-supervisor prof. Marco Picone who suggested to me to read the book State of Exception written by 
the Italian Philosopher Giorgio Agamben.  
State of Exception enlightened me about an important issue which I have to take into consideration, 
mainly the use of “legal structure” for the purpose of colonization. State of Exception answers a 
central question: how can a power fabricate and misrepresent a system of law for its own desire and 
how a power can be itself the law?. The law which is also (a paradigm of knowledge) in occupied 
Palestine has been used to normalize the confiscation, subjection, and control. In fact, it is a mask 
behind it the process of territorial colonization occurs.  
Many ideas had flooded as a result of thinking, reading and discussions with my supervisors Prof. 
Arch. Francesco Lo Piccolo and Prof. Marco Picone, such as planning as an instrument of oppression, 
vanishing of Palestinian landscape, elements of control, legitimization of control, space of exception 
… etc. Therefore, the spatial focus of the study is suggested to be on landscape, while the conceptual 
focus is on an exercise of unfair power. With my supervisor and co-supervisor help, the theme of the 
research was developed to be; manipulation of landscape as an exercise of unfair power. 
After that, I began thinking about an appropriate case study to be analyzed and explored. During the 
last decade Palestinian’s life in the West Bank and Jerusalem has been dominated by new element of 
control in the Landscape (the apartheid wall). Personally as I mentioned, I have grown up in 
Jerusalem and I have experienced the difference between the way of life before and after the wall. 
Today, I have to pass through military checkpoints established by the occupying power “Israel”. It is 
an exercise of unjust power when my time and movement are under control. Despite the exercise of 
unfair power over people of Palestine (who live in Jerusalem), I did not select it as a case study 
because my research focuses on the interrelation between landscape and power. The case of Jerusalem 
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may be used when the focus of research on the relation between power and urban spaces. 
Accordingly, I selected Qalqiliya district as a case study where colonies, the apartheid wall, bypass 
roads have fragmented the landscape of Qalqiliya, influencing harshly the whole life of its inhabitants.  
 
The work on my doctoral research during three years had been very valuable and also stressed. 
Without the encouragement, support, and the constructive feedback of my supervisors this research 
would not get to light. 
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Research Approach  
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Chapter 1: Research Approach 
__________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The “visible features of an area of land”, that is how landscape described in oxford dictionary. The 
definition tells us that the landscape is the scene of mountains, valleys, agricultural lands, and built-up 
environment. According to this definition, landscape “is a combination of elements such as fields, 
buildings, hills, forests, deserts, water bodies and settlements" (Steiner, 2008, 4). However, landscape 
was seen by many scholars and theorists as a field that goes beyond an aesthetic appearance of a 
region to include perceptible expression of social, political and ideological sets as well as 
geographical scene.  
An understanding of the landscape as a scene, including nature and man-made built-up environment is 
very narrow. Therefore, the concept of the landscape exceeds material considerations (which is, of 
course, a cornerstone of understanding the meaning of the landscape), to include symbolic and 
physical representation of power relations. In landscape paintings in English Landscape in eighteenth 
century, artists painted the scene of rural area, representing it as a place for leisure or as a place of 
agricultural laborers (Zukin, 1993, 16). 
Landscape and social practices are inseparable, because landscape consists of natural environment 
(created by Allah) and man-made environment. ‘Landscape’ is defined as "an area, as perceived by 
people, whose character is the result of the action and interaction of natural and/or human factors" 
(Europe, 2000, chap.1, art.1). Not only, the landscape is a natural environment (forests, valleys, trees, 
and mountains) and man-made environment, but also (as many studies explained) it is medium highly 
linked to culture, history, and identity.   
Over the decades, the study of landscape has been broadened to include political and cultural issues. 
O'keeffe (2007, 9-10) argues that the landscape is a social-ecological realm in which communities 
invest in the landscape formation, locating their identities within landscape. Zukin indicates that 
landscape can represent social relations and social practices. According to Zukin (1993, 16) landscape 
is a mediator which represents social and race relations. Thereby, the transformation of the landscape 
could produce juxtapositions between many images especially the struggle between the image of 
powerful and the image of powerless.   
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W.J.T. Mitchel views the landscape as a verb rather than a noun. Consequently, researchers should 
ask not just what landscape is or means but what it does and how it works (Duncan & Duncan, 2010, 
237). Mitchel (2002) indicates that landscape has the ability to exert power over people, even with 
slight influence. He defines the landscape as a ‘cultural medium’ like a language or painting, which 
plays a great role of communication and expression, emphasizing that the landscape is a physical and 
multisensory medium in which cultural meanings and values are encoded. ‘Culture’ in Mitchel's 
definition is a general term that includes the culture of a nation such as traditions, and conventions 
and also includes the culture of domination, control, and colonization. 
The landscape in some cases exerts power over people. In this sense the meaning of landscape is 
stretched from the geographical meaning and physical surrounding to a power meaning. For example, 
the scene of high skyscraper near slums reflects the dominancy of economic capital power over the 
scene. Accordingly, the scene contains juxtaposition image between the space of poor and space of 
economic power. According to Zukin (1991, 16) the scene combines both the landscape of powerful; 
factories and skyscrapers, and the landscape of powerless; shantytowns and tenements. Consequently, 
a power have the ability to force its view on the landscape, "it was normal for such activities as 
landscaping the grounds of a country estate and drawing maps of the world to distort, obliterate, and 
rearrange geography to serve the interests of the viewer" (Ibid, 17).  
According to all above, the concept of landscape is not just related to a material (tangible object), it is 
a medium of representation and practice, having multiple interpretations. The landscape as a scene in 
some cases around the world is not a neutral. So, the landscape in turn may be a medium of colonial 
order in which the landscape is articulated to have the ability to exercise unfair power over its users. 
In this context some elements of the landscape are designed intentionally by an occupying power to 
play the role of exercise of unfair power over people who inhabit the landscape. Therefore, this thesis 
shift the focus from what landscape is to what it does, what it means and how it works. 
 
Achieving the harmony between human being and the environment shapes the discipline of the 
landscape planning which aims (as an academic discipline) to minimize the negative impact of human 
activities upon it and to preserve the nature. This idea was emphasized (in planning field) after the 
industrial revolution which is one of main driving forces of transformation of cities and landscape in 
the Nineteenth Century; cities expanded and new cities founded which affected the surrounding 
environment. Sprawl, pollution, shrinkage of agricultural lands, urban and environmental 
deteriorations became features of that era in Western Communities. As a reaction to ills of 
urbanization, planning discipline emerged to deal with environmental problems, and for the aim to 
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achieve progress and prosperity for human life. Planners and theorists thought about good and 
workable cities, such as Lewis Mumford and Ebenezer Howard who proposed the garden city
1
.  
Planners seek to direct the growth of cities towards sustainable development. They believe preserving 
green zones and green belts, as well as increasing green cover, are central and suitable policies for 
sustainable development. In spite of preserving natural parks and planting trees are encouraged and 
suggested as guidelines for sustainable development and good planning, in some cases around the 
world environmental and ecological concern may be used as an indirect way to exercise unfair power 
as this thesis explores. This deviation of the basic role of green zones are highlighted  by examining 
cases in the occupied Palestine in which agriculture and green areas have been used to impose a 
colonial control.    
The main driving force of meaning shift of landscape is the type of regime power. When a power is a 
colonial power, its dealing with spaces is different form a legitimate power which aims usually to 
satisfy the needs of people, enhance the quality of spaces and achieve progress in urban life, while a 
colonial power always tries to control both the people and the space, neglecting the essential needs of 
people and denying their rights. Ó Tuathail (1996) points out that imperial system through history 
exercised power to impose particular order and meaning upon space. Moreover, colonial powers 
reorder spaces to fit their cultural visions and material interests. 
Therefore, viewing the role of planning as a reform tool is narrow and too idealistic. Spatial planning 
is a multidisciplinary field, many conflicting interests are in the pool of planning; politicians, 
sociologists, and environmentalists. Thereby, there are rare conditions in which planning is neutral as 
Forester points out: "planners do not work on a neutral stage, an ideally liberal setting in which all 
affected interests have voice; they work with political institutions, on political issues " (Forester, 
1989, 3). Planning is a twin of politics and an executive arm of a government. Consequently, planning 
can be used as a negative and repressive tool. Moreover, ‘planning as oppression’ does exist in a 
variety of settings.  
The context of occupation affects spatial knowledge such as planning, spatial organization, as well as 
aesthetic of landscape. In Palestine, the discipline of planning and geography are employed and 
exploited by the occupying authority as means for constructing colonial subject, in order to reorganize 
and reshape the landscape to satisfy the view of the occupier and control the occupied people, trying 
                                                          
1 The increase of the environmental problems, deforestation, desertification, biodiversity losses, and climate change that 
threatens the quality of life and the future of our plant -The Earth- led to the emergence of the concept of sustainability 
which becomes the goal of many disciplines such as urban planning, urban design, architecture and landscape. The 
Brundtland Commission (1987) defined sustainability as "development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". Planning and environmental policies in many 
countries were changed to reconsider the new environmental challenges to achieve the sustainability. 
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to create new facts on the ground for serving Jewish settlers while at the same time limiting and 
chocking Palestinian community spatial development. Since the occupation in 1948, “Israel” began to 
build colonial existence with different forms; adopting systematic policies to create new demographic 
and geographic realities on the ground.  
The landscape of Palestine, including the West Bank has been changed dramatically; the original and 
indigenous landscape has been changed. A tour between main cities of Palestine, Jerusalem, Yafa, 
A’ka, Nablus, Jericho and Hebron, one can watch colonial settlements spread out over hilltops, giant 
concrete wall encircling cities, and steel fences with surveillance cameras. There are steel gates and 
solid concrete blocks in some villages’ entrances, checkpoints where many people wait to pass. 
Spaces are full of unjust, and exploitation meanings with the suspension of original norms of planning 
principles, influencing the whole life of people of Palestine, threating their existence, limiting their 
movement through their land. 
 
This study investigates the mechanism and modalities of colonization in which the landscape has been 
manipulated and transformed. It analyzes the role of occupying power in the formation of fully 
controlled space and in the production of new image and meanings of the landscape. It focuses on 
how landscape and planning can be articulated and circulated as tools of control.  
The landscape transformation is “legitimatized” by creating new “statutory” planning system, and by 
creating new laws and regulations for the space. Additionally, new narratives of the landscape have 
been made, denying the indigenous narrative of the space, resulting in new colonial vocabularies. The 
stories of the place, its history, its image, its identity are reconstructed to hide, abolish, and deny the 
land of Palestine and its Islamic identity. Altout (2006) investigated the occupation environmental 
narratives, arguing that water scarcity was the narrative of the occupation for justifying its control 
over water resources. 
New maps have been produced in which the name of Palestine was erased; the Arabic names of 
eradicated Palestinian villages, valleys, and places were renamed to be given Hebrew names. De-
islamization, de- arabizaion, and judaization of the geography and the land aimed to produce new 
colonial narratives, hiding the indigenous narrative of the landscape. Meron Benvenisti in his book 
‘Sacred landscape’ points out that a new map for Palestine prepared in 1948 with Hebrew names; 
mountains, valleys, and springs were given Hebrew names replacing the Arabic ones. This map is 
considered one of the "intellectual weapons by which the power could be gained, administered, given 
legitimacy, and codified" (Benvenisti, 2000, 13).  
Consequently, the occupying power has eliminated knowledge and destroyed the landscape that might 
remind people of Palestine of their history. This process is associated with proliferation of new 
linguistic expressions which aims to memoricide of geography, history, and culture. The following 
section is an introductory section which highlights the political background that was the main driving 
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force of transformation of space. It also explains the turning points in history that have affected the 
current landscape of Palestine. 
1.2 Preface to the Research Problem  
The analysis of the current situation of the landscape change in the selected case study will be 
incomplete without unveiling the historical and cultural context regarding the question of Palestine. 
The existing situation in Palestine has been shaped during historical phases; many key events have 
been articulating the current situation. Palestine before 1917 was part of Islamic Ottoman State (Al 
Khilafah Uthmaniyah) in which all the Arabic countries are part of it about five centuries. According 
to the late administrative system in the Ottoman State, the north part of Palestine belonged to the 
province (Wilayet) of Biuret. Alquds (Jerusalem) was considered a special district which was directly 
subordinate to the capital of the state (Istanbul). It (Sanjaq of Jerusalem) includes Jaffa, Gaza and 
Hebron (fig. 1.1) (Aldabag, 1991, 13).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 1.1: The last administrative system of Palestine in the Islamic Ottoman state. Source: 
http://scottthong.wordpress.com/2012/06/16/1873-ottoman-empire-map-no-palestine-noted/ (edit by: Halawani).  
 Research Approach … Ch.1 
  
7 
 
.   
Following the collapse of the Islamic Ottoman State in the First World War (in which it allied with 
Germany against Allies), the whole region was changed, resulting in colonization and division of the 
region into weak national states according to so-called Sykes–Picot agreement between France and 
Britain. During the British colonization of Palestine, Britain encouraged Jews to go to Palestine. 
Between the years 1922 to 1946, the increase percentage of the Jews was about 9% annually, in the 
year 1927 alone the increase reached about 28.7% and in 1934 the increase percentage was about 
25.9% (Said, 1992, 17-18).  
In November 1947 the United Nations proposed the so-called resolution number 181 to divide 
Palestine between Jews and Arabs, and Jerusalem to become an international city, the Jews accepted 
this plan; however, Muslims and Arabs refused this partition plan. They did not accept that any part of 
their country should be given and ruled by Jews (Tamari, 1999) (fig.1.2). The Zionist Movement saw 
the “resolution” as a chance and a beginning to control the whole Palestine while Muslims have seen 
and still see the plan as a colonial plan to control their lands and prevent their unity again (Salabi, 
2001).  
 
Fig.1.2:  Palestine between 1917 -1967. Source: Halawani, 2014, based on atlas of Palestine, issued by Arij    
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Fig.1.3:  Destroyed Palestinian villages in occupied Palestine in 1948. 
Source: Halawani, 2014, based on atlas of Palestine, issued by Arij.     
 
After that the war of 1948 erupted, 
resulting in the occupation of the 
first part of Palestine. According to 
Pappe’ (2006, 41) the ethnic 
cleansing of Palestine began in 
early December 1947 and then 
continued during the war. As a 
result Jewish militants groups 
demolished about four hundred 
eighteenth villages in which the vast 
majority of them inhabited by 
Muslims (Khalidi, 1992), forcing 
about 750,000 Palestinians to leave 
Palestine (Said, 1992, 45), later 
these expelled citizens (over half of 
them villagers) will be known as 
Palestinian refugees, the majority of 
them lives in Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Syria, counting now more than five 
million persons (see appendix A). 
From that moment, the villages 
disappeared from the map (fig.1.3).  
 
The Arabic names of destroyed 
villages’ sites were replaced by 
Hebrew names. In some cases no 
physical evidence of a village 
remains. Al-Shakhina (located 5 km 
to the north of Baysan) is an 
example. Today, it cannot be 
identified because the entire area 
has been plowed and turned into 
agricultural land belonging to 
Jewish settlers living in Nir David 
colony (Khalidi, 1992, 58).  
 
 
Occupied Palestine 
Haifa 
Gaza 
 Research Approach … Ch.1 
  
9 
 
.   
 
Many massacres were committed by Irgun, Stern and Hagana (Jewish militant groups) such as Deir 
Yasin massacre. The plan of the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians was ready on March, 1948, as written 
in the book The Ethnic Cleansing in Palestine “On a cold Wednesday afternoon, 10 March 1948, a 
group of eleven men, veteran Zionist leaders together with young military Jewish officers, put the 
final touches on a plan for the ethnic cleansing of Palestine” (Pappe’, 2006, xxi). Peppe’ mentions that 
the same evening military orders with detailed description were given to prepare for the systematic 
expulsion of Palestinians
2. The descriptions included “laying siege to and bombarding villages and 
population centers; setting fire to homes, properties, and goods; expelling residents; demolishing 
homes; and, finally, planting mines in the rubble to prevent the expelled inhabitants from returning.” 
(ibid, xxi). 
 
One of those villages that was destroyed by Jewish militant groups is Saffuriyya (the village was 
located in the Galilee) (fig.1.4). What had remained of the village are only remnants of destroyed 
buildings and pine trees (unhistorical trees). Today, the site is a park
3
.  
Indeed, when one visits most of the sites of the destroyed villages, ancient stones and walls scattered 
on fields, or abandoned houses and destroyed mosques, are visible features. This scene indicates that 
people of Palestine lived there before the year 1948.  
 Fig. 1.4: Saffuriya, Palestinian village that was demolished and erased form the map in 19484  
                                                          
2 A report published in New York times in August 2, 1988 mentioned that the victims of the massacre are as the following: 
“a total of 254 dead were counted by an International Red Cross official, including 145 women, of whom 35 were pregnant”. 
3  Source: http://smpalestine.com/tag/saffuriyya/  
4  Source: http://www.palestineremembered.com/Nazareth/Saffuriyya/Picture1277.html  
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Fig.1.5:  Division of land in the West-bank (A, B, C). Source: 
Halawani, 2014, based on map produced by Palestinian Ministry of 
Planning     
The character of the indigenous landscape of the land 1948 has been changing due to; the destruction 
of the villages which (after that) were replaced by fabricated landscape consists of massive colonies. 
These colonies are part of territorial and demographical strategies to strengthening the existence of 
colonizers (Jewish settlers). In spite of the high level of the manipulation of knowledge regarding the 
occupied 1948 land of Palestine, this study will not analyze this part or select it as a case study 
because the inability to access to the data.  
In the year 1967, after the six days 
war between “Israel” and the Arabic 
countries, the West Bank was also 
occupied. Immediately after the 
occupation, “Israel” began to 
strengthening its territorial 
colonization by issuing laws and 
constructing colonies as part of the 
Judaization project. Usually, the 
colonies have been constructed on the 
hill tops to be functioned as places of 
surveillance. Today, the number of 
Jewish settlers in the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem is about half million 
settlers.  
In 1991, the negotiation between the 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and “Israel” was started in 
Madrid. And thus, the so-called Oslo 
agreement was signed in 1993 (which 
is viewed by many intellectuals as a 
liquidation of Palestinian case). The 
first application of the so-called Oslo 
agreement is called Gaza-Jericho 
agreement, meaning that the control of 
these two cities would be transformed 
to Palestinian Authority (P.A.). In 
1995 the Oslo agreement B was 
signed in Taba in Egypt, by which 
major Palestinians cities in the West 
Bank were handed to P.A. According to 
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this agreement Gaza Strip and the West Bank were divided in to three Zones: 
‘Zone A’: in this area, the “Palestinian Authority” has full responsibility of “security” and civil 
affairs. This zone includes Jericho and seven major Palestinian cities in the West Bank. It is worth to 
mention that a special protocol and arrangements related to Hebron city was signed on January 17, 
1997. The city has been divided into two areas: ‘H1 area’ where Palestinian Authority has the 
responsibility of “security” and civil affairs and ‘H2 area’ where “Israel” has the full responsibility of 
“security”. 
‘Zone B’: in this area “Palestinian Authority” has just the full responsibility of civil affairs, and do not 
have the responsibility of “security”. ‘Zone C’: in this area, “Israel” has the responsibility of 
“security” and the responsibility of civil affairs, including land administration and planning. ‘Zone C’ 
is a contiguous land area in the West Bank, while ‘zone A’ and ‘Zone B’ are fragmented and without 
any contiguity. ‘Zone C’ covers about 60 % of the West-Bank.  
The mentioned division was made to confine part of Palestinians into two zones A and B, while 
keeping their agricultural lands in ‘Zone C’.  It is worth mentioning that all the Jewish colonies in the 
West Bank, in addition to 149 Palestinian villages are located totally within the ‘Area C’.     
The policy of constructing and expanding Jewish colonies -after the so-called Oslo agreement- has 
never stopped. The continuation of the control of Palestinian lands has taken many shapes and 
modalities; colonial settlements, roads network, apartheid wall, and demolishing Palestinian buildings 
… etc. In the following sections, only three modalities of control (colonial settlements, bypass roads, 
and the apartheid wall) are highlighted as the following:  
 Colonial Settlements 
Since the occupation of the West-bank, the “Israeli governments” have adopted the policy of 
establishing a Jewish existence by building colonial settlements. The first plan that prepared to 
implement this policy was Alon plan which proposed to establish colonies in the Jordan Valley and 
the area around Jerusalem. By 1977 about 55,000 settlers were living in colonies established in the 
West Bank and “East Jerusalem”.   
New strategy was adopted at the end of seventies; its aim was to build colonies around Palestinian 
towns and villages. After Oslo, the expansions of colonies have never stopped. Statistics show that the 
number of housing units for settlers in the West Bank and Gaza strip between September 1993 till 
September 2001 (excluding East-Jerusalem) rose from 20,400 to 31,400 – an increase of 55% in seven 
years (Lein 2002, 16).  
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According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2010), the total number of colonies in the 
West Bank is 133 and another 100 random colonies known as ‘outposts’. The table (in the next page) 
shows the increase of settlers since 2005.  
 
 
Through the framework of occupation, “Laws” have been invented to confiscate lands from people of 
Palestine. When the occupation fails to confiscate lands by fabricated laws, it issues military orders 
for the purpose of confiscation. For example, Ma’ale Adummin colony located near Jerusalem was 
constructed on confiscated lands. Several years before confiscation, the “Israeli military commander” 
declared most of the land as military zone, forbidding Palestinians people from entering or using it 
(Shalev, 2009). Today, its built-up area is about 4 km
2
, where approximately 38,000 Jewish settlers 
live (Paz-Fuch, Cohen-Lifshiz, 2010). 
 Bypass Roads 
The ‘bypass roads’ is a term to describe the street network that connects colonies together in the West 
Bank.  Travelling through this network is allowed for settlers, while Palestinians are prevented to use. 
There is no written “law” that prevents Palestinians from using bypass roads, this executive action 
implemented by verbal orders from “Israeli soldiers” in checkpoints located in the streets. 
 
The separation and restriction of movement is not the only result of bypass roads. If one is traveling 
by car through one of those roads near Bir Nabala (Palestinian village on whose land the road is 
established),  one can see the street with concrete edges with a suitable height that prevent drivers 
form seeing what is behind this street. The view of the village has been concealed behind the concrete 
edges. In other cases, the concrete edges disappeared showing an empty land. As a result the settlers 
can drive and never see the indigenous people and their built-up environment. The Palestinian villages 
were canceled from the scene of drivers. 
Year The West Bank (including “East-
Jerusalem”) 
2005 448,489 
2006 465,419 
2007 482,211 
2008 501,354 
2009 511,739 
2010 518,974 
Table 1: Number of settlers between 2005-2010 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/ 
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Fig. 1.6: The Apartheid wall around Qalqiliya City. 
Source: Halawani, 2014   
In the article titled ‘you can drive long and never see an Arab’, Hass (journalist) wrote about the 
vanishing image of the Palestinian villages while driving through the bypass roads "a person could 
travel the length and breadth of the West Bank without ever knowing - not only the names of the 
villages and cities whose lands were confiscated in order to build the Jewish settlements and 
neighborhoods, but even the fact that they exist. Most of their names cannot be found on the road 
signs. And from a distance, the calls of the muezzins and the streets empty of people (after all, there is 
nothing to go out for) seem like an aesthetic decoration “(Hass, 2003).  
Accordingly, the bypass roads are features in the landscape and they are not only limit the expansion 
of Palestinian cities and villages, but also they create a new perception, new fabricated image, and 
new fabricated narratives.     
 The Apartheid Wall  
The third control element explored in this chapter is the apartheid wall, because of its devastating 
influence on the landscape.  The construction work of the wall was started in 2002; its total length will 
be approximately 700 kilometers. The wall in some areas is an electronic fence with two trenches on 
both sides and patrol paved road, in other areas it is an eight-meter high concrete barrier.  
The wall (which was built on confiscated lands from people of Palestine) is seen as an act of 
oppression that isolates cities and villages from its natural geographical surroundings, and agricultural 
lands, forming regional prisons. Qalqiliya town, located about 70 km to the north of Jerusalem is a 
clear example.   
The construction of the apartheid wall in Qalqiliya 
was begun in 2002, isolating the city from about 
5,000 dunums (one dunum equals 1000 m
2
) of its 
agricultural lands and 22 ground water wells. The 
wall separates the city from surrounding 
Palestinian villages, dividing and destroying 
farmlands, and restricting the movement of 
inhabitants. The farmers found themselves facing 
extremely severe situation that limits access to 
their lands and their farms. The sense of rupture 
and prohibition casts its shadow on farmers as 
they cannot reach their lands freely (chapter five 
details the impact of the wall in Qalqiliya 
District).   
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1.3 Researcher’s Observations 
The fragmentation and territorial colonization of the landscape of Palestine is clear. Features of 
control have been implanted in its landscape which transformed according to the Judization project. 
This section details my personal observation regarding the transformation of the landscape of 
Palestine. There are four themes; vanishing of the indigenous landscape, the relation between 
devastation of space (Spacio-cide) and power, planning as a control tool, and the last theme is the 
mechanism of legitimization of territorial colonization. These observations constitute the first step of 
understanding the existing situation and they are essential to clarify the problem of research.   
 Vanishing of the Indigenous Landscape  
 
- The glorious landscape of Palestine has been re-produced, with devastating consequences 
to its original inhabitants (people of Palestine). The Palestinian villages were erased in the 
year 1948; more than four hundred villages faced deliberate destruction and urban 
annihilation. At the beginning, the Palestinian refugees lived in tents, after that they built 
brick and concrete buildings which called now refugee camps and they are now very 
visible features in the landscape of the West Bank and Gaza strip.  
 
- The original scenery (in many areas of Palestine) which consists of the integration of 
villages, olive orchards, and wavy rock fences over hills is no longer dominating the 
landscape. The beautiful hilltops around Palestinian villages have been changed and were 
used to build colonies. 
 
- The original landscape has been converted to another fabricated landscape, holding a 
colonial image, new meanings, and a new story, which denies and obliterates the 
narratives of the original people. The occupying power changed the names of valleys, 
hills, and places in order to enhance its existence and give itself confidence. The names of 
destroyed Palestinian villages were disappeared form maps prepared by “Israel”, and the 
villages that survived were given symbols marking them as ancient ruins (Benvenisti, 
2002, 41).     
 
 Spacio-cide as Colonial Politics  
 
- The occupation targets the space in which Palestinians live. The systematic         
destruction of the living space is termed spaio-cidce (Hanafi, 2009). Colonies are not 
static space, but they expand horizontally on confiscated land owned by Palestinians. 
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According to the table1 (in the previous section), colonies continued significantly to grow 
and settler numbers have grown. They control space which is not limited to the built up 
area, but exceed that including surrounding vacant lands. An obvious example of that the 
Ma'ale Adummim colony which has built over just 8% of its jurisdiction area. The spacio-
cide was done by “Israeli planners”; planners who know very well about imperial 
strategies and understand the relation between power and space (fig.1.7). 
 
 Planning and Controlling Space 
 
- Historically, understanding of planning discipline is limited to land-use planning which is 
based on technical experts and professional planners. In this sense, planners suggest 
various zoning (such as housing, commercial, and industrial zones) and focuses on 
physical aspects of built environment. However, planning in the case of Palestine has not 
been used as a technical or professional tool; instead it is used to set vast area of land for 
establishing colonies in order to enhance the existence of Jewish settlers while at the same 
time chocking Palestinians communities leaving them with minimum possible spaces 
 
- Most of Palestinian communities in the West Bank have been classified as so- called 
‘Area A’. These areas are dispersed geographically, separated by area so-called ‘Area C’ 
which is connected geographically. Therefore, the land on which cities and villages exists 
transformed into cantons, forming obstacles for the expansion of Palestinian villages and 
cities.  
 
 The Legitimatization of Territorial Colonization  
 
- The system of planning in the West Bank is a dual system; one for establishing colonial 
settlements and another for Palestinian villages that are located in ‘Area C’. This system 
is centralized and headed by a military commander (fig.1.8). 
 
- The main and first step of building new colonies is land confiscation which is 
“legitimatized” by invention and fabrication of laws (the details are in 4.7).    
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Fig. 1.7: Jewish colonies in the West-Bank (2012). Source: Halawani, 2014. based on B'tselem maps 
 
Source: Halawni, 2012. based on B'tselem maps 
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Fig. 1.8: “Statuary” planning system in the West-Bank. Source: Alexander, 2010 
 
The emergence of the occupying power has led dramatically to urban and landscape transformation on 
regional, local and neighborhood scales. This continuous change, articulates the space in different 
form and meaning, shaping the life of Palestinians in terms of their movements, worship, social 
relationship, and economic situation. Once a colonial settlement or elements of control such as fences 
and gates are built, new zones emerge called buffer zones. Palestinians are deprived form entering 
their lands in buffer zones. The feeling of fear controls them when they approach these areas, because 
they are unsafe spaces for them. This type of space as this thesis argues is ‘space of exception’. The 
following chart shows the process through which ‘space of exception’ is produced (fig.1.9).  
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Fig. 1.9: Power, planning, landscape, and space of exception interrelations.  Source: Halawani, 2014 
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Fig. 1.10: Shilo colony was constructed on natural preserved lands. Source: http://peacenow.org.il & https://earth.google.com 
 
   
1.4 Problem Identification  
The original landscape of Palestine consists of villages that are usually located on slopes of hills, 
agricultural lands, orchards, hills covered with olive trees, stone terrace walls with grape-draped 
gardens, cities on seashore, and tent of Bedouins in the desert. In the last century, however, the 
landscape of Palestine has been transformed dramatically; losing its natural rhythm and harmony.    
The transformation has been caused by political, economic, demographical, cultural, and social 
changes. However, the main driving force for this transformation is the practices of occupation which 
controlled all urban activities in terms of planning and regulations. Since 1948, the landscape of 
Palestine has been reproduced by the occupation; planners have deployed methods, tools and 
mechanisms for the purpose of seizing land of Palestine and colonising it with Jews from abroad. 
On natural preserved sites some colonies were constructed. A significant example is the Shilo colony 
that contains 45 caravans and 2 concrete buildings. It was built totally upon land classified as a natural 
preserved area (fig. 1.10).  The destruction of the unique landscape by a systematic use of planning 
deprived the Palestinians from their cultural, social and natural heritage. 
The construction of colonies negatively affects the environment. Historically, peasants utilized hill 
slopes for their agricultural needs using stones terraces which integrated in a unique way with lands 
cultivated with olive tree and almond, and with streams forming cultural landscape. But, as a result of 
occupation the landscape has been reorganized and reshaped; the elements of control have fragmented 
the landscape, creating closed spaces filled with the meaning of oppression and unfair power. 
 
The people of Palestine are witnessing the change of their landscape image. Continually, Palestinians 
observe new control elements dominating their landscape; colonies near their farms and houses, 
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Fig.1.11: Buffer zones around indigenous cities.  Source: 
Halawani, 2014 
concrete walls eight meters height saturated with observer towers, and new roads passing through 
their lands. Consequently villages and cities have been suffocating as a result of these elements which 
immobilize the way to surrounding agricultural lands and water resources which constitute one of the 
most important pillars of the their economy. 
The scene of integration between Palestinian 
villages and the landscape has been threatened 
and in some places vanished. Buffer zones have 
been produced around elements of control 
which create new image of the space and new 
spatial morphology (fig 1.11).  Buffer zones 
may be viewed as a spacio-cide mechanism 
because farmers are prevented from using these 
zones. 
 
Accordingly, Palestinians think about their lands 
emotionally and mentally, but not physically. 
Palestinian planners found themselves facing fragmented landscape with different classification (A, B, 
C) according to the so-called Oslo. There is no authority on natural and water resources, or on the 
main and regional roads of the West Bank. All these circumstances are set of obstacles facing 
planners who can develop outline plans on very limited area of land. They are allowed only to plan on 
’Area A’ which constitutes only about 11% of the West Bank, and ’Area B’ which constitutes about 
26% of the West Bank. This geopolitical context has resulted in shrinkage of lands, limitation of 
urban expansion, and squeezing Palestinians communities into small and closed spaces. Therefore, the 
whole Palestinian life including their social relations is influenced harshly.   
The discipline of planning is in the hand of occupying power, maps and planning laws are produced to 
create a “legal geography” for settlers. Foucault points out that a power can take the role of 
production, and produces certain type of knowledge (Foucault, 1994, 31). Thus, colonial knowledge 
and colonial power go hand by hand and cannot be separated, since the occupying power produces 
knowledge, concerning its existence, continuity, and expansion. This is called by Michel Foucault 
‘culture industry’, meaning that language, intellectuals, and scholars can be deployed and functioned 
for the favor of unfair power.  
The deviation of the use of spatial knowledge influences the character of spaces which (as a result) 
loses its livability, aesthetic, unity, original image, and normal settings. It can be called a space of 
exception that characterized by a void of law. Agamben (2005) explored the meaning of exception, 
mentioning that its main character is the emptiness of law and order.  
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A case study will be selected to be examined. Two main criteria are taken into consideration in the 
selection of the case study. Firstly, it should reflect the theme of the research; secondly, the data 
should be accessible at several levels from overview to details.  Qalqiliya district is found a suitable 
case study to be analyzed. It is located about 75 Km to the north of Jerusalem. Around 92,000 
inhabitants are living in the district, while approximately 42,000 are living in the city. Obviously, this 
case represents a significate example of the way in which the landscape traformed from a delightful 
scene to scene that exercise unfair power upon its users.   
The apartheid wall was built adjacent to build up area, forming a siege around the city, reducing the 
lands that are essential for future urban growth, grabbing most of fertile agricultural lands, controlling 
the natural resources, preventing and limiting the accessibility to farming lands (fig. 1.12). At the 
same time, vast area of land has been joined with the colonies to facilitate its future expansion.  
 
 
1.5 Hypotheses  
 
 The context of occupation extends to multi-levels; from the discipline of knowledge until 
daily life of people. New frameworks (such as new laws), pseudo-scientific approaches and 
arguments are created for the desire of justification of occupation. 
 
 The occupying power employs planning and landscape planning to strengthen the 
demography of Jewish settlers while weakening the existence of people of Palestine. In this 
Fig. 1.12:  Agricultural gates in the apartheid wall in Qalqilia city, limiting the accessibility to farming lands.    
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context the goal of planning discipline is twisted from a reform tool to a control tool, despite 
that planning emerged out to make better environment and improve people's life.   
 
 As a result of landscape transformation in Palestine, new spaces appeared and can be called 
‘spaces of exception’; spaces of emptiness of laws and norms, and space of control and 
surveillance. 
 
 The occupying power do not just control the space, but the socio-economic and cultural 
sectors become also under control, aiming to weaken the economy of Palestinian cities and 
villages that depend on agriculture through re-division it into two spaces: one for Palestinian 
built-up areas, and another for Jewish colonies and natural resources together. Thus, exiling 
the farmers from their main income and their original work.  
 
 The elements of control form a major hurdle for achieving regional and urban development in 
Palestinian towns and district. These elements are threatening the environment, eliminating 
the natural reserve zones, depriving towns from natural resources such as water, endangering 
the living conditions of people, and decreasing land for urban expansion.   
1.6 Research Objectives  
After clarifying the problem identification and researcher observations, the following objectives of 
research come to surface:  
 To develop a conceptual model and framework to understand the manipulation of the 
landscape as an exercise of unfair power. This model highlights domains that are used as 
frameworks for the purpose of exercising disciplinary power. This model facilitates for 
decision makers and researchers the way in which to view and analyze landscape in situations 
of oppression and injustice.   
 
 To define how the landscape can be approached as a subject of power exercise. 
 
 To develop an understanding about the way in which landscape may be transformed to play a 
role in symbolizing colonial meanings such as dominancy and subjection.   
 
 To investigate the territorial control that has been practiced by the occupying power, focusing 
on the role of planning in occupied Palestine.  
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 To analyze the chronological changes of the landscape in the case study as an impact of the 
planning policies, and its consequences upon Palestinian citizens focusing on socio-economic 
and cultural aspects. 
 
 To explore the challenge of planning to counter or resist hegemonies of colonial landscape 
features.  
 
 To investigate policies and spatial modalities used to normalize the occupation and “legalize” 
the territorial colonization. And to highlight the way in which it attempts to legitimize its 
practices of oppression and subjection against those who have colonized.  
1.7 Research Questions  
After exploring the research problems and tracing the objectives of dissertation. Several questions 
have been raised to provide a clarification of the purpose of this study; they are centralized around the 
relations between occupying power, space, planning and landscape. The questions are divided into 
two groups: main question (grand tour question) and sub questions.   
The main question of the research is: How are landscape and planning manipulated as an exercise of 
unfair power in the colonized zones?  
Sub-questions are traced, narrowing the focus of the study, as the following: 
 What are the mechanisms and modalities (used in local and regional scales) in which 
landscape is traformed in the case of Palestine?  
 
 What are the characteristics and identities of new emerging spaces, as a result of landscape 
transformation?   
 
 What are the consequences of occupying power practices upon people of Palestine who live in 
controlled and closed zones? 
 
 Does the occupying power produce new narratives concerning the landscape as part of 
legitimization process? 
 
 What are the new meanings of the landscape as a result of elements of control and apartheid 
wall?  
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 What are the recommendations to support the existence of people of Palestine on their land 
and in the closed zones?   
1.8 Research Methodology 
According to the researcher’s observation and literature review, the research problem and hypotheses 
are written. Alan Bryman (1998, 2) points out that the personal observation is a useful step for the 
research and a procedure for developing hypotheses. However, it is very restricted technique in a 
certain stage in the research. 
 
Indeed, the landscape offers a domain for observation of the spatial manifestation of power relations, 
motivating us for a comprehensive analysis about the change of landscape from homogeneous to 
heterogeneous and from ordered to disordered. Despite that the image of landscape is helpful to unveil 
the way in which the production and reproduction of the landscape have been occurred but we cannot 
theorize that transformation without theories, thus in this thesis the works of Foucault, Agmaben, and 
Lefebvre are employed to construct a conceptual framework to understand the landscape manipulation 
and landscape transformation. Therefore, this thesis operationalizes some theorist’s notions such as 
the notion of exception in the analysis of the case study.    
Drawing on theorists’ work and practical analysis, I have tried to show that the analysis of landscape 
transformation is similar to the analysis of a discourse which may (in some cases) deceive people for 
the purpose of domination, control, and exclusion. This study will show that the change of the 
landscape is something further than physical and spatial change; it is about a power that tries to build 
a new mind regarding the landscape.   
This analysis unveils the role of the spatial image and landscape that paly in the context of occupation 
and the way in which the narrative of the landscape is used as a discourse of occupation to naturalize 
the status quo and features of control. This analysis seeks to relate landscape and planning to a larger 
domain and field of knowledge which was structured in a specific way. This is useful to understand 
the way in which colonial knowledge is formulated and used.  
 
The analysis of the data will be on two levels; regional level and local level. At the regional level the 
analysis focuses on two themes; firstly the territorial colonization of the landscape, secondly the 
procedural control of the space such as the laws used to control the space and reproduce it. At the 
local level, territorial analysis will be conducted and the impact of the landscape transformation on the 
city of Qalqiliya in terms of socio-economic and cultural aspects will be investigated. Moreover, the 
daily-life changes (after the construction of the wall) will be examined.   
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This study views landscape as a medium, holding meanings that are created through a process. This 
perspective shows that the production of landscape is a process for inculcating meanings of 
domination and control in the space. For this purpose, interviews with farmers and key persons will be 
conducted to investigate new perception concerning the space. The samples will take into account 
different locations of Palestinian communities.  
 
The West Bank consists of eleven governorates and eleven cities. The researcher will visit these cities 
and governorates in order to observe the landscape transformation. These visits are important for the 
researcher to collect a preliminary data that is essential for assessing the landscape transformation 
occurred after 1967 in the West Bank and to specify the case study. The selection (as mentioned) is 
based upon the correspondence between the theme of the research and the case study, and the 
availability of the data. The following chart explores the methodology of the research:  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observation 
Literature Review 
Hypotheses, Research Objectives  
Case study  
  Theory  Power and landscape    
                     Planning as a control tool  
                     Space and surveillance 
                     Space and fragmentation   
                     Space of exception 
Local Level 
 
Regional Level 
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1.8.1 Research Mode  
The general mode of writing in this dissertation (writing method) is critical approach. This mode of 
writing does not focus on the basic ideas of knowledge that emerged and has continued to participate 
in prosperity of communities; but the study seeks to illustrate knowledge deployed to function in a 
Findings 
Conceptual (reexamining and contextualizing the meaning of space of exception, landscape 
and power, planning as an oppression tool)  
Operational (recommendations for strengthening the existence of Palestinian farmers in 
colonized zones, the challenges of planning and future spatial development).   
 
 
 
Consequences  
 
 
 
Literature Review 
Regional Level 
- Spatial analysis 
(territorial control) 
- Procedural analysis 
(planning policies and 
laws) 
 
Local Level 
- Spatial analysis (territorial control) 
- Socio-economic analysis  (consequences of 
territorial control on citizens in space) 
- Narrative of the landscape  
Discussion 
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different way of its original purposes. The critical thinking is to think differently about meanings of 
spaces, geography, and landscape, in order to reach more accurate and concrete diagnoses of the 
problem of spatiality.   
Edward Said adopted the criticism approach; he criticizes the orientalist text which was created to 
construct ‘the orient’. His criticism of the text unveils the purpose behind it (the desire of writing) and 
examines the way in which knowledge is made by a power for the purpose of domination, control, and 
obliteration. Soja (1996) reassures the importance of this way of thinking by noting: “it thus becomes 
more urgent than ever to keep our contemporary consciousness of spatiality- our critical geographical 
imagination- creatively open to redefinition and expansion in new directions; and to resist to narrow 
or confine its scope” (Soja, 1996, 2).  
Foucault (2000, 1989a) approached the society from the point view of dichotomy between groups of 
people. That critical thought led him to detail mechanisms that were used for the purpose of 
domination (see section 2.2). Similarly, this thesis criticizes the production of the landscape, detailing 
the mechanisms that have been used by the occupation to control those who have been occupied to a 
degree to prevent them from essential and basic needs of living (land and water).  
Adopting critical approach means to think differently about the landscape; its meaning, production, 
and reproduction. This way of thinking does not just focus on the material of the landscape (physical 
features), but it aims also to unveil in details the way in which the landscape is produced and the 
reasons behind the reproduction process. Consequently, this dissertation unveils domains in which the 
landscape is transformed, highlighting the new meanings of landscape acquired. In this sense, issues 
such as oppression, subjection, tyranny, injustice take more attention than issues of development, 
enjoyment, and beauty.  
This approach is an attempt to re-conceptualize some aspects regarding the discipline of the landscape 
and suggests a new interpretation of its role in occupied zones. Through this mode of thinking the 
research can highlight an interpretative framework from which can experts and researchers view the 
landscape transformation in other zones around the world where oppression is embedded in the 
process of landscape production. This approach is very helpful to establish relations between the 
discipline of landscape and (power, law, planning).  
1.8.2 Data Collection  
Data were collected using qualitative method. The main research method is in-depth interviews in 
order to explore the ability of landscape elements to exercise unfair power over its user. Direct 
observation is also a method used to observe human activity influenced by the new features of 
landscape imposed by the occupation (specifically the wall). Therefore, visits to the Qalqiliya district 
and staying long time with people in different communities (inside and outside the wall) familiarized 
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Fig. 1.13: The interview with one of those farmers who has faced the change 
of the landscape of Qalqiliya before and after building the wall. Source: 
Halawani, May, 2013 
the researcher to the new way of life that people face after building the wall. There are three main 
sources of data: interviews (see appendix B), spatial data, and documents. Winchester (2000) points 
out that there are three main types of qualitative research: oral, textual and observational.  
 Interviews  
 
The selected sample for the interview consists of twenty farmers who experience the exercise of 
unfair power through landscape. The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to 45 minutes, and some of 
them were recorded using video camera. Questions were prepared before as guidelines, so the 
interview sample may be described as a ‘semi-structured' interview which has some degree of order 
but it is also flexible.  
 
The interview questions were 
structured and developed based 
on the researcher’s observation 
and literature. An important point 
regarding the interviews is to 
explore the change of daily life in 
terms of (economic situation, 
movement, time and so on) 
before and after building the wall. 
The main sample condition is that 
a farmer must have experience of 
work in his agricultural land 
before and after building the wall. 
 
 
The questions include five components, general information, exposure to the wall (its impact, passing 
through … etc.), control over time, economical status information, and the way in which to support 
their life.  The Farmers narrated their everyday life stories; problems they face during passing gates to 
farming lands, and hardship of working due to the building of the wall. Thomas Kaplan (1993) 
emphasizes the usefulness of storytelling, pointing out that this device can offer a powerful tool to an 
analyst. Stories are not only present facts and express opinions and emotions; they also reconstruct 
selectively what the problems really are (Foster, 1993). Consequently, in this research the field work 
which consists of interviews, group discussions, and site observation forms an important step to 
unveil in details and make visible the way in which the landscape transformation and manipulation 
influences the user of space (Palestinian farmers). 
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Two group meetings were conducted to discuss the issues of colonies and the wall and their impact on 
water and agriculture (fig. 1.14). Both were held in the Qalqiliya municipality. No quotations were 
used in this research based on these two meetings but they were useful to understand the general 
problem (especially socio-economic issues) that farmers face because of elements of control in the 
landscape.  
 
 
 Spatial data  
The spatial analysis is based on the geographic information system (GIS) which is a tool of analysis. 
The spatial data includes master plans and aerial photos. The analysis is found in chapter five which 
explores the case study (Qalqiliya). The base map is an aerial photo produced in 2011. There are 
various spatial layers which were collected from Land Research Center and Palestinian Ministry of 
Agriculture.  
 
 Documents  
The documentary sources include newspapers and reports from different institutions regarding 
colonies and the apartheid wall. One of the main sources of non-spatial data is Palestinian Central 
Bureaus of Statistics (PCBS). It is governmental institution, conducting statists about Palestinian 
matters since 1997.  
 
Fig. 1.14: Meeting in the Qalqiliya Municipality Hall. Source: Halawani, June, 2013 
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1.9 Research Structure  
The dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter one clarifies the research approach, highlighting 
the hypotheses, the problem identification, the goals, the methodology, the methods, and the data 
collection methods. Planning theories that examine the relation between power and planning are 
detailed in chapter two. This chapter also highlights the relation between power and landscape, and 
the role of power on landscape's narratives and meanings, while chapter three examines the theories 
that conceptualize the impact of power on the space, detailing the meaning of space in various conflict 
contexts.    
Chapter four provides a general overview of geopolitical context in Palestine, examining spatial 
impact of occupation. It focuses on spatial colonial control over land and resources in the West Bank 
after 1967, detailing territorial control over lands as a result of the colonies and the apartheid wall. 
Chapter five are devoted for the case study analysis (Qalqilya district), detailing the territorial, 
procedural, soio-economic, and cultural  control practiced by the occupying power. The 
conceptualization of the landscape as a medium of exercising unfair power, the landscape of 
exception, and the role of planning in the landscape of exception are illustrated and discussed in 
chapter six. Finally, chapter seven presents the conclusion and empirical recommendations to 
strengthening the existence of people of Palestine in the controlled spaces. 
  
 
 
Chapter 2 
Power, Planning & Landscape 
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Chapter 2: Power, Planning & Landscape  
__________________________________________________ 
 
Understanding the relation between planning and power is a central point for this dissertation, which 
examines the landscape transformation occurring in Palestine, specifically in the West Bank. This 
understanding provides a framework for understanding how landscape is articulated, which is the 
result of a complex process of production. Specifically it provides a lens through which the researcher 
can view landscape manipulation in the West Bank, where the struggle is highest, and where the role 
of planning and landscape become controversial issues. A central point of this chapter is to construct 
an understanding of the relation between transformations occurring in the landscape and the practice 
of planning, which can be a tool used by a power in society for shaping a hegemony and dominance 
inside the landscape. 
This chapter starts by reviewing key theoretical positions on the power relations which have an 
influence on planning theories by focusing on two central questions: what is the suitable theoretical 
approach that could be used to conceptualize the practice of the occupying power in Palestine and 
what is a convenient theoretical framework guiding the analysis of the case study? Reviewing the 
work of intellectuals and philosophers concerning power relations paves the way to understand the 
meaning of the landscape in colonial, conflict, and struggle situations and its relation with power. 
Moreover, it helps realize the influence of a power on landscape narratives and memories that are 
essential to know the landscape's role in occupied lands. The aim of this chapter is not just to highlight 
the practice of power, but also to illustrate the framework in which the practice is articulated. 
Accordingly, this chapter presents the landscape as a process in which spatial differences are formed. 
For this, it will avoid the examining of the concept of landscape as a natural scene we interact with, 
instead examining it as an active force, highlighting its power in expression, conveying meanings, and 
ability of practice.  
2.1 Power and Planning in Theories  
The breakdown of feudal society in the west and the emergence of the idea of the nation-state changed 
the structure of political systems throughout the world, producing a new structure of power relations 
inside societies. The new political and economic realities raise new issues and new frameworks for 
intellectuals and theorists to understand power relations and in particular how they have been 
spatialized. One of a significant issue that has been attracting scholars to investigate is the issue of 
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power relations due to its great importance for providing a comprehensive understanding of the 
concepts of colonization, inequalities, and oppression.  
Investigation the meaning of power in theories forms a base to acquiring a deep understanding of the 
relation between planning theories and power. Planning, in its simplest form as a normative task seeks 
to work as a reform process, aiming to produce environment that satisfies the need of its users and 
provides a healthy circumstances for them (Friedman, 1987). However, the practice and actual realty 
of planning as practice is often far from such ideas and can be corruptive, technical or reformist. The 
negative role of planning is intimately connected with the misuse of power which is clear in the work 
of Nicollò Machiavelli who wrote The Prince, early in 16
th
 century. The Prince answers a central 
question: how can power survive? It is a book detailing methods and tactics to preserve, protect, and 
strengthen the power of the ruling political regime, but at the same time disregards the negative and 
unjust consequences of maintaining that power. 
Some theorists began to address this dilemma by exploring alternatives such as Paul Davidoff (1965) 
and his concern for representation in western states and societies. He argues that planners should play 
a representative role, especially for the powerless groups. In his paper ‘Advocacy and Pluralism in 
Planning’, he emphasizes that planning must be pluralistic to be effective and that in order to achieve 
this pluralism; the urban planner must be a representative (advocator) of groups who lack the 
technical power and knowledge of state. According to Davidoff, advocacy planning is an effective 
process to provide better opportunities for development, especially for poor people: "Pluralism and 
advocacy are means for stimulating consideration of future conditions by all groups in society. But 
there is one social group which at present is particularly in need of the assistance of planners; this 
group includes organizations representing low-income families" (Davidoff, 1965, 334). 
Later, a wide range of planning theories draw on a Habermasian approach have tried to deal with 
power inequalities and exploitation by cooperation with different unequal powers, but not by a 
transformation of power structure. This approach shares their concern in preserving the structure of 
power in societies and making it more effective with the philosophical trend of Weber (1947). 
According to Weber (1947) power can dominate a given group of persons, but at the same time it 
takes a compulsory and imperative form. He thus links the concept of power with the idea of 
authority, and how the legal authority can be established and given a legitimacy of domination, 
focusing on the state as a form of social guidance. Therefore, his approach emphasizes the role 
planning practice in making the power of the state more effective (Friedman, 1987). 
Habermasian analysis of social actions led him to propose communicative action theory. This refers to 
at least two subjects or two actors for establishing interpersonal relations, seeking to reach an 
understanding about their plans of action, in order to build agreement, consensus, and cooperation 
between them. It focuses on building a consensus by open public debate rather than power exercise 
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(Habermas, 1984). This approach stresses that people can ‘make sense together’ despite their differing 
lifestyles (Healey, 2006, 50). 
Habermas inspired planning theorists' such as Forester and Healey in conceptualizing power relations 
and power inequalities. Forester (1989) illustrates that planning is not an utopian process. Planners 
cannot work in an abstract manner or as if in a vacuum because the world is full of conflicting 
interests and inequalities of power. Despite this, according to Forester, the proper role of urban 
planners is to treat all interests and stakeholders equally and to make planning more equitable. He 
emphasizes that planners are not problem solvers, as they are not dealing with machines to which they 
can input data and gain the out-put in a systematic way. They deal with communities full of varieties, 
contradictions, different interests, and different groups with different values. Consequently, planners 
should know and gain skills from which they can identify and understand the position of different 
stakeholders.    
Drawing on Habermasian communicative action theory, Healey (2006) views the most effective 
treatment of dealing with power relation is by collaboration. Healey introduces collaborative planning 
as an instrument to co-existence and as a tool to build understanding and consensus. However, 
Planning is a ‘double-edged weapon’; on one side it can be a progressive and communicative tool, 
while on the other hand it can be a tool for repression, consolidating fragmentation, normalizing and 
legalizing the control and oppression. Planning is inseparable with politics, since planning policies 
and strategies are set by governments. And planning is also part of a political system; governmental 
initiations and ministries are involved in shaping planning policies.   
Thus, political power plays an influential role in shaping the planning system and power relations, 
leading planning to be an executive arm of the state (Yiftachel, 1998). Moreover, when planners work 
in the state institutions, they usually behave as a servant to them, trying to promote the institution's 
interests even if this requires them to be deceptive (Flyvbjerg, 1996). Moreover, the dark side of 
planning which is unavoidable practices in some situations, occurring under the guise of rationality 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998). Based on this point of view, the communicative approach neglects the context in 
which planning is used, instead it focuses extensively on the process of building consensus and 
management of inequalities and differences.  
Thus, it can be said that the communicative approach ignores several points. First, this approach 
neglects the relation between planning and politics; it can often act as an arm of the government and 
as an alternative form of politics, it may be employed to “legalize” the regressive practices of 
occupying power or hegemonic power. In addition, the communicative approach focuses too little on 
the structure of power and its executive role in shaping inequalities.  Finally, it neglects the role of 
occupying power or hegemonic powers, which have an assured role in producing spatial inequalities 
and meanings of domination and foster marginalization and exclusion. (Bond, 2011, 162) criticizes 
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this approach because it preserves the status quo rather than transforming the inequitable power 
relations.   
Consequently, the communicative approach leaves a void in planning theories when a power is not 
progressive but it is an oppressive because this approach simplifies contradictions and struggles to the 
degree of ignorance. Another approach which explores the concept of power is Foucauldian approach. 
Foucault, who was concerned with the concept of power: its mechanism, its practices, and its role in 
society. His approach invites us to contemplate the oppressive practices by a power. He interested in 
how knowledge (that should be constructive) is used negatively in the service of power. Then, the 
misuse of power becomes part of the structure of society, and also becomes acceptable to those whom 
it is practiced upon. The following text written by Foucault shows the importance of examining power 
in contemporary society, namely because of the fact that power has infiltrated all social sectors in 
society, influencing the network of relations and the daily life of people. 
“In feudal society the control of individuals is based on local insertion, on the fact they belong to a 
particular place. Feudal power was exercised over men insofar as they belonged to a manor. Local 
geographic inscription was a means of exercising power. Power was inscribed in men through their 
localization. In contrast the modern society that formed at the beginning of the nineteenth century was 
basically indifferent or relatively indifferent to individual's spatial ties: it was not interested in the 
spatial control of individuals insofar as they belonged to an estate, a locale, but only insofar as it 
needed people to place their time at its disposal. People's time had to be offered to the production 
apparatus; the production apparatus had to be able to use people's living time, their time of existence" 
(Foucault, 2000, 80). 
From that perspective, a power is no longer exercised in relation to location in society, instead 
proliferating until it becomes parts in the cells of society, influencing every aspect of human life. In 
this sense, tools and devices (apparatus or dispositif  in Foucault’s term) are deployed by power to 
sustain the exercise of power (Pløger, 2008, 54). Foucault understands the space as a dispositif
5
 where 
structures are created to serve "the needs of power". From that perspective, the practice of power in 
some contexts should be viewed with suspicion because it may be manipulative and oppressive.  
 
Foucault views knowledge as a mask of an exercise of power, so again it is double edged; it may be 
progressive and it may act as a destructive tool. In the context of occupation knowledge becomes a 
mask of injustice; certain disciplines such as planning turns out to function as oppressive instrument 
that can be used to exercise unfair power and oppress certain groups in society. Yiftachel (1995, 
                                                          
5 Dispositif is defined by Foucault (1980, 194):  “consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions  … . 
Such are the elements of apparatus (dispositif). The apparatus itself is a system of relations that can be established between 
these elements”   
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1998) describes how planning is a useful tool in the hand of a power for exercising social control 
through four dimensions: territorial, procedural, socio-economic, and cultural. 
 
According to Yiftachel, the territorial dimension concerns the use of space by land use, zoning, 
densities, land ownership, demarcation of administrative boundaries, urban expansions, allocation of 
settlements and social facilities. The procedural dimension determines the formation and 
implementation of plans and policies of the government, including statuary aspects that define the 
relation between authority and the public, which influence the public participation and preparation of 
decision making. The socio-economic dimension concerns the impact of planning actions on social 
and economic relations in society. The cultural dimension concerns the impact of planning's actions 
on culture and collective identities of people. 
As noted these dimensions are all double-edged: on one hand, they could achieve improvement, 
progress and prosperity in people's lives, but on the other hand they could be used for control, 
oppression, and exclusion for certain groups of people. The use of these dimensions depend on the 
type of power (if it is occupying power or not) which is the main mobilizer of planning uses (as a tool 
of reform or as a tool of control). 
What is important to note is that some theorists who inspired by Foucauldian approach, also ignore 
the context where the oppression is found. As an example, the work of Yiftachel (2006a) in which he 
describes the native people of Palestine (those who have been occupied) as minorities and he views 
the problem through an ethnic framework by describing the occupying regime as an ‘ethnocratic’ 
regime.  
In reviewing the development of planning theories and planning practice, it is clear that the task of 
planners is not isolated form politics. Therefore, planning is not politically neutral, despite that 
planning is addressed to be “rational”. Moreover, in some contexts, planning practices can be 
understood only in terms of vocabulary of power because it could be used to rationalize oppressive 
policies.   
2.2 Dimensions of Power    
The definition of power in oxford dictionary is "the ability or capacity to do something or act in a 
particular way", or "the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of 
events", or "physical strength and force exerted by something or someone". The mentioned definitions 
highlight two approaches regarding the meaning of power in language. Firstly is the personal power: 
to do something and act effectively. This is clear in the first and the third definition. The second 
definition reveals the ability to influence someone or a group of people.  
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In the field of politics the concept of power means an authority which may be any kind of authority. 
In some cases it is a legitimate authority while on the other it is illegitimate. Michel Foucault, 
however, does not distinguish between them. He analyzes a power as a negative social phenomenon 
"the power is not something that is given, exchanged, or taken back, that is something that is 
exercised and that it exists only is action" (Foucault, 2003, 14). He views power in the manner of 
dominance and having an impact of control. Therefore, in the cases of colonization in which 
oppression and subjection is part of colonial regime this perspective is useful.  
When Foucault analyzed history, he focused on the practice of power on groups in society in order to 
theorize about the practice of power in contemporary society. He views history not from the 
standpoint of politics, but from the standpoint of groups of people on whom torture and exclusion 
were practiced, creating a new trend in philosophical analysis. For example, in his book ‘Madness and 
Civilization’, Foucault describes the evolution of attitudes towards madness from the Middle Ages in 
Europe, detailing how madmen treated by the rest of society. He describes how in the Middle Ages 
madmen were put into a ship called the ‘ship of fools’ and were carried across seas and canals in order 
to signal their exclusion from society. When in Renaissance Period the ‘ship of fools’ no longer 
existed, this form of exclusion practiced on madmen was replaced by the practice of confinement in 
closed spaces called ‘hospitals’, described as the ‘center of confinement’ according to Foucault. The 
point that Foucault wanted to highlight is that although the treatment of the ‘madness’ phenomenon 
may take diverse forms through time, it retains the same meaning: keeping the rules of social 
exclusion and segregation intact. He mentions also the policies of treatment for some diseases in the 
Middle Ages in Europe, such as the leprosy and the plague, that spread in the Sixteenth Century. 
Patients were confined to special spaces with restricted rules.  When the diseases vanished, however, 
they left behind them different social meanings "what doubtless remained longer than leprosy, and 
would persist when the lazar houses had been empty for years, were the values and images attached to 
the figure of the leper as well as the meaning of his exclusion” (Foucault, 1989, 4).  
Foucault explores in his book ‘The Birth of Clinic’ an emergence of a particular perspective 
developed in 18
th
 century towards the discourse of medicine through new modes of relations between 
doctor, physiologist and with patients. It has been developed in such a way that a space of disease 
should be under surveillance (Pløger, 2008, 60). Here this study does not discuss or criticize the 
discipline of medicine which is, of course, is very essential for mankind. But the idea is that in 
particular circumstances, the creation of a certain discipline or a certain framework may be negatively 
influence people. What Foucault tries to highlight is that new spaces can be created or demarcated in 
communities and come under restricted rules different from surrounding such as spatial cantons. The 
re-examination of history by Foucault reveals that demarcation of the space is bound up with 
discipline. Moreover, the types of people within those spaces in some cases are 'made' also by such 
discipline (Murduch, 2006, 35). 
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According to Foucault in his works (2000, 1978), the forms of power in which people live can be 
classified into three types; sovereignty power, disciplinary power, and bio-power. For the purpose of 
this thesis, this section examines the meaning of disciplinary power and bio-power as the following: 
 Disciplinary power 
It is a set of mechanisms and procedures for regulating the behavior of people, including penal and 
surveillance practices on individuals or a group of people. Foucault linked between disciplinary power 
and knowledge, indicating that the knowledge which is produced to serve the disciplinary power 
focuses on the behavior of people in accordance with a rule "A knowledge …, it was about whether an 
individual was behaving as he should, in accordance with the rule or not … it was no longer organized 
in terms of presence and absence, of existence and nonexistence; it was organized around the norm, in 
terms of what was normal or not, correct or not, in terms of what one must do or not" (Foucault, 2000, 
59). Additionally, in that context the knowledge is constituted in a selective form, leading to 
appearance of institutions in which the disciplinary power can be exercised (Foucault, 2003, 182-
183).  
According to Foucault this power forms with its penal and surveillance system a "disciplinary 
society". In the context of occupation, the disciplinary approaches of occupation are mechanisms of 
control infiltrating to daily life of people who are colonized. There are four types of punishment in 
order to make sure that the behavior of people follows the “rules” without breaking them in a 
"disciplinary society" (Foucault, 2000).  
- Punishment by expelling and deporting from the social body. 
- Punishment by exclusion in a place. In other words, it is not deporting from the place, instead 
it is isolation by forming public opinions against individuals or a group of people, practicing 
humiliation and condemnation on them. 
- Punishment by compensation for social damage, forcing a person “who breaks the law” to 
perform useful activities for the society or the state. 
- Punishment by retaliation. 
Foucault (1977) illustrates surveillance practices by referring to the work of Jeremy Bentham, who 
designed a circular prison building called the Panopticon. In its center there is a yard with a tower in 
the middle. In the tower there is a supervisor who can see all the facades of the building through a 
shattered window or small holes. The circular building is divided into cells, and in each cell there is a 
prisoner, with glass facades overlooking the yard in which the observer tower stands. Prisoners inside 
cells can be monitored by an observer while at the same time prisoners cannot communicate with 
neighboring each other because of the presence of a wall surrounding each cell. This situation makes 
prisoners inside these cells feel constantly under control by the observer even when an observer does 
not exist, this control by supervision and surveillance being given the name ‘panopticism’ by 
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Foucault: "in panopticism, the supervision of individuals is carried out not at the level of what one 
does but of what one is, not at the level of what one does but of what might do" (Foucault, 2000, 70). 
The Panopticon is not just a type of a prison used to imprison persons in a jail, but it has a general 
meaning of function, representing the function of a certain type of power in communities.  Panopticon 
does not just have a function of surveillance, but in addition to that it is a kind of laboratory: "it could 
be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to alter behavior, to train or correct individuals" 
(Foucault, 1977, 203). Foucault describes the mechanism of Panopticon as motif for disciplinary 
power and as a perfect mechanism of power exercise because it is exercised continuously by a few 
persons who can exercise power on a larger number of people:  “it makes it possible to perfect the 
exercise of power. It does this in several ways: because it can reduce the number of those who 
exercise …. it is exercised spontaneously and without noise” (ibid, 206).      
 Bio-power  
It is a set of mechanisms and procedures for managing populations. This power is directed to control 
people as species, such as the ratio of birth, the fertility of population. Foucault (2005, 16) defines it 
as "a set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the 
object of a political strategy". According to Pløger (2008) the body of human being had been viewed 
by Foucault as a core of space in which tyranny can be practiced over man kind’s bodies.   
The bio-power does not only concern with the biological features, but also it is linked to a process in 
which human body is treated like a machine with surveillance and control. In order to illustrate the 
mechanism of practicing of bio-power, Foucault investigates the plague regulations current in the 
sixteenth until the seventeenth century, aiming to indicate that this rule is not limited to the past but 
can also obviously be found in contemporary societies. He wrote "these plague regulations involve 
literally imposing a partitioning grid on the regions and town struck by plague, with regulations 
indicating when people can go out, how, at what times, what they must do at home, what type of food 
they must have, prohibiting certain types of contact, requiring them to present themselves to 
inspectors, and to open their homes to inspector" (Foucault, 2005, 24). What happens today is that the 
concept of the plague regulations is extended in contemporary societies and the ‘rules of plague’ have 
become applicable regulations. Moreover, with the passage of time the procedures and the techniques 
practiced by power become a law, and as Foucault (2005, 24) points out many aspects of exclusion 
took place through the legal system (law and regulations). 
The problem of racism (discrimination based on races, hierarchy of races and so no) is well-matched 
with the bio-power. According Foucault (2003, 255) racism “is a way of separating out the groups 
that exist within a population …. this allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to 
be accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into subspecies known, precisely, 
as races".   
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Based on what have been examined, the point is that a power may create frameworks, models and 
structures of orders through disciplinary approaches that aim to frame particular group of people and 
certain actions for the purpose of control. Mitchell (1991) invites us to acknowledge that approach, in 
some cases frameworks appear to order things, but in fact they are ways to exclude, surveil, and 
discipline people. Landscape Planning may be one of those frameworks which is organized around the 
concept of subjection, with the aim of making people disciplined as a power desires.  
It is worth mentioning that despite the existence of different mechanism of power (such as penal, 
surveillance mechanisms), a power in a context of occupation (as it will be clear in the analysis of the 
case study) aims to ensure a well-structured activities and behaviors of occupied people inside 
controlled spaces. The occupying power creates modalities to oppress, exclude, deny and ultimately 
control the occupied.  
What, however, happens to the space, geography, and landscape when a power insists upon 
controlling them, or when it dominates the landscape while at the same time silencing or obliterating 
those who are powerless? The next sections examine this and illustrate the consequences of hegemony 
on the landscape. 
2.3 Landscape, Ideology, and Narratives  
Since the evolution of the concept of landscape in arts and literature, starting from the Renaissance 
and up to the Romanticism (Camporesi, 1992), landscape does not uniquely refer to the aesthetic 
dimension (Cosgrove, 1984), although a common feeling has always brought ‘positive ideas’ about 
landscape such as beauty, harmony, enjoyment and even sublime. Landscape is a material as well as 
cultural artefact; it is a ‘datum’, but it is also a representation; it is a place, but it is also its imagine. 
Landscape is an artificial product, a highly complex social artefact, a mix of aesthetic (arts), nature 
(ecology) and humane labour (economy), in a bijective mapping between urban culture and rural 
activities. This peculiar and highly complex human artefact has ever been produced and maintained in 
a long term dynamic process: this process - in its historical dimension - has ever been made not just of 
(planning or design) transformations, but also (and primarily) of "maintenance" (Sestini, 1947a). 
In more recent years, a wide international literature has developed a more diverse approach to 
landscape. The work of Mitchell (2002), in his book Landscape and Power, which was originally 
published in 1994, shifts the meaning of landscape from an object to a process by which social and 
subjective identities are formed. It gives a different view on the interpretation of landscape, aiming to 
conceptualize a meaning that exceeds its surface. Likewise Swaffield (2002, 233) describes the 
landscape exceeding its physical meaning, considering landscape as a social practice, "dealing with 
the creation, reproduction, and representation of social and cultural experience and meaning". 
 Power, Planning & Landscape      
 
41 
 
Ch.2 
Landscape is like language, which has the ability to express and represent. Ann Whiston Sprin (1998) 
in her book ‘the language of landscape’ argues that landscape has all the features of language. It has 
the characteristic of storytelling, which connects human beings with the place. The term ‘landscape 
narrative’ has become a common term in the contemporary landscape realm. This term refers to both 
the story (what is told) and also to the means of telling (Potteiger, Purinton, 2002, 136). According to 
Potteiger and Purinton (2002) ideologies can play a critical role in creating a narrative of landscape. 
For understanding the narrative quality, Potteiger and Purinton classified the narrative forms and 
practices into three related realms: 
- The story realm 
It discusses the role of designer in creating meaning. The story of a landscape represents a 
period of time which can be accelerated, frozen, and modulated in many ways. 
- The contextual/ inter-textual realm  
It examines the role of the reader, communities or memory in making the landscape 
narratives. The meaning of the story of the landscape shifts from the intentions of the designer 
or author to the role of reader within a particular cultural context. 
- The discourse realm  
It examines the purpose of using the story of the landscape, concentrating on the role of 
ideologies in constructing the narrative of the landscape, because narration helps to establish 
systems of belief and authority.  
Therefore, ideologies can play a role in creating the narrative of the landscape (such as the Zionist 
ideology which has fabricated certain narratives about the landscape of Palestine) (see 4.1). Ann 
Bermingham points out (2002) that the process of constructing a scene in the landscape is not 
ideologically neutral and a scene can function as a symbol for a specific ideology. Some ideologies 
which have the role of hegemony find through landscape a suitable tool to achieve their dominance 
(Baker & Biger, 1992). (Potteiger , Purinton, 2002, 142) wrote, based on the work (Parker, 1992, 20): 
"since narratives help to establish systems of belief and authority they reproduce relations of power in 
a society. Often dominant groups tell their story in the landscape, controlling interpretations as well as 
preventing others from making history". Thus, it is possible to argue that a landscape could be a 
container of ideology, representing the power relations in a space. 
One of the cases where narrative of landscape aims to produce new geography and new culture is the 
narrative about archeological sites when a power tries to spread its own special misrepresented 
interpretation of the landscape. In this sense, archeological sites are exploited in order to “legitimize” 
claims to possess land and developing archeological knowledge which is a key of colonial cultural 
(Abu el-Haj, 2001). In colonized land the terms of landscape features (valleys, mountains, ruins, and 
archeological sites) are controlled and narrated (that is named) by dominant colonial interests who try 
to encapsulate colonial culture in naming landscape terms. For example, Benvenisti (2002) highlights 
 Power, Planning & Landscape      
 
42 
 
Ch.2 
a process of preparing maps by “Israel” for Naqab region. He points out that all features of the 
landscape (mountains, valleys, springs, roads and so on) were given Hebrew names, silencing Arabic 
names that were currently in use.  
2.4 Power and Landscape  
It becomes clear that landscape has some features of the language. The meanings and narratives of a 
landscape are affected by the structure of power relation and wider geo-political conditions. Power 
can shape the landscape and its features, loading the landscape with new meanings and 
representations, through which new frames and domains can be articulated. For that, it can be said that 
the authenticity of the narrative of the landscape becomes under debate in some situations, especially 
in occupied geographies.  
The exercise of power in the field of language was examined by Said in his famous book Orientalism. 
The main concept of his work is that power can be practiced by a body of knowledge that includes 
texts, poets and philosophy. Orientalism illustrates the reasons behind shaping pre-conceived ideas 
about people and geography and demonstrates that structure of ideas created in Europe about 
geographic areas around the world serves colonial purposes, forming ‘imaginary geography’ and 
‘stereotyped ideas’.  
What is significant in this work is that a body of knowledge has the ability to shape practice rather 
than being pure and abstract ideas about a specific geographic area, and also the ability to reframe a 
certain society in terms of negativity. For example, the Zionist narrative about the land and people of 
Palestine at the end of the Nineteenth Century was produced for the purpose of occupation. Another 
example, the narratives and metaphors produced by Elizabethan England concerning the island of 
Ireland was for the aim of conquest. Ireland was seen as virgin territory needs cultivation (Tuathail, 
1996, 3-6). Tuathail (1996) concludes that in some cases the geographical knowledge is not an 
innocent body of knowledge from the desires of colonial powers which tries to function and 
restructure this knowledge to meet its concerns.     
This form of knowledge is produced through a framework defining how it works. Foucault (1981, 
2000) argues that when the power joins with knowledge, they produce a ‘discourse’, shifting the 
linguistic meaning of ‘discourse’ from a set of linguistic facts linked together by syntactic rules to the 
meaning of practice.  
The role of discourse depends on the contexts in which it is deployed, it can be regarded as a reform 
method and in particular cases it may be used as a control method to conceal the truth. The concept of 
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discourse
6
 which has a double-edge role does not only refer to speech but also can be connected to 
other domains such as the landscape transformation. Landscape is changed in some cases to have the 
role of exercise of unfair power. In this sense landscape change is separated from basic reform norms.   
 
Despite that discourse can be used for different two functions (negative and positive) the works of 
Foucault and Said view the discourse as part of an exercise of power. Through discourse, knowledge 
is governed by rules of construction and evaluation, indicating its context and purpose in order to 
become a useful tool of exercising power (Foucault, 2000, xvi). Discourse is constituted by the 
reproduction of knowledge through forms of selection, exclusion, and domination (Young, 1981, cited 
in Hook, 2001). Foucault (1981, 72) emphasizes that "the regular formation of discourse can 
incorporate the procedures of control, in certain conditions and to a certain extent".  It is worth 
mentioning that although the term ‘discourse’ was created for describing a certain sort of text; it is not 
limited to the field of language or literary. It can be found in architecture, urban planning and 
landscape. The discipline of landscape planning also can be a tool of selection, exclusion, and 
domination just as negative discourse mechanism is.  
The discourse concept has a real effect on people; on their imagination, shaping pre-conceived ideas 
about other people and geography. In some contexts, discourse becomes a tool of limitation; as Said 
illustrates “orientalist notions influenced the people who were called orientals as well as those called 
occidental, European, or Western; in short, orientalism is better grasped as a set of constraints upon 
and limitations of thought than it is simply as a positive doctrine" (Said, 1978, 42). The mentioned 
text shows the practice of ‘orientalism’ upon people, uncovering how knowledge consists of texts, 
literature … etc., which seem independent and pure, can play a role of orientation and 
instrumentalities for the exercise of unfair power.  
The colonial discourse theory refers to the analysis of the way in which such discourse veil and hide 
the aims colonization, because a colonial power constructs the knowledge in particular way to serve 
its aims (Ashcroft, Ahluwalia, 1999, 15). While the responses of society who under colonization are 
concerned to produce its own narratives which concerns about “the struggle to control self-
representation, through the appropriation of dominant languages, discourses, and forms of narrative; 
the struggle over representations of place, history, race, and ethnicity; and the struggle to present a 
local reality to a global audience” (ibid, 1999, 15). 
    
The knowledge which is supposed to be constructive may be used as a mask of injustice practices by 
power. Foucault (2000) insists on the inseparable relation between Power and knowledge; where ever 
knowledge exists there is a power behind it. Foucault indicates that "knowledge and power were 
                                                          
6 Discourse is also defined as: “complex of signs and practices that organizes social existence and social reproduction, which 
determines how experiences and identities are categorized” (Ashcroft , Ahluwalia , 1999). 
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exactly reciprocal, correlative … there could not be knowledge without power, and there could not be 
political power without the possession of a certain special knowledge" (Foucault, 2000, 31). By 
Foucault’s definition the relation between power and knowledge is viewed negatively without linking 
this relation with specific contexts.  
The negative sense regarding power and knowledge cannot be generalized in all contexts and 
situations. However, the Foucauldian view of this relation is useful in particular circumstances such as 
the context that this study investigates, since the occupying power develops mechanisms for 
producing knowledge to meet certain purposes: territorial, cultural and socio-economic colonization.  
The analytical work of Foucault about the relation between knowledge and power and the work of 
Edward Said, Orientalism clearly reveal how power can be exercised through knowledge. 
Furthermore, they help to build a concrete understanding of how power can be implemented as a 
practice over others. Similarly, urban planning and  landscape can be  instruments for the exercise of 
unfair power  as Mitchel (2002) indicates that landscape has the ability to exert  power over people, 
even with slight influence. He defined the landscape as a ‘cultural medium’ like a language or 
painting, which plays a great role of communication and expression, emphasizing that the landscape is 
a physical and multisensory medium in which cultural meanings and values are encoded. ‘Culture’ in 
Mitchel's definition is a general term that includes the culture of a nation such as traditions, 
conventions, and nationalism and also includes the culture of domination, control, and imperialism. 
2.5 Landscape and the Exercise of Unfair Power 
There is no doubt that if landscape planning
7
 is used for the aim of development such as protection of 
natural resources and agricultural lands will result in a delightful scene and can also contribute 
intensely to improve the quality of life. While transformation of landscape can produce a harmonious 
scene, it can also produce a meaning of domination, surveillance, silencing and exploitation of all 
kinds, especially in colonized zones where theme of narratives of landscape gain more attention than 
other themes. 
Franz Fanon in his book The Wretched of the Earth describes a colonial space which consists of two 
contradictory spaces; space of settlers (colonizers) and space of colonized people. His description of 
the two spaces shows the way in which knowledge such as planning and architecture is devoted to 
serve settlers in colonized zones.  
“The settlers' town is a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town; the 
streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown and 
hardly thought about. The settler's feet are never visible, except perhaps in the sea; but there you're 
                                                          
7“Landscape planning is defined as an activity concerned with reconciling competing land uses while protecting natural 
processes and significant cultural and natural resources” (Zube, 1986, 367).  
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never close enough to see them. His feet are protected by strong shoes although the streets of his town 
are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler's town is a well-fed town, an easygoing town; 
its belly is always full of good things. The settlers' town is a town of white people, of foreigners”.  
While the native town is described as: 
“The town belonging to the colonized people, or at least the native town, the Negro village, the medina, 
the reservation, is a place of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute. They are born there, it matters 
little where or how; they die there, it matters not where, nor how. It is a world without spaciousness; 
men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a 
hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching 
village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire”. 
In India, during British colonial era, Indians experienced the meaning of domination through city 
spaces. Sen (2010, 205) points out that most of British architecture and urban planning in India since 
the late Eighteenth Century has been created to express the sense of British power upon Indians, 
aiming to control Indians by surveillance. Additionally, surveillance and control played an important 
role in guiding British planners. As a consequence, colonized cities became an expression of a 
domination and surveillance practiced by colonizers. 
Foucault (1977) extended the concept of prison mechanisms (i.e. operational instructions) having 
internal tools of surveillance, repression, and punishment to other functional institutions in society. 
Landscape in some cases resembles the ‘mechanism of operation in prison’ concept, when landscape 
functions as a physical mechanism for controlling people’s time and space. It determines when they 
move and how they move; where they should go and where they should not go, and so on. In this case 
(colonized zones) the meaning of unfair power appears visibly. For example a walk between and 
through the landscape of Palestine clearly reveals to the beholder the impact of occupying power in 
the landscape. No sign is needed to indicate the imposed landscape elements to control and surveil 
people. 
In other cases where economic power is hegemonizing the space, it alters and silences the ‘vernacular 
scene’ by constructing ‘iconic architecture’ such as building skyscrapers, through which many world 
cities have become known. When an economic power alters cities to be the centers of wealth and 
power, the new spaces convey to spectators an ‘impression of authority’ (Lefebvre, 1991, 98). Two 
meanings emerge: the powerful landscape, such as industrial towns and skyscrapers, and powerless 
landscapes, such as slums and shanty towns. Accordingly, it is possible for an economic power to 
impose its view in the landscape, reshaping, weakening, and displacing the vernacular scene. In this 
context landscape reflects the spatiality of capital mode of production, allowing economic power to 
dominate the scene (Zukin, 1993). Moreover, the narrative and representation of the landscape is also 
 Power, Planning & Landscape      
 
46 
 
Ch.2 
linked to the capital accumulate and to support the strategies of capital development (ibid). So, a 
hegemonic power creates ‘discourse’ which aims to reproduce urban environment to serve its desire.  
Thus landscape (either in urban or regional scales) can be a medium to represent oppression and 
exploitation. However, the practice of oppression cannot be achieved without domains in which the 
spatial knowledge such as planning is used as an instrument of power. The exercise of unfair power 
through landscape is not produced randomly and does not work momentarily. On the contrary, a 
power produces set structure of frameworks in which its mechanisms such as disciplinary become 
rules and spatial knowledge such as planning becomes a tool. Together, they articulate the meaning of 
power in landscape. Thereby, the landscape acquires new meanings: domination, surveillance, and 
exploitation and have the function of social control as shown in the following chart.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the context of occupation, frameworks, disciplines and domains are not created to order things, but 
to subjugate those who are occupied and to consolidate territorial control as next chapters will detail. 
The mechanism is made to be convenient to the period of time people live in, assuring a full 
obedience of them with minimum possibility of failure. In this case, the exercise of unfair power 
becomes an everyday practice; because of surveillance ‘panoptic machine’ (as it is clear in the chart) 
is part of system of control.     
This conceptual chart helps to understand the way in which the landscape is reconstructed by spatial 
knowledge which is also connected to the question of law as a technique to “legalize” control of 
society. The law as a new order does not mean that there is fix distinction between outside and inside 
Mechanism of Power 
- Disciplinary  
- Panopticism 
- Punishment 
Spatial technical knowledge  
as instrument of power 
- Planning 
- Geography  
- Architecture  
 
Social Control Landscape Transformation 
-   Domination 
-   Surveillance 
-   Exploitation  
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actions of the law because in the context of occupation as later will be explained law which is 
invented by the occupying power is suspended and deactivated when it is necessary to practice 
subjection and control over people (see  3.4).  
In this way, planning in the context of occupation is not neutral and innocent from oppression as well 
as law. This process influences narratives and memories of the landscape, and consequently the 
following section examines the relation between landscape and memory.  
2.6 The Narrative of the Landscape and Memory   
The struggle over geography extends to the contradiction between two narratives regarding the 
landscape. Because as Said (1993, 7) notes that "just none of us is outside or beyond geography, none 
of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting 
because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and 
imaginings". Therefore, colonial powers try to construct new narratives of the space to justify its 
actions. 
One of the extreme cases that Said conceptualizes about the narratives of space, which is used by a 
power (specifically colonial power) as a mean to create a new identity, is an invention of memories 
which are not authentic (Said, 2002, 245). In this sense, Said (2002) argues that in some cases power 
invent memory of the past as a way of creating a new sense of identity. This means that in some 
circumstances, certain unauthentic memories are encouraged to appear and others which are authentic 
will be silenced. Said called this process a ‘refashioned memory’. According to Said (2002) the role 
of refashioned memory is to give people who belonged to it a coherent identity, a national narrative, 
and a place in the world. 
The field of archeology is one of the cornerstones for producing memories of the place. The 
archeological field is used to generate knowledge, exceeding its academic discipline in order to build 
narrative of a place, and in some cases to legitimize colonization of a land (Abu el-Haj, 2001). For 
example, following the 1967 War and the occupation of “East Jerusalem”, almost immediately after 
the end of the war archaeological excavation began in the old city of Jerusalem, concentrating on 
building biblical narratives regarding Jerusalem (Ibid). Hence, in some particular cases the inventions 
of memories are not created arbitrarily, but rather for the desire of control.  
Therefore, the territorial colonization goes in parallel with different narratives to justify the attempt of 
changing of landscape which change the perceptions that people has about the environment (Piquard, 
2011). That attempt of production of narratives is intensified by occupying powers, because narratives 
of a place have the power of normalizing the exploitation and oppression. Accordingly, what is so 
important to know is narratives can be used to reinforce the regime of an occupying power, making it 
appear as the rightful owner of the territory.  
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2.6.1 Landscape and Urbicide  
Urbicide in language is made up of two words: 'urban' and 'cide'. The epithet '-cide' refers to killing or 
slaughter, while the ‘urban’ derived from the Latin word urbanus that means "characteristics of, 
occurring or taking place, in a city or town". So the meaning of urbicide linguistically means 'killing 
the urban' (Coward, 2004, 165).  
This term describes the deliberate destruction that a city faces in a time of occupation, crisis, and 
wars. Through history in the time of wars, urbicide occurred against cities. Through history cities 
were protected by walls and the war happened around them. However, recently since the development 
of military technology, human being acquires high ability to destroy cities. This was visible in the 
Second World War when the Japan's two cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed and destroyed.  
Stephen Graham describes the practice of urbicide, reveling the history of urban destruction by 
writing: "strategies of deliberately attacking the systems and places that support civilian urban life has 
only become more sophisticated since the mass, total, urban annihilation that characterized the 
twentieth century" (Graham, 2004).  
Generally, the physical destruction of cities and urban annihilation are accompanied with ethnic 
cleansing, population transfer and expulsion. Martin Shaw connects the concept of urbicide with the 
concept of genocide and politicide, emphasizing the difficulty of separation between these concepts, 
concluding the difficulty of separation between the destruction of urban fabric with the destruction of 
social relationship. He wrote "urbicide was part of the war that also involved genocide" (Shaw, 2004, 
148).  The destruction of the indigenous architecture and places of memory can be considered as an 
early signs of ethnic cleansing (Piquard, 2011).  And also the destruction of indigenous architecture 
alters the indigenous landscape in which re-invention and re-making of new landscape can be found, 
leading to abolishing the indigenous history and landscape.   
2.7 Conclusion  
In planning theories, it can be seen that there are two main trends in the analysis of the power 
relations which affect the planning approach. The first one is the Habermasian approach, concerning 
the communicative theory and consensus building. The second one is the Foucauldian approach, 
concerning the practice of power which has been integrated into all parts of society, constructing 
disciplinary rules for people to determine their attitudes, modes, and behaviors in everyday life.  
The Foucauldian approach to theorizing the mechanisms of power and its role in producing and 
manipulating knowledge will be helpful partially in the analysis of a case-study (Qalqiliya district). 
This district is divided between zones A, B, C after “Oslo”, and its landscape has been highly 
changed. Moreover, the construction of the apartheid wall isolates Palestinian people and 
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communities from their lands. It functions as a disciplinary power of occupation, determining who 
may reach his/her land, how he/she can use lands, when and for how long can stay in lands. 
This chapter clearly reveals the potent ability of planning used by a power for landscape 
transformation, transforming landscape from a medium of development to a medium of control. It 
shows also that the landscape is not a fixed environment but it is a dynamic medium in which various 
cultural and political practices can be articulated, transmitting signs, holding narratives and memories. 
However, these signs depend on the system of power that produces the landscape.  
The exercise of unfair power is a process which does not occur arbitrarily, but it is an organized 
process created by the fabrication of new system of law, and new morphology of landscape, through 
which meanings of exclusion, domination, and surveillance are consolidated. Moreover, colonial 
powers can reshape and articulate landscape for the desire of conquest to consolidate their political 
leverage in the space.  
The transformation of landscape meaning is highly pertinent in colonized geography, where landscape 
becomes a medium of power exercise. Through landscape transformation, an occupying power could 
silence and degrade certain memories and narratives in order to invent and fabricate new memories of 
the landscape, deviating far from the authenticity of the place.  
Investigating the relations between power, planning, and landscape forms the basis for the 
examination of the consequences of these relations upon geography and people. The main 
consequence according to the researcher's observation is the creation of spaces where exclusion, 
domination, and control exist. As shown in this chapter, planning can incorporate the meaning of 
control through four dimensions: the territorial, procedural, socio-economical, and cultural 
dimensions, leading to landscape transformation and the production of spaces of exception.  
Accordingly, this chapter paves the way for the researcher to examine and crystalize the concept of 
space of exception, which will be investigated in depth; its relations with law, and practice of power, 
and social dimension in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Power, Space & Space of Exception  
__________________________________________________ 
 
The previous chapter has demonstrated the connection between geography and power and that 
attitude to landscape depend on the kind of a power that controls a land. Following this debate, this 
chapter will seek to make an understanding of the relation between power and space in many and 
different contexts where the space becomes domain of control, subjection and exclusion.   
The chapter is divided into three parts; the first illustrates the meaning of ‘space’ and its relation with 
variables involved in its production, shaping its morphology and meanings. This part goes beyond a 
shallow understanding of space as physical/material structure, giving another view (mainly based on 
Lefebvre’s theory of the production of the space) to understand its components and their relations 
together. Then, this part focuses on the meaning of fragmentation which is considered one of the main 
consequences of the territorial colonization and control of a hegemonic power.  
The second part examines the meaning of space of exception and what it means, how it is produced 
and for what purposes? Accordingly, this part delves into the meaning of the concept of exception, 
based on the work of Agamben and Carl Schmitt, extending the discussion of exception from politics 
to a spatial domain. In this thesis, interpretation of the meaning of the space in the context of 
occupation depends on the analysis of the meaning of exception. Since the transformation and change 
of the landscape in Palestine is occurred in the name of the law which is invented by the occupying 
power “Israel”. The concept of exception and its relation with the manipulation of landscape will be 
discussed in chapter 6, in order to suggest a model to understand the transformation of landscape in 
the context of occupation.  
The third part concerns with the mode of thinking that influenced by the analysis of spatiality. In other 
words, this part explains theoretical trends that gained high concern in planning theories to deal with 
negative themes that exist in the space such as oppression and hegemony. These trends such as the 
right of the city aim to build environment free from control, fragmentation, and oppression. However, 
this study will highlight these concepts just to explain the gap between theory and real spaces in the 
case study, because these concepts do not help in offering spatial alternatives.  
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3.1 Theorizing the Meaning of the Space according to Lefebvre’s Theory   
Decades ago, space was commonly understood as a geometrical meaning (Lefebvre, 1991, 1). 
Therefore, spatiality had been neglected as an important pillar in western critical social studies (Soja, 
1989, 15).  Until the mid of 20
th
 century, spatially was not a debated concept in western philosophy as 
an important approach to interpret the human behavior (Soja, 1996, 71). According to Soja (1989, 15) 
this approach had been peripheralizing the spatial perspective, and made an annihilation of space in 
critical social thought, therefore Soja (1996) emphasizes on spatiality as an ontological knowledge 
which is important to be examined. A clear awareness of spatiality appeared in the work of Lefebvre, 
especially in his book the production of the space which is originally published in 1978, asserting the 
relation of spatiality with human ideologies. He explained that the space is not a thing but rather it is a 
set of relations between things and the real space is a social space, since any space contains social 
relationships and it is developed by human being (Lefebvre, 1991, 83). He illustrates the meaning of 
spatiality and gives an understanding of what spatiality means by suggesting a model that consists of 
three pillars, spatial practice (perceived space), representation of space (conceived space), and 
representational space (lived space).  Lefebvre (1991, 46) emphasizes that the following three pillars 
of the model contribute in different ways to the production of space. In other words, they are 
intertwined together, influencing the reproduction and production of spaces. 
1- Spatial practice (perceived space) 
Spatial practice is considered as a medium and as an outcome of human activity, behavior, and 
experience (Soja, 1996, 66). It is the materiality of the space; the relative location of things and 
activities, site; in patterns of distribution, designs, and the differentiation of a multitude of 
materialized phenomena across spaces and places … It is empirical space which surrounds our bodies 
and shapes our “action space” in households, buildings, villages, cities, regions. … It is socially space 
which come as a result of the society” (Soja, 1996, 66, 75).  Clearly ‘perceived space’ is not just the 
physical aspect of the space (urban reality), but it the production and reproduction of space, which is 
produced by complex interactions between people while they are performing their daily routines. 
Lefebvre (1991, 38) describes it as "it embodies a close association, within perceived space, between 
daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set 
aside for work, 'private' life and leisure". 
2- Representations of space (conceived space) 
It is "conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and 
social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent – all of whom identify what is lived 
and what is perceived with what is conceived" (Lefebvre, 1991, 38). It is a mental space that is 
imagined about a neighbourhood, and a city …. etc.  
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Lefebvre (1991, 50) points out that the representation of space is affected by both knowledge and 
power, leaving a narrow influence to representational space (lived space). Thus, conceived space is 
tied to the relation of the production through a certain order which is controlled by knowledge, signs, 
and codes (Soja, 1996, 67). Accordingly, the power can reproduce the representation of space to plant 
its dominance and hegemony by using ‘systems of verbal’ as Lefebvre (1991, 39) points out that 
“conceptions of space tend … towards a system of verbal”. “System of verbal”, of course, is related to 
the written and spoken word (language, discourse, texts, logos and so on) (Soja, 1996, 67), and also 
this system touches very significantly the ability and the way in which a power can implant control 
upon the space.  
What is important to say is that a hegemonic power is able to make its narrative a dominant one while 
silencing other stories and memories. And it may impose its desired image on the representation of 
place and make a conceived space as a dominant space, controlling both spatial practices and the lived 
space of representation (Soja, 1996, 80). Accordingly, a power can reproduce the representation of 
space to plant its dominance and hegemony. However, in the context of occupation, the occupying 
power fabricates stories and narratives that are not authentic, while abolishing indigenous narratives 
(Said, 2002, 245).       
A hegemonic power seeks to create a mental image (i.e. imagined geography) about the space that 
represents its desire. Then the way of producing a new order of space that is highly related to the 
desire of hegemonic power, does not necessary go smoothly as a hegemonic power wants. Because as 
one may understand from the theory of Lefebvre about the space that the image of inhabitant 
contradicts with the image of hegemonic power. Therefore, the space may contain a struggle between 
two images.  
3- Representational space (lived space)  
It is the space of inhabitants where the imagination of people seeks to change. Lefebvre (1991) 
described the representational spaces as "space as directly lived through its associated images and 
symbols, and hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users', … space which imagination seeks to change 
and appropriate". Live spaces are “the terrain for the generation of ‘counterspaces’, spaces of 
resistance to the dominant order arising precisely from their subordinate, peripheral or marginalized 
positioning”. Lived space (‘Thirdspace’ in Soja’s terminology) encompasses the three spaces 
(perceived, conceived, and lived) tending to transform all them simultaneously. For Soja it is “the 
space of radical openness, and the space of social struggle” (Soja, 1996, 68).  
‘Thirdspace’ is a way of thinking concerning space. Soja was inspired by Lefebvre and consequently 
developed the concept of ‘Thirdspace’ which addresses a new domain to think about peripheralized 
and marginalized spatial subjects (Soja, 1996, 68). It is a way of understanding the spatiality of human 
life (ibid, 10).  
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3.2 Space and Power 
 
Understanding the relation between power and space explains the reason behind the spatial 
differences or inequalities in cities and regions. Lefebvre (1991) developed a framework to understand 
the space, through which space may not be understood as a physical space which is a shallow 
understanding of what space is.  
 
It is important to note that the space is not free from politics and ideologies and that is emphasized by 
Soja (2010, 19) who wrote: “space is always filled with politics, ideology, and other forces shaping 
our lives and challenging us to engage in struggles over geography".  The space is also considered by 
Foucault as a domain for configuration of knowledge, affecting the human behavior, and leading to 
form specific social and institutional order (Pløger, 2008, 61). This unbounded relation between 
power and space makes the space or the spatiality strongly engaged in the contexts of occupation, 
conflict and struggle.     
 
Due to the ability of space to sustain and represents ideologies, the struggles over geography are not 
just about the way to capture it, but they are also about ideas regarding the geography, and about 
underlying narratives as Said (1993) insists that "just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, 
none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex because it is 
not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings" 
(Said, 1993, 7).  The struggle over the geography leads to struggle between images about the way 
space should be structured.   
Furthermore, space does not only reflect political ideologies but it also can be a device for control. As 
it has been explained in chapter two, the disciplines of planning, architecture, geography may be used 
as a desire of power, employing the space to practice social control. These disciplines have a potent 
role in shaping the space according to the desire of a power because architects are not free from 
external forces.  
In this sense, as explained by (Teyssot, 1998) architecture can be considered as a ‘text’ and the 
fundamental aspects of the discourse about architecture, is logical and semantic. So one cannot ignore 
the analysis of semiotic
8
 forms centering around architecture or space. In the context of occupation as 
this thesis argues the space becomes a sphere in which the representation and symbols of domination, 
                                                          
8 Semiotic is derived from the Greek word semeion which refers to the “study of signs” or such as metaphor (def. by 
wikipedia). In architecture this study can identify signs that might represent the message of a certain work, employing it as a 
tool to interpret the expression of architectural forms (Ramzy, 2013).  
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tyranny, subjection, and oppression do exit. In other words, what the occupying power uses to control 
people efficiently and continuously are methods, strategies, and disciplines.  
Lefebvre (1991, 77) distinguishes between the meaning of social space which according to him 
contains a great diversity of knowledge and the meaning of space when is used as a device or a mean 
of control.  The case in which the space is deployed to play the role of control is called by Lefebvre an 
‘abstract space’. According to Lefebvre (1991, 26) the abstract space is a device of domination and 
control. In the ‘abstract space’ users of the space, their presence, and their experience are silenced 
(Lefebvre, 1991, 51).  
Harvey (2001) illustrates that economic power in the capitalist regime tends toward hegemony 
through creating an appropriate physical infrastructure for preserving and increasing its profit such as 
building industrial plants, transportation network, and restructuring workers accommodation. 
According to that, under capitalism regime cities and regions structures are influenced by the 
capitalism principles such as the free market. In this sense, structure of cities tends towards 
segmentation and fragmentation of the space (Lefebvre, 1991, 93). Lefebvre (1991) uncovers the 
negative effects of capitalism upon the space, insisting on its role in fixing homogenization and 
fragmentation; thereby as he argues an abstract space is produced, "capitalism and neo-capitalism 
have produced abstract space, which includes 'the world of commodities', its logic and its worldwide 
strategies, as well as the power of money" (Lefebvre, 1991, 53).   
The work of Foucault extensively concerned about the relationship between power and knowledge, 
and did not examine a detailed and comprehensive relation between power and space as Lefebvre did, 
nevertheless in the article titled ‘the otherness space’ Foucault raised the subject of space. In addition 
to that in the interview with him in March 1982 he explained that the space is not just essential for the 
communal life, but it is where the exercise of power occurs. “Yes. Space is fundamental in any form 
of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power. To make a parenthetical remark, I 
recall having been invited, in 1966, by a group of architects to do a study of space, of something that I 
called at that time ‘heterotopias’, those singular spaces to be found in some given social spaces whose 
functions are different or even the opposite of others". Foucault (1984) conceptualized the term 
‘Heterotopia’ for describing the space of otherness by writing an article the otherness space. In this 
article Foucault discusses the way in which some spaces had been organized and the order of them 
had been interrupted similar to a sentence or paragraph without syntax.   
Heterotopia can be a conceptual notion in the epistemological domain that represents out of order and 
anomalous. In other words, the way of the heterotopic space functions are different and opposite from 
the way of other spaces function. This analytical approach of the classification of places reveals that 
the space is a medium through which hegemony and fragmentation may be represented. According to 
Foucault (1984) ‘Heterotopias’ is a space where norms are disappeared and suspended.  
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The spatial fragmentation in theories is linked with power relations as many intellectuals and scholars 
linked between the unequal division of space in a contemporary city (such as the division between 
core and peripheries) and the capitalism. Writing on the relation between space and capitalism, 
unveils the negative and blatant role played by this system on changing frameworks and perspectives 
through which the space and geography is produced and reproduced. The point which will be 
explored in next section is that the establishment of domains in which fragmentation occurs is rooted 
in the capitalist system. Understanding that link unveils how a certain system influence the spatial 
structure of urban environment.   This understanding in turn led to a concern on the role of a certain 
system in maintaining conditions in which unfair control over people is sustained. As this thesis 
examines how the system of occupation reframes knowledge to operate in the interest of colonizers 
and to maintain full control of the daily life of colonised people.  Therefore, a central issue in this 
chapter is that some systems are concerned with shaping spatial fragmentation, however 
fragmentation have never been produced at the same level of oppression and torture as in the context 
of occupation.      
3.2.1 The Production of Space and Capitalism    
Many countries around the world have been connected to capitalist economic system which is seen as 
a system that builds and maintains disciplines, models and frameworks for the desire of its dominancy 
and hegemony. Harvey (1978, 124) points out that under capitalism, there are enduring tendencies to 
build a physical landscape fitting to capital own condition. So, physical environments are reproduced 
to be appropriate for the capital production, circulation, exchange and consumption (Harvey, 1978, 
113). Harvey wrote: "capital represents itself in the form of a physical landscape created in its own 
image, created as use values to enhance the progressive accumulation of capital" (ibid, 124). Thereby, 
capitalist development has been caused a huge transformation of the traditional city as a response of 
over accumulating capital and no matter of consequences whether socially, environmentally, and 
politically (Harvey, 2012, xv).  
Harvey (1978) presents the relation between the capitalism and urban process, highlighting the role of 
capital mode of production with production of the space, unveiling also its role in division of the city 
based on “class” considerations. Capital accumulation and social conflict are the main issues related 
to capitalism that Harvey focuses on as main themes influences urban process. The capitalist society 
is founded on the concept of accumulation for accumulation sake, and production for production sake 
(Harvey, 1978, Wallerstein, 1978). 
Capitalism seeks to increase the production on one hand, and increases the consumption on the other 
hand. For this purpose, structure of city, built environment, and disciplines, and domains are created 
to serve both purposes whether to serve the production or consumption. Regarding the production, 
there is a ‘built environment for production’ which means “a physical framework for production" and 
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regarding the consumption, there is a "built environment for consumption" which means "a physical 
framework for consumption" (Harvey, 1978, 106). Consequently, the accumulation of capital has 
influenced reconfiguration of cities and their transformation towards making an ultimate profit as 
Harvey (2000, 121) described the way that capitalism system participates in transforming cities by 
noting:   
"It has likewise led to a restless search for new product lines, new technologies, new lifestyles, new 
ways to move around, new places to colonize – an infinite variety of stratagems that reflect a boundless 
human ingenuity for coming up with new ways to make a profit". 
 
Furthermore, capitalism influences the spatiality in multiple scales as Soja (1989, 34) points out "at 
every scale of life, from global to the local, the spatial organization of society was being restructured 
to meet the urgent demands of capitalism in crisis – to open up new opportunities for super- profits, to 
find new ways to maintain social control, to stimulate increased production and consumption".  
3.3 Fragmentation of Contemporary Cities in Theory  
The concept of fragmentation in the Western theories is linked mainly into three main issues; firstly 
the issue of economic disparities as a result of capitalism; a wide range of literature insist that with the 
transformation Fordist to post-Fordfist leads to the flourishing of gated communities. Secondly, the 
issue of ethnic conflict participates in division of cities. Thirdly, as a result of the globalization which 
facilitates the mobility of capital, however there is uneven spatial development in cities. Nevertheless, 
as I will explain later in details, the fragmentation is also the result of colonial territorial policies. It is 
important to note that fragmentation in different contexts is different of level of repression, because 
each context belongs to different cultural and political conditions.   
Much of world’s urban fragmentation can be located within the four mentioned framework 
(capitalism, ethnic conflict, globalization, and occupation). However, it is important to make a 
differentiation about the type of fragmentation, because each type has its special features and 
characteristics. Given that fact, how are these types to be understood? The following paragraphs 
examine the concept of fragmentation in cities.        
 Fragmentation and Capitalism  
The shift from an industrial (Fordist) to a post-industrial (post-Fordist) has caused an enormous 
influence on socio-economic issues as well as spatial structure of cities. The industrial Fordist regime 
-which dates back to 1920s
-
 depended on Tayloristic techniques of production (the assembly line). In 
addition, it was combined with mass production, mass consumption, the replacement of local cultures 
with commodified lifestyle, and welfare state (Rossi & Vanolo, 2012, 30). This regime had led to 
produce a spatial form to serve both (mass production and consumption) in cities as well as regions, 
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and caused unprecedented spatial transformation; factories were constructed around cities, 
urbanization was taking place, large cities exploded, and satellite cities began to emerge around large 
cities.   
Through production and reproduction of spaces in the Fordist city, general improvements in the living 
conditions had taken place in Western countries and the image of industrial city has been associated 
with positive ideas of prosperity. And despite that some social tensions had happened around some 
spatial issues, the image of Fordist city was linked to the concept of progress and prosperity (ibid, 31).  
As mentioned above, during Fordism, unprecedented growth of economy scale and agglomeration 
were taken place. During the 1970s, however, the production was no longer increasing, and 
consequently the economic growth was weak (i.e. Fordism resulted in an economic crisis). Moreover, 
a stagflation as a result of the crisis reduced the mass consumption which was related to welfare state 
(Soja, 2000, 171-172).  
Due to the crisis of Fordism regime in 1970s, a new regime raised (post- Fordism). Fordism principles 
no longer worked to the enhancement of economy. So the old-style of mass assembly line was shifted 
to a new style characterized by a flexible accumulation
9
, welfare-state interventions policies were 
diminished, privatization policies were adopted, new technologies appeared (Harvey, 2001, 123). The 
transformation had resulted in declining of industrial activities and the increase in services 
employment. Thereby, it caused a loss of many jobs due to the transferring industrial factories outside 
previous manufacturing centers to take advantage of cheaper land and labor.   
The sort of growth related to post- Fordism principles promoted uneven development; some regions in 
a same country developed because of good business climates and governmental investment while 
other regions suffered from obsolete industrial structure (Fainstein & Campbell, 2011, 9). Despite that 
many regions and cities have been developed in terms of economic situation fragmentation of space is 
obvious in many contemporary and global cities; some locations suffer from negligence and 
marginalization while others are well developed in terms of infrastructure and services. 
The transformation from Fordist mass production to post-Fordist flexible production has increased 
inequalities between “different social groups” and increased spatial division in cities. This 
transformation consolidates fragmentation of contemporary cities in which there are many separate 
areas of concentration of different people all desiring to stay apart from all others (Marcuse, 2003, 
168-169). Therefore, in many cities across the world, no sign is needed to distinguish between poor 
areas characterized by undeveloped urban environment and rich areas characterized by a well-
developed urban environment. Additionally, many poor areas in European countries are inhabited by 
                                                          
9 Flexible accumulation means a very high mobility of capital from sector to sector and place to place (Fainstein & 
Campbell, 2011, 7).  
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minorities, and other parts -especially where rich people live or where business areas are located- are 
secured by fences and permission is needed to go in (they are called gated communities).  
Concentration of power and wealth in a few hands and economic opportunities in a few locations of 
cities and regions increases inequalities and divisions. Therefore, many parts of cities have been a 
product of elite groups who have power while other parts are inhabited by those who lack the power 
and wealth. For example, Mike Davis (1990) examines the transformation of Los Angeles in the 
period of Twentieth Century, unveiling the forces that have influenced the spatial structure of the city 
such as social stratification. As a result the city has been changed to classist and racist meanings. He 
narrates the complex historical evolution of the city, focusing on the way in which the capitalist 
system, with all its influences, produced a tattered landscape.  
 Fragmentation and conflict10  
Fragmentation in the context of ethnic conflict can be considered spatial expression of a conflict, 
because the city structure is highly influenced by an ethnic conflict. Around the world there are many 
evidences that reflect the sectarian conflict on the physical environment. The city of Belfast in 
Northern Ireland is one of those cases where ethnic conflict between Catholic and Protestant is 
manifested in the fragmentation of the city. It contains ethnic lines or boundaries in thirteen localities 
where there are walls and physical barriers used to separate catholic from protestant communities (fig. 
3.1). 
Nowadays, Belfast city is a divided city: 98% of public housing is segregated along ethnic lines. 
Neighborhoods are divided by walls. On either side of the walls communities live, who have long 
been segregated in religion, culture, and tradition. Catholics became even more concentrated in 
overcrowded enclaves within the city. Protestants were more concentrated in the new suburbs and 
outline growth centers.   
The escalation of sectarian violence increases during marches organized by Protestant in 12
th
 of July. 
According to Protestants groups the marches are organized to commemorate the Battle of the Boyne 
fought in 1690. Marchers pass through or near Catholic enclaves in Belfast whereas Catholics see the 
marches as a symbol of domination. The violence, partition, and discrimination indicate the level of 
partition in Belfast community. Despite the political reconciliation between parties, faith in urban 
barricades remains firm. Petitions for new walls, or the extension of old ones, are regularly delivered 
to Members of Parliament (Calame, Charlesworth, 2002, 162). In addition to that, new housing 
developments and streets on either side were designed to avoid direct contact (Morrow, 2011). 
                                                          
10  It is important to note that the case of Palestine is not an ethnic conflict, despite that some international writers try to put it 
in that framework. But Palestine is occupied land since 1917; therefore the context of Palestine is context of occupation as 
this thesis explains in details.  
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The physical division reveals the division of cultures; most of those living in Protestant communities 
describes themselves as British, and similarly Catholics call themselves Irish (Murtagh, 2002, 51).  
The division is not just found in housing sector but it also extends into public sectors. Alexander Park 
in north Belfast is also divided between the two ethnic groups. There is a wall that divides the park 
into two parts by a sheet metal fence. The barrier which was erected in 1994 is 120 meters long and 
3.5 meters high (fig. 3.2). So, the ethnic division affects nearly every aspect of residential life, 
schooling and the use of services. Segregation is breaking down but primarily in “middle class 
districts” to the south of the city whilst segregation and interfacing has intensified in poorer 
neighborhoods in the north, west and inner-east.     
Another example about the fragmentation due to racial segregation was found in cities in the South 
Africa during the apartheid era (1948-1994). Buffer zones (about 100 m wide) were planned to 
separate white and non-white people.  The cities were constructed and reconstructed under apartheid 
system, for the purpose of minimizing social contact between black and whites.  Planning was used as 
a tool for the aim of apartheid separation between white and black and also to produce and reproduce 
residential segregation (Murtagh, 2002, 153).     
Fig. 3.1: The barrier with a gate that separates both communities (Catholic & Protestant). Source: Halawani, July, 2014 
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Fig. 3.2: The wall divides Alexander Park into two parts. Source: Halawani, July, 2014 
 Fragmentation and occupation   
In the context of occupation, cities are not fragmented because of internal reasons but because of 
external forces acting to weaken indigenous morphology of cities. Unlike other fragmentation 
situations as mentioned which are usually internal conflict whether between ethnicities or between 
economic power and other actors in community. The fragmentation in the context of occupation is 
one of repressive strategies of colonial power to weaken and humiliate the colonised people, and to 
control daily life of people, leaving them behind poverty and disorder. Moreover, there is tendency to 
impose colonial culture onto the colonised people. And that is clear in narratives of colonizers about 
land and people. And then deliberately, new frameworks of knowledge may appear to normalize the 
context of occupation and describing the colonised as minorities or the problem of occupation as a 
civil war
11
.   
 
                                                          
11  Describing those who colonized as minorities  were used by Calame and Charlesworth in the book Divided Cities  
Power, Space & Space of Exception       
 
  62 
 
Ch.3  
3.3.1 Globalization and Fragmentation of Cities’ Structure  
After the crisis of Fordism, questions of restructuring the socio-economic system in Western countries 
became urgent to deal with the crisis. Consequently, the regulations of the welfare state had been 
dismantled as it has been mentioned. In other words, educational and health care services had reduced 
as well as the supply of social housing (Rossi, Vanolo, 2002, 88-89).  The reason of restructuring the 
system was theoretically interpreted by Harvey (1989) who theorized this change by arguing that 
urban governance transformed from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. The concept of 
managerialism regards the power of society embodied in social, economic, and political units and not 
in individuals (Enteman, 1993, 157). Thereby, urban governance (based on managerialism concept) 
had a significant role in provision of services which benefits urban population (Harvey, 1989). And 
clearly, through this approach policies had focused on provision of social welfare services to citizens.  
 
However, during 1970s and 1980s reorientation of urban governance had taken place in Western 
capital cities toward entrepreneurialism, which was strongly associated with an orientation towards 
the private-sector. Consequently, this orientation facilitated a partnership between both sectors (public 
and private) and enhanced a competitive position of cities (in Harvey’s terminology inter-urban 
competition). Accordingly, local governments tried to initiate economic growth by investments to 
attract consumers in order to make the city an attractive place. What is important is that this policy 
deploys the power of local government to attract external investments (ibid,) and thus public-private 
partnerships connect local economies to global framework and provides a platform for cities to 
compete in the global context.   
 
The transformation from managerial approach to entrepreneurialization of urban governance was 
connected with the model of neo-liberalism, which was responding to the market problems and the 
economic crisis that hit capitalist cities in 1970s. Neo-liberalism promotes the free market, 
individualization, and deregulation principles. These principles which are considered part of 
Capitalism principles dominate the global economic atmosphere and relations. Today, Neo-liberalism 
principles dominate the policy of the global institutions such as the World Bank which imposes these 
policies on many developing countries around the world.    
Neoliberalism principles which are accompanied with the atmosphere of globalization become the 
way to globalizing the principles of capitalism (global capitalism). In this sense, the local or national 
economies are integrated to the global economies and the power of capitalist institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund increases. Clearly, the global economic-juridical system was 
restructured, facilitating the flow of capital from region to another. Thereby, corporations, banks, and 
individual investors can move freely across national borders (Peck, Theodore, Brenner, 2012).  
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The global cities are of great importance to capitalist system in which the neo-liberal market
12
 rules 
facilitate the movement of capital beyond borders. Under the logic of neo-liberalism, many global 
cities have been shaped to become a fertile land to attracting external investors. What is obvious is 
that most of strategies of urban intervention in most of globalizing cities concern to develop iconic 
architecture (Sklair, 2005).  Although many global cities around the world have witnessed 
unprecedented economic growth, they have faced spatial problems such as proliferation of urban poor 
areas that inhabited by marginalized social groups (particularly migrants and the ethnic minorities). 
As Rossi & Vanolo (2012, 89) points out that in large cities, which influenced by neo-liberal 
principles, there is the problem of weak groups such migrants. Another clear point about inequity is 
the huge gap between rich and poor which is still widening (Sklair, 2002, 48).  
Oxfam reports in (January, 2014) that “85 richest people as wealthy as poorest half of the world … 
they share a combined wealth as much as the poorest 3.5 billion of the world's population” (the 
guardian, January, 20, 2014). This problem is the result of capitalism principle which includes (neo-
liberalism principles). This gap has been reflected on spatial structure of cities; there are iconic 
architectural projects beside slums and urban poor areas. In addition to that as Harvey (2003, 940)  
points out that the gap between poor and rich promotes uneven geography in cities, thereby cities 
become more ghettoized as rich people see themselves off for protection while poor people become 
ghettoized by default.   
 
Mike Davies (2006) points out in his book Planet of Slum that the neoliberal capitalism policy 
participates in generating urban slums. He provided some statists based on UN report and case studies 
around the world about the problems of slums, homeless, squat (i.e. living in a space without legal 
claim), in order to clarify how big the problem of slum really is around the world. For example, he 
mentioned that UN researchers estimate that there were at least 921 million slum-dwellers in 2001 and 
more than one billion in 2005 (ibid, 23).  
 
As mentioned, the transmission of neoliberal accumulation has influenced the urban morphology of 
cities, causing radical changes of their structures. And consequently, many global cities have become 
a representation of hegemonic economic power. On one hand global cities become an arena for free 
market, flow of capital and information as explained, but from the other hand, they are places where 
marginalization, exclusion, and vanishing of indigenous identity occur. “The process of globalization 
is typically market by features of unevenness and imbalance: regions across the world unevenly take 
advantage of, or conversely are threatened by, globalization” (Rossi, Vanalo, 2011, 9).  
                                                          
12  Neoliberal principle is an extension of the traditional liberal philosophy, which argues that market should be free from 
formal obligations of government. It assumes that according to this theory, the optimum performance of economic growth is 
achieved when a state have a very limited economic role.   
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Globalization plays a role in urban arenas; leading to scattered and fragmented spaces. In this sense 
globalization is a framework deployed by a hegemonic power for its desires. Consequently, this 
understanding gives us access to ways of seeing fragmentation as a result of certain system and not as 
a result of misuse of tools and methods. In the context of occupation, however, the fragmentation is a 
result of colonial system and also it is a tool of control and subjugation of those who are occupied. 
According to Palestino (2011) one of main reasons in facilitating the fragmentation of spaces is 
practicing the social control by power which creates ghettos in which powerless groups live in, in 
order to practice discriminative rules that are not authorized to other spaces.   
3.4 The ‘State of Exception’ Theory, Power, and Hegemony  
When a country is occupied, the occupying power invents new laws which are totally different from 
previous laws in order to secure its full control on both land and people.  In the case of occupied 
Palestine, however, the previous laws were not abolished. They were manipulated. The work of 
Agamben in the State of Exception is helpful to conceptualize these actions of power. The state of 
exception answers a central question: how can a power manipulate a juridical system to be itself the 
law? Agamben (2005) reveals the way in which a power can move craftily to state of exception by 
circumventing and suspending laws. What makes Agamben tries to conceptualize the concept of 
exception is the point that the same power that suspends a law produces it again. He argues that when 
a power faces a crisis, it suspends laws and seeks to put in place another law. Under this atmosphere a 
power seeks to deploy the mentioned ambiguous condition for its desire of control.  
The work of German philosopher Carl Schmitt influenced Agamben work about theorizing the state 
of exception. Carl Schmitt wrote the book ‘Political Theology’ (originally published in 1922).  
Political Theology is about the kind of the political authority that had been developed in the West.  
 
Schmitt clarifies that the exception is different from anarchy and chaos although the context of 
exception is produced by the suspension of the entire legal order. According to Agamben (1998,19) 
chaos is necessary to produce the context of exception “chaos must first be included in the juridical 
order through the creation of a zone of indistinction between outside and inside”, but according to 
him, it is not the situation of exception. According to Agamben (1998, 18) “the state of exception is 
thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension”. 
Therefore, chaos is not the result of imposing the exception, but rather it is a mean by which a power 
may use to produce the context of exception in which the distinction between action inside or outside 
law (which is in some cases illegitimate, like the case of occupied Palestine) becomes unclear.  
 
According to Agamben, the state of siege has its origins in France during the revolution when the 
constitution was suspended, and that many other states also experienced it. For example in Italy “the 
governments of the kingdom resorted to proclaiming a state of siege many times: in Palermo and the 
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Sicilian provinces in 1862 and 1866, in Naples in 1862, in Sicily and Lunigiana in 1894, and in 
Naples and Milan in 1898, where the repression of the disturbances was particularly bloody and 
provoked bitter debates in parliament” (Agamben, 2005, 17). 
 
Indeed, suspension of law makes an atmosphere in which a power seeks to do unilateral central 
decisions, attempting to establish a system that serves its own interest. When a power suspends the 
law, it continues to monopolize decisions out of law; meanwhile minor powers have no role of 
influence of production of new laws “What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited 
authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing order. In such a situation it is clear that 
the state remains, whereas law recedes” (Schmitt, 1985, 12).  
 
Given this atmosphere, a power becomes a central power and tends towards hegemony, facilitating its 
desire also not just to make actions out the juridical order but to be the law itself. In this context a 
power becomes unbounded with laws and norms, gaining unlimited authority to impose new laws and 
define new norms. That is similar to the character of monarchical regime that had ruled Western 
societies until the 19th century that Foucault (1997, 26) described in which the juridical structure was 
made at the demand and for the benefit of the royal power. The outcome of this process towards 
centrality, as Foucault (1997, 27) explained, is a proliferation of relations of subjection and 
domination within social body. The point which is important to highlight is that, although the way to 
the unfair centrality may take diverse forms through time, it retains the same meaning: keeping the 
rules of subjection, marginalization, and control intact.   
  
The theory of the state of exception as has been noted by (Downey, 2009: 109) goes beyond the 
binary distinctions of dichotomies such as inside/outside or inclusion/exclusion, but is the matter in 
which ‘zone of in-distinction’ exists. Agmaben (2005) clarifies the context in which there is no law 
and order ‘emptiness of law’ which can be used to legalize what cannot be legal. Drawing on that 
point, a hegemonic power finds in the situation of exception a suitable way to legalize the lawlessness 
actions.  
 
According to Agamben, the context of exception is; a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie
13
, where 
all legal determinations are deactivated (ibid. 50). Agamben emphasizes that in the context of 
exception there is no clear shape, and it has a blur characteristics. However, he discussed and 
illustrated the features of this model (ibid, 4). 
 
The state of exception is declared and imposed in the name of necessity which becomes source of law 
and used as a “legitimate” idea to make the paradigm of exception. From this perspective, it can be 
                                                          
13 According to oxford dictionary, anomie means: lack of the usual social or ethical standards in an individual or group. In 
other words it is a lack of values.   
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understood that necessity as a concept related to power may be used to justify action of oppression 
occurred whether by law itself or absence of law, according to Agamben (2005, 24) necessity acts to 
“justify a single, specific case of transgression by means of an exception". Consequently, the principle 
of necessity becomes a justification base on which new structure of laws which may contradict of 
moral and ethical values.  
 
Many forms of “necessity” can be used such as “rhetoric of security”. In the case of occupied 
Palestine this rhetoric is deployed as a pretext of violence against people of Palestine. The occupying 
power (especially through international media) tries to justify its actions and to make a context of 
exception which causes a blur situation ‘emptiness of law’ and that make an “appropriate” atmosphere 
for controlling and subjecting people of Palestine. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 detail the deployment of 
the context of exception in the case study.  
 
Another example of deployment of concept of “necessity” to make the context of exception is the 
“rhetoric of fear" which is deployed to legitimate an endless series of states of exception around the 
world (Bellina & Paola, 2006). What is important to note that, despite the action of power transgress 
people they can appear “lawful” in the context of exception (Humphreys, 2006, 678).   
 
The new fabricated laws that made by an occupying power or hegemonic power, play a role in the 
formation and enactment of subjection and exploitation. And that is how a power justifies its actions 
of control. The extreme case that Agamben (2005, 54) pointed out is the situation in which a power 
becomes itself the law. In this situation, a power tries to create new laws suitable for its desires and 
the context of exception becomes a de facto situation. It is worth to mention that despite the law may 
be used as a legal order but it does not mean that it is a legitimate order. Charl Schmitt (1985) 
differentiates between the two concepts legality and legitimacy and that differentiation means 
sometimes the law cannot be legitimate. 
 
3.4.1 The State of Exception Theory and Bare life Theory 
 
To consider the concept of exception as a method of control, means to explain its influence on the life 
of human. It is associated with a particular role in reproduction domains in which human natural life 
should be controlled by a hegemonic power. Therefore, through the paradigm of exception people can 
be oppressed, excluded and marginalized, and also categorized into groups in order to exercise unfair 
power over them. That can be seen by bio-politics mechanisms, when people daily life begins to be 
included in the mechanisms of repressive control.  
Foucault (2007, 16) defines bio-politics as "a set of mechanisms through which the basic biological 
features of the human species became the object of a political strategy". According to Pløger (2008, 
61) Foucault views space as a medium through which a bio-politics is implemented by classification 
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of the body of human between normal and a-normal. Through the mechanism of bio-politics, a power 
can classify a group of people to impose subjection upon them. Therefore, discrimination based on 
racial considerations is well-matched with the bio-power and racism allow power according to 
(Foucault, 2003: 255) to treat population as a mixture of races and subdivide them also into 
subspecies to control them.   
Giorgio Agamben (1998) in his book Homo Sacer: Sovereign and Bare Life, examines the relation 
between the exception and its devastating consequence on human life which occurs under the guise of 
the law. He describes the status of homo sacer in ancient Rome who is a person that may be killed 
(without this act being considered murder) but not sacrificed. Agamben used the metaphorical figure 
of the homo sacer, in order to signal the existence outside the law, exclusion, and deprival of rights. 
Agamben traces that history to theorize the continuous production of the status of homo sacer in 
contemporary societies; although the homo sacer phenomenon disappeared, it is found nowadays, and 
that when an oppression, exclusion and marginalization implicate within the juridical order. The point 
that Agamben (1998) wanted to highlight is that those who were banned from the rights to have right; 
they are instantiation of the homo scaer, and also to highlight that the ban allows bare life to exist in a 
society.   
Accordingly, the context of exception leads to include man’s life in the unfair mechanism of power, 
transforming the normal life to bare life and certain people to homo sacer. People who exist in the 
situation of exception, their life become precarious. Therefore, the violence become in the “law”. 
According to (Downey, 2009), the paradigm of exception turns people to the condition of bare life. 
 
The paradigm of exception has brought out many zones of exceptions where torture and deprivation 
from basic rights sustained in the space. For example, Agamben mentions that Guantánamo Bay is a 
zone of exception which was produced by US during its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan 
(Gregory, 2006). Agamben criticized US law that was enacted on November 13, 2001 which 
authorized the indefinite detention and trial by military commission (Agamben, 2005, 3). People who 
had been imprisoned, their legal status were denied (Gregory, 2006). Guantánamo Bay had been 
described as a lawless place and as a place of indeterminate time; a place where prisoners are subject 
to indefinite detention without trial” (ibid).  Another example of space of exception is the Abu Ghraib 
prison (in Iraq) where torture and humiliation against Muslim prisoners were documented. 
 
It is worth mentioning, there are many examples around the world of the spaces of exception where 
people are reduced to forms of bare life, but they have never been produced at the same level of 
oppression and torture as in the context of occupation (as the next two chapters explore). 
  
3.4.2 Space of Exception  
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What are the spatial consequences of deployment of the context of exception? How the space is 
reproduced under the atmosphere of exception? These questions bring into focus the meaning of a 
space when a power invents laws for the aim of subjection and control. This investigation is crucial in 
this study because the occupying power “Israel” as this study will explain manipulates and 
misrepresented laws dating back to Ottoman regime, British occupation period, and Jordanian era to 
produce spaces of exceptions.      
Chapter two has highlighted how a power may transform a space to secure its social control by using 
planning as a tool of control. As a result, new meanings may be acquired while using the space; 
meaning of domination, surveillance, and exclusion. Agamben (2005) argues in his book State of 
Exceptions, when a power faces a crisis, it circumvents norms and laws and a state of exception which 
is characterized by a void of law is produced. As mentioned this study uses a metaphor of the concept 
of exception in effort  to  analyze the manipulation of the landscape in occupied Palestine, specifically 
in the case of Qalqiliya, where the occupying power uses planning to transform the space into a space 
of exception. 
Based on the mentioned analysis of the theory of exception in the work of Agamben, it can be pointed 
out that there are three central features of the paradigm of exception. First, the executive power 
dominates the context of exception "the executive power has in fact, at least partially, absorbed the 
legislative power" (Agamben, 2005, 18). Secondly, juridical orders are deactivated (ibid, 23). Thirdly, 
norm is also suspended and the application of the ‘force of law’ transforms to application just to the 
force without law (Ibid, 40). In other word, the exception is the context where there is no law and 
order ‘emptiness of law’.  
According to that under the paradigm of exception the meaning of space deviates from its basic 
meaning as a medium that satisfy the needs of people, to a medium that is full of control. In this 
context of exception the space does not function to serve people or aim to provide the essential needs 
of people in terms of their right in; adequate houses, their right in work and normal settings in the 
whole life.  
The most obvious characters of the paradigm of exception are emptiness of norms and laws.  
Agamben wrote: "in this sense, the state of exception is the opening of space in which application and 
norm reveal their separation and a pure of law realize … a norm whose application has been 
suspended" (Agamben, 2005, 40). Therefore, the space does not serve any more people and it 
becomes a space of exception characterized by ‘a void of law’.  
Moreover, the space which is characterized by a void of law reflects the meaning of oppression and 
injustice. So, the space is produced and reproduced to be engaged in violation of the rights of people 
by the law itself. Agamben wrote: “violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence” 
(1998, 32). 
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3.5 Spatiality as a Mode of Change  
Given the inseparable relation between social issues and spatial form, it has been reasonable by 
assuming that the human perception of the space could be one of those points to recognize the relation 
between spatial form and the human behavior. Harvey (1973) highlighted this relation which he called 
‘spatial consciousness’ or the ‘geographical imagination’. This imagination enables people to 
recognize the role of space in their own life, because as widely explained that a spatial form of city is 
meaningful; it is ‘symbolic of our aspiration, our needs, and our fears’ (ibid, 31). Thereby, when 
people perceive a space which they use, they can recognize if the space satisfies their needs or not, 
and how it affects them.  
As mentioned in (section 3.3) many cities around the world have been witnessing proliferation of 
spatial division and spatial fragmentation associated with negative social consequences.  Around the 
world many cities have a good economic situation, while paradoxically their spatial harmony has 
declined. For example, gentrification and fragmentation issues have become significant themes in 
planning studies about many cities which witnessed a high economic growth. This paradox has 
accelerated the reassertion of importance of spatial issues in critical social studies in which the 
relation between spatiality, power, and justice have been critically investigated.  So the interest of the 
meaning of the space and how a power represents itself within it have extended to other issues 
concerning the rights of people in the city spaces.     
The current global spatial heterogeneity (as described in this chapter (sections 3.3 & 3.3.1) has an 
effect to make new spatial debates about the injustice in spaces.  Some scholars as I will explain later 
in details view the inequality as well as injustice as a threat on the original function of the space which 
is supposed to satisfy the needs of people. This view emerged as a result of the growing contradictious 
in the structure of cities between the space of poor people and space of rich, as a result the system of 
capitalism, which is from one hand enhances economic situation of some areas in cities and from the 
other hand, increases injustice and fragmentation. As an example, there are gentrified neighborhoods 
which are adjacent to neighborhoods inhabited by poor. Despite that many cities have a good 
economic situation, but spatial fragmentations are obvious. Accordingly recently the concept of right 
to city has acquired an increasing interest among scholars.  
It is worth to note that the purpose of examining the following concepts is not to advocate them in the 
context of occupation, but to make use of them as theoretical indicators of negative consequences 
when the landscape is manipulated for the purpose of control and subjecting people. Of course, they 
are not useful for offering alternatives in the context of occupation. They can be useful in order to 
show the high level of severe restrictions on those who are colonized.   
 The right to the city  
Power, Space & Space of Exception       
 
  70 
 
Ch.3  
The Lefebvre’s concept the ‘right to the city’ is formulated in 1968, when his book Le Droit à la ville 
was published. This idea was developed in the context of his work which is an attempt to restructure 
social, economic, and political relations. Through the ‘right to the city’ concept Lefebvre aimed to 
counter the monopoly of decisions by a political regime over what space should be in the future. As 
explained in details Lefebvre triad model (perceived, conceived, and lived) shows that the production 
of space do not limited to the production of materiality of the space (i.e. the formation of physical 
aspects of the spaces). Therefore the right to the city is not limited to the right of being part of 
decision of articulating and re-articulating physical space but it includes restructuring of power 
relations that influences the production of space.   
 
Researches on negative consequences of neoliberalism principles and globalization have made a need 
for dealing with the problem of exclusion of inhabitants from decisions that shape their cities. 
Consequently, the concept of ‘right to the city’ has been addressed as an approach to counteract the 
growing disenfranchisement of urban inhabitants (Purcell, 2002, 101).  And many academics have 
begun to explore ‘the right to the city’ as an approach which may offer alternatives that empower 
those who are marginalized from decisions (ibid, 101).   The right to the city gives inhabitants a direct 
voice in any decision that contributes to the production of urban space and also it means the right to 
appropriation; the right to use and access urban space (ibid, 102-103).   
 
According to Harvey (2003, 939) the right to the city is not only the right to access spaces in cities but 
the right to change the space. Harvey (2008) views the ‘right to the city’ as a model and working 
slogan to unify social movements that are focusing on the urban questions, seeking to have voices in 
the atmosphere full of spatial inequalities and uneven geographies. Because according to him under 
the capitalist system the only groups who have ‘the right to city’ is a small political and economic 
elite “The right to the city, as it is now constituted, is too narrowly confined, restricted in most cases 
to a small political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities more and more after their 
own desires” (Harvey, 2008, 38).   
 
This theory does not offer open-ended interpretations (or one way of interpretation), instead it offers 
an approach to criticize the relation between powerful and powerless in many different contexts. One 
of those contexts where can be used as a critical tool is the context of occupation. In the context of 
occupation, this concept is addressed to highlight the degree of disenfranchisement over those who are 
occupied, but not as a domain of alternatives. Right to the city addresses questions more than 
solutions of exclusion; hence it is not the panacea of exclusion and deprivation from spatial rights in 
the context of occupation. It can be used as a conceptual notion to criticize the oppression and 
domination produced and sustained by occupying power in the landscape of Palestine. And to 
understand the high degree of oppression that people face; they has been deprived form the basic 
rights to the city such as the right to access to private lands.   
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 3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter provides a wide range of theories to understand the relation between power and the 
production and reproduction of the space. Space is an outcome of a complex process, representing a 
type of system that rules communities. Space may be an arena of harmony, variety and coexistence, 
but in the context of occupation it is an arena of oppression, reflecting strategies of occupying power 
to implant the meaning of domination and control. 
The regime system influences the structure and morphology of cities. A wide range of literature 
shows the persistence of fragmentation in any city ruled by capitalism. The geographical 
fragmentations occur repeatedly; they are reproduced and sustained by a continuous process control 
by the system of capitalism. However the character of fragmentation under occupation is totally 
different in terms of degree of oppression as the next two chapters explore.  
 
The state of exception theory and the bare life theory are useful to understand the role of 
circumvention and suspension of norms in the production and reproduction of zones which represent a 
void of law. The paradigm of exception is deployed for the purpose of subjection and control as it will 
examined in the case of occupied Palestine where the model of exception is deployed to arrest urban 
and regional development. 
 
The concept of right of the city which explored in this chapter will not answer the question; what 
should the space be? Instead it will serve as a critique (i.e. analytical concept) of an oppression that 
has been produced in the landscape of the occupied Palestine.  
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Chapter 4: The West Bank (in the Occupied Palestine): 
Dimensions of Control  
__________________________________________________ 
The previous chapter has illustrated the role of planning in landscape transformation through the use 
of planning theory and has explored the way in which planning is used to produce spatial inequalities 
despite being intended to be a tool for reform. In the West Bank planning is considered a tool which is 
deployed by the occupying power, aiming to control both land and people.  Consequently, the 
geography and the landscape of the West Bank becomes the embodiment of colonization.  The 
landscape of the West Bank is thus transformed to one of control, saturated by colonies, bypass roads, 
walls, watch towers and checkpoints.   
This chapter provides a broader perspective and overview of the nature of spatial control in the West 
Bank. It is a comprehensive overview of the practice of the occupying power to control land by 
territorial means (specifically through the process of land confiscation) and procedural control 
mechanisms (most notably through the fabrication and subsequent use of “statutory” planning 
systems). The chapter is divided into four parts; part one is an overview of Palestine in terms of, 
historical background, physical settings, and demographic settings. Part two describes the natural 
environment of the West Bank, including; agriculture, natural preserved lands and water resources 
before next turning to examine territorial control and occupation of the West Bank through the 
construction of colonies, bypass roads, and the apartheid wall. The fourth part and most substantive 
section investigates planning policies employed by “Israel” to control Palestinians and to strengthen 
the existence of Jewish settlers. This part refers to decades of the Islamic Ottoman regime, British 
colonization and Jordanian rule eras, with a view to highlighting that “Israel” has been manipulating 
previous historically embedded planning laws to control the land and demography of people of 
Palestine.  
   
 4.1 Historical Background  
 
To understand precisely the current situation in Palestine, specifically the West Bank, it is noteworthy 
to highlight briefly the historical background before focusing on the planning and landscape issues 
that inform the main body of this thesis. Palestine was part of the Bilad-al Sham district (Syria, 
Lebanon, and Jordan) under the Islamic Ottoman State (Al-khilafa AlOthmanyehah) before the First 
World War. Following the First World War, the Islamic Ottoman state collapsed with most of the land 
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under its rule, colonized and divided between the United Kingdom and France. These colonial powers 
re-mapped the area more commonly known as ‘The Middle East’, under the terms of the so-called 
Sykes–Picot agreement. In 1920, the boundaries of Palestine were demarcated in the San Remo 
conference and Palestine was put under control of the “British mandate”, subsequently confirmed by 
the so-called League of Nations in 24 July 1922.  Importantly, it was during the British colonization 
period that Britain played a role in changing the demographical situation in Palestine by encouraging 
Jewish immigration.  
 
McCarth (1990) who studied the statistics of population in Palestine in the late nineteenth (part of 
Ottoman period) early twentieth century (at the end of British Occupation) points out that there is 
some debate on population numbers in Palestine after the First World War, however, he estimated the 
population, making a correction of Ottoman and British records
14
. McCarth points out that between 
the years 1922 to 1946 the growth of Muslims and Christians was a natural increase while the upsurge 
of Jews was at high rate caused by immigration rather than natural increase. This indicates that the 
increase of the Jews was from 12% of the total population of Palestine in 1922 to 31% in 1946.  The 
reason for this rise in Jewish immigration includes the British government promise to establish a 
“national home” for Jews in Palestine, through the Balfour Declaration which led to mass Jewish 
immigration from Europe. In a letter to Lord Rothschild, The British Foreign Secretary wrote on 2
nd
 
of November, 1917:   
 
“Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been 
submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet … His Majesty's Government view with favour the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours 
to facilitate the achievement of the object …. ….. ….. I should be grateful if you would bring this 
declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation”.  
 
In the 1880's Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian Jew, founded the Zionist movement. The main concept of 
the Zionist movement is based on uniting all the Jews on “the Promised Land”. It was decided by the 
Zionist movement to establish a Jewish state on the land of Palestine which considered by the 
movement as “a promised land” for them. In the early 1900s, refusal to this plan was declared by the 
last Ottoman Caliphate Sultan Abd-al Hamid II who refused that Palestine ruled by Jews or given to 
them.  He responded to Herzl’s project with the following:  
“I would not accept this at all. I have served the Islamic milla [nation] and the Ummah of 
Muhammad for more than thirty years, and never did I blacken the pages of the Muslims- my fathers and 
ancestors, the Ottoman sultans and caliphs. And so I will never accept what you ask of me” 
                                                          
14 British conducted its first census in 1922, dividing the population of Palestine at the basis of religious group. It recorded 
that the number of population as the following 572,992 (Muslim), 83,794 (Jewish), 73,024 (Christian), 7,028 (Druze), 2,446 
(other). The second census was in 1931 which recorded the population as the following:  759,712 (Muslim), 174,610 (Jews), 
91,398 (Christians), 10,101 (others) (McCarth, 1990, 30-31).  
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The movement did not spare time in turning their colonial idea into reality and concrete plans, by 
expediently organizing groups to help in the immigration of Jews and encouraging them to move to 
Palestine. According to Edward Said in his book the Question of Palestine, Zionism saw Palestine as 
empty territory or inhabited by dispensable natives (Said, 1993, 81). Zionism described the land of 
Palestine - as a, “land without people to people without land”, thus encouraging immigration of Jews 
from other countries.  
 
Since the establishment of the Zionist movement and the spreading of its concepts amongst the Jews, 
there have been waves of immigration to Palestine. Specifically, at the end of the nineteenth century 
(1882), Jews began to immigrate to Palestine from Russia and Romania (Holzman-Gazit, 2007, 56). 
In describing the incompatibility with the slogan  and the reality on the ground, Holzman- Gazit 
(2007, 56) notes: "upon their arrival, the settlers realized that the common perception of the 'promised 
land' as empty of any people and waiting for over 2000 years for Zionist Jews to redeem it was not all 
compatible with reality". 
 
According to Said (1993, 85) Zionism used rhetorical tools for fostering the existence of Jews by 
arguing and claiming that the land was neglected.  Practical steps followed, with the Zionist ideas and 
colonial visions culminating in the foundation of the Jewish National Fund (JNF), serving as the 
agency of Zionist movements controlling lands in Palestine.  
 
JNF was established in 1901 based on a decision in the fifth Zionist Congress (Holzman-Gazit, 2007, 
57). The role of the JNF is to “purchase” land in Palestine for the benefits of the Jewish settlers, with 
the first “purchase” being made in 1905 (Said, 1993, 97). The JNF considered the “purchase” of 
agricultural lands the most effective way into acquiring lands, and such it invested approximately 70 
percent of its resources into buying agricultural land. Between the years 1882 to 1944, there were 193 
“Jewish settlements” founded by JNF in the form of a Kibbutz and a Moshav (Holzman-Gazit, 2007, 
64).  
 
In addition, the JNF planted pine forests in areas declared as so called “state land”, mainly in the 
Jerusalem region, to prevent Palestinian planting and to maintain land reserves for new Jewish 
settlements or for the future expansion of existing settlements (Weizman, 2007, 120). It is worth 
noting that today pine trees cover many Palestinian destroyed villages which are located in the land 
occupied in 1948. Ilan Pappé decribed the act of planting trees over destroyed villages in his book 
The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine by writing: “hiding their remains under vast ‘green lungs’ planted 
by the Jewish National Fund… Such as a forest of pine trees was planted over destroyed Palestinian 
village of Lubya” (Pappé, 2006, 154-155). In other cases, parks and recreation area have been laid out 
over village sites (fig 4.1). 
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The issue of agriculture and water were matters intertwined with ideological concepts of Zionism 
which viewed water and agriculture as tools to support the existence of Jewish settlers in Palestine 
(Elmusa, 1993, 10).  Therefore, agriculture should not be viewed as an economic basis and something 
apart from the Zionist project in Palestine; rather, before 1948 agricultural activates were considered 
by Zionism a suitable policy for controlling lands and as a way to attract Jews to live in Palestine.  In 
addition, Zionism saw the land of Palestine through a biblical lens which considered it the ‘land of 
milk and honey’ (Rouyer, 2000, 87). Zionism has seen the landscape of Palestine as a veil under 
which an historic biblical landscape exists (Weizman, 2007, 39). Even to this day, constant 
archeological excavations in Palestine are carried out by the occupying power to remove the veil and 
to search for the so-called “ancient biblical” archaeologies. Abu El-Haj (2001) has explored the 
relation between the discipline of archeology with the process of the enactment of colonization, noting 
that archeological sites are employed to produce the ideology of a “Jewish national” home in 
Palestine.   
       
Following the war in 1948, “Israel” issued what was called the law of Return which allows any Jews 
from anywhere in the world to immigrate to Palestine and settle there. Paradoxically, Palestinians who 
were dispossessed from their lands (approximately 780,000 expelled in 1948) and who now number 
more than five millions are not allowed to return to their villages and cities. It is worth mentioning 
that, following the war in 1948 the Palestinian landscape has gradually vanished; not only Palestinian 
villages being destroyed but also fields of olives and citrus neglected and subsequently vanished. As 
Meron Benvensiti (2002, 7) described: “most abandoned trees were neglected or destroyed outright as 
the Israelis destroyed whatever the Arabs had left that could not be integrated into their framework. 
Most citrus groves were uprooted to make room for housing developments, ancient olive trees were 
left uncared for or destroyed to make room for field crops”.   
Fig. 4.1: On the right, a small park established on the site of the village school in Zir'in (Jinin). On the left, the cemetery 
of Salama (Jaffa), now a park (May, 1987). Source: Khalidi, 1992 
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Fig. 4.2: The topography of the occupied Palestine. Source: Khalidi, 
1992  
4.2 Geographic Character  
 
The total area of Occupied Palestine is 
estimated to be about 26,320 km
2
, 
including the 1948 lands, the West Bank, 
and Gaza Strip. The West Bank covers 
an area approximately 5844 Km
2
, 
including East Jerusalem. Despite its 
small area, it has a diverse landscape, 
including the shore of the Dead Sea as 
the lowest point on earth, at about 400 
meters below sea level. The land remains 
below sea level extending to the north 
and to the south (in an area known more 
commonly as the Jordan valley). The 
water and fertile land availability in 
conjunction with the high temperature 
throughout the seasons of the year, 
results in the region (Jordan Valley) 
being famous for its crops of dates and 
banana. The land rises sharply from the 
Jordan valley towards the east to reach an 
altitude of about 1000 meters above sea 
level. The chain of mountains which are 
covered with tress, in particular the olive 
and almond tree, extends towards west 
before descending again towards the 
Mediterranean Sea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The landscape of the West Bank Governorates was classified by the Palestinian Ministry of Planning 
and Administrative Development (MOPAD) into five landscape character areas, namely; the semi-
coastal plain, with an altitude ranging from 50 to 300 meters above sea level- this zone has open 
valley specifically in the north. Secondly, the western slopes, with an altitude ranging from 300 to 600 
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Fig. 4.3: The landscape Character in the West Bank. 
Source: MOPAD 
meters. Thirdly, the mountain plateau, with an altitude ranging from 600 to 1000 meters. Fourthly, the 
eastern slopes, with an altitude ranging from 0 to 600 meters. Finally, the Jordan River Valley, with 
an altitude ranging from – 400 to 0 meters, where the weather is hot for most of year. In this zone the 
Jordan River flows from the North until it reaches the Dead Sea. Worth mentioning is that in this zone 
the Palestinian population is concentrated around Jericho city, in close proximity to the Dead Sea.  
 
Each zone is devoted to specific crops appropriate 
for the specific climate.  Therefore, the Ministry 
of Agriculture divided the West Bank into four 
zones having regard to these climate 
circumstances. The semi-coastal zone (north-
western corner of the West Bank), includes Jenin, 
Tulkarm and Qalqylia provinces and is where the 
average annual rainfall is approximately 600mm.  
The third is the middle elevation zone extending 
from northern Jenin to south Hebron. The fourth is 
an area known as the steppe zone which extends 
from eastern Jenin to the Dead Sea in the south. In 
this zone, average annual rainfall is about 150-350 
mm. The fifth is the Ghor (western Jordan Valley) 
zone with an average annual rainfall of 100-250 
mm (cited in USAID, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Demographic Sector    
 
The West Bank is divided into eleven districts; Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, 
Qalqiliya, Salfit, Jenin, Tulkarem, Tubas and Jericho. According to Palestinian Bureau of Statistics 
(2007), the estimated number of the Palestinian population in the West Bank is approximately 2.35 
million. Table 3.1 outlines the distribution of population by districts in the two censuses 1997 and 
2007 (the only two census done by Palestinian Bureau of Statistic after the establishment of 
Palestinian Authority in 1993).  
 
At the end of 2007, the registered refugee population in the West Bank was estimated to be around 
599,436. However, a more accurate reflection of the actual number of refugees was estimated to be 
about 642,903 persons, accounting for 27.3 percent of the West Bank population (UNRWA, 2010).   
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 Governorate  Census 1997 Census 2007 
Jenin  203,026  256,619 
Tubas  36,609 50,261 
Tulkarem  134,110 157,988 
Nablus 261,340 320,830 
Qalqiliya  72,007 91,217 
Salfit  48,538 59,570 
Ramallah & Al-Bireh 213,582 279,730 
Jericho  32,713 42,320 
Jerusalem  328,601 363,649  
Jerusalem J1 area 210,209 225,416 
Jerusalem J2 area 118,392 138,233 
Bethlehem  137,286 176,235 
Hebron  405,664 552,164 
West Bank  1,873,476 2,350,583 
 
 
The population increased by 25% between the years 1997-2007; indicating an annual average growth 
rate of 2.5 percent as represented in Table 7.1. The number of Palestinians in East Jerusalem was 
estimated approximately 210,209 in 1997, while in 2007 the number was about 225,416 with an 
increase 15,207. This indicates an annual population expansion rate of 0.72% on average, which is 
considered a low population growth compared with the total population growth in the West Bank.   
 
4.4 Agricultural Sector  
 
Agriculture is one of the main economic activities in the West-bank, with many traditional industries 
related to agriculture such as soap manufacture. Historically, Palestine has long been known for 
agriculture. In 1967, the West Bank exported 80% of the entire vegetable crop which it produced, and 
45% of its total fruit production (Hazboun, S., 1986 cited in Butterfield, Isaac, Kubursi, Spencer, 
2000). In 2008, it contributed to 8.1% of Gross Domestic Product, down from 10.3% in 2004 (MOA, 
2009). Additionally, in the year 2008, around 13% of the formal Palestinian labor force was working 
in the agricultural sector (ibid). This sector, however, has guaranteed work for more than 39% of 
those who works in informal sectors (Attaya, 2005). Moreover, agriculture provides job opportunities 
for women and young people who work as family units in agriculture.    
 
In 2007, the total area of cultivated lands in the West Bank and Gaza trip was estimated to be around 
1,835 km
2 
(of which 90.1% lies in the West Bank and 9.9 in Gaza Strip) (PCBS, 2007). Around 70 % 
of agricultural lands were planted with fruit trees, 10.2% planted with vegetables, and 26.3% planted 
Table 4.1: The estimated number of Palestinians in each governorate in the West Bank. Source: PCBS   
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with filed crops such as wheat. Over time, agricultural production has been characterized by a 
diversity of planted crops due to the diversity of climates. There are up to 105 main crop types, 
however the olive tree represents the leading crop (with about half of the total cultivated area being 
covered by olive trees) (ARIJ, 2007). Nevertheless, fruit production is generally unable to meet the 
requirements of the population, with the exception being the production of both olives and grapes.  A 
study conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture in the year 2005, concerning the production and 
consumption of agricultural commodities in Gaza Strip and the West Bank showed that the 
agricultural sector is meeting Palestinians’ requirements for the main vegetables (cucumber, tomato, 
okra and squash). However, regarding fruit production, there is a general inability to meet consumers’ 
demand, with the exception of olives, grapes, and citrus (cited in ARIJ, 2007).  
 
According to PCBS (2011), in the West Bank there is a clear dominance of rain-fed cultivated lands 
compared with irrigated lands. The West Bank contains 212,683 dunums of rain-fed cultivated lands, 
producing annually 28,112 tons of crops. While it contains 8,199 dunums of irrigated land area (only 
3.7% of land which is under cultivation) which produces annually 8,409 tons of crops.    
 
“Oslo agreement” has determined quota of water consumption for Palestinians. Nowadays it is not 
sufficient for the requirement of agricultural production. The agreement gave the “Palestinian 
Authority” full control on densely populated areas by Palestinians while allowing the Authority only 
very limited control of the natural resources (lands and water), resulting in a detrimental effect on 
production and development of the agricultural sector.  
 
In the West Bank, of approximately 5,844 km
2
 which make up the total geographical area, only 30% 
is used for agricultural purposes, and about 63% of the land is located in Area C, under full “Israeli 
control” as a result of the ongoing occupation in terms of “security” and civilian affairs. This results 
in a severe restriction on the movement of Palestinians and impacts directly on their ability to enjoy 
the benefits of the natural resources (land & water). In addition, Area C is where number of Jewish 
settler colonies, practice robbery of the natural resources of the West Bank (arable lands and water) 
mainly in the Jordan Valley.  
 
Land cultivated by Jewish settlers accounts for about 10.12 km
2
 (more than 90% is located in the 
Jordan valley) (OHCA, 2007). The annual consumption of water to irrigate agricultural lands is 60 
MCM (Arej, 2007). A report conducted by Peace Now in the year 1993 showed that in the West Bank 
Jewish settlers’ per capita irrigated areas are thirteen times larger than the areas irrigated by 
Palestinians (cited in Le Monde Diplomatique, special report, 1998).  
 
Since 1967 there has been a decline of the total area of cultivated land in the West Bank due to the 
occupation and restrictions of accessibility to land and water. Le monde-diplomatique (1998) reports 
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that, since 1967 lands cultivated by Palestinians have been reduced at a high degree, noting that “in 
1967, 2,300 sq. km of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were under Palestinian cultivation. In 1989, that 
figure had been reduced to 1,945 sq. km, or 31.5 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip”.  
 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture (2009), the total area of the pasture lands in the West Bank 
is approximately 2.02 million dunums, however colonies and the apartheid wall construction have 
reduced grazing lands to only 700,000 dunums. The World Bank reports (2013) that, the 
inaccessibility of lands located in Area C in which most of pasture lands and agricultural lands are 
located causes economic loss to the Palestinian economy at about US$3.4 billion.  
 
Regarding the natural reserve areas, there are about 49,348 hectares declared by “Israel” as nature 
reserves in the West Bank. In 1998 according to the Wye River Memorandum
15
 a further 16.665 
hectare were declared by this agreement as a nature reserve area inside the West Bank (OCHA, 2007, 
44). Moreover, forests cover approximately 3.94% of the total area of the West Bank. Despite this, 
large areas of these forests are confiscated by the occupation and declared as closed military areas 
(ARIJ, 2010, 70). 
 
4.5 Water Sector  
 
Most of the Palestinian villages in the West Bank are located near springs and fountains, an important 
factor that determined their locations. The main source of water for Palestinians in the West Bank is 
from underground sources which consist of three aquifers (the Western Aquifer Basin, the North-
eastern Aquifer Basin, and the Eastern Aquifer Basin). In addition, there are surface water areas in the 
West Bank; the Jordan River (main surface water resource) as well as number of Wadis (water of 
valleys) and seasonal streams. The topographic character of the West Bank influences the flow of 
Wadis, mainly into two directions. The first group of wadis flow towards the Jordan River and the 
second group flow towards the Mediterranean Sea.  
 
This water scarcity, as many analysts have argued, could be a contributing factor in the ‘Middle East’ 
instability (Elmusa, 1993). American interventions began early in 1950s about the matter of 
distribution of water. Specifically, on 16 October 1953, when Eric Johaston was appointed to seek a 
comprehensive program to divide water resources of the Jordan Basin (Royer, 2000, 114).   
 
The ground and surface water control and exploitation of the West Bank began before the occupation 
in 1967. It took place in two ways; the construction of water carriers to divert the upper Jordan River 
                                                          
15 The Wye River Memorandum: is an agreement made between Palestinian Authority and “Israel” in a summit, hosted by 
Bill Clinton, was held at Wye River, Maryland in October 1998. This agreement addresses specific “security” concerns 
which had been raised by “Israel” in the past and also it address some economic issues. Source: www. UNSCO.org  
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(water of Hasbani and Banias rivers) towards the desert of Negab (which is known by “Israeli 
National Water Carrier”), and by drilling deep wells near the “green line” to extract ground water 
from the western aquifer. The establishment of the water carrier had decreased the quantity of water 
flowing into the Dead Sea, lowering the level of water in the sea and as a result part of it has dried 
out. A report issued by the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) (2011) points out that there has been a 
huge reduction of water flow into the Dead Sea primarily because of the diversion of water from the 
upper Jordan of more than 500 MCM/year through the (Water Carrier)
16
.  
 
After the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, many military orders -still in force today- were issued 
in order to limit the amount of water Palestinian’s can use from the ground and surface water reserves. 
As mentioned, many military orders were issued concerning water
17
, but three of them are considered 
the main orders that transferred the power of controlling water resource from the hand of Palestinian 
municipalities and villages councils to the hand of military commander of the West Bank. As a result 
the power to use of water resources is transferred to the hand of “Israeli Civilian Administration”.  
 
The first military order concerning water (No.92) transferred all the power dealing with water 
including; laws, production, consumption, distribution, establishment of water projects, fixing of 
water allotments to be under the authority of the “Israeli military commander” in the West Bank. The 
order was followed by further decrees, including; No.158 & No. 291, which focused on restrictions of 
utilization of both ground and surface water by Palestinians. Under the military order (No.158) no 
person can set up, assemble, or operate water installation without a license obtained from the military 
commander of the West Bank. In other words, a permit is obligatory to drill a new well or repair an 
old well.  Messerchmid (2007, 349) has noted that the order is used to deny any applications being 
made by Palestinians without being obliged to provide any explanation. Military order (No.291) 
suspended the Jordanian law (pre-occupation water law in the West Bank) which considered the water 
a private ownership, declaring all water resources to be “state property” (Rouyer, 2000, 47). Between 
the years 1967 until 1994 (the year of signing so-called Oslo agreement), “Israel” issued permissions 
to drill 27 water wells in the West Bank (20 wells for domestic use and only 7 for agricultural use). 
No permits were given to drill new water wells in the Western aquifer (ibid, 48). 
   
During the so-called Oslo negotiations, multilateral talks were devoted to the matter of water use. 
According to the agreement, a specific amount of water was determined for the use of Palestinians 
                                                          
16 The reports also points out that historically the quantity of water that discharge into the Dead Sea from the Jordan River is 
estimated about 1400 MCM/year.  Due to the diversion of the upper Jordan River to the desert of AL-Naqab, this amount has 
been decreased to no more than 30 MCM/Y.  
   
17 In addition to the mentioned three military orders (No. 92, No.158, No.291) , there are also other military orders issued to 
complete control of the water resources in the West Bank; No. 291, No. 457, No 484, No. 494, No. 715, and No. 1376 – to 
achieve complete control over Palestinian water resources. 
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from each aquifer. Table 4.2 (below) details the permitted amount of water for Palestinians according 
to the so-called Oslo agreement, and the actual use according to statistics gathered by the Palestinian 
Water Authority (PWA) in 2011. The table further highlights the use of water by “Israelis” in the 
same year.   
 
 Western Aquifer 
Basin (WAB): 
Northeastern Aquifer 
Basin (NEAB): 
Eastern Aquifer Basin 
(EAB): 
Total 
Estimated yield 
annually  
400 MCM 100-145 MCM 145-185 MCM 645-730 
MCM 
Palestinians/ 
according to 
Oslo 
22 42 54 118 
Palestinians/ the 
use in 2011  
25 20 42 87 
“Israel”/ 
according to 
Oslo  
340 103 40 483 
“Israel”/ the use 
in 2011 
411 103 150
18
 664 
 
 
 
The agreement did not increase the access to ground-water resource by Palestinians, but it reinforces 
the de facto situation (the inequality of use of water between indigenous and colonizers). This 
agreement has increased the disproportionate utilization of water resources, ensuring that the 
Palestinians consumption at a level that “Israel” can accept and forecast (Zeitoun M., Messerchmid 
C., Attlili S., 2009, 157).  Messerchmid (2007) points out that “Oslo agreement” did not put end to the 
exploitation of water in the West Bank, but on the contrary it has perpetuated the pattern of 
domination which established as a result of occupation. A study done by Al-Haq (2013) shows that 
the agreement regarding the water issue is a continuation, preservation, and consolidation of “Israel’s” 
exclusive control over water in the West Bank.  
 
The Palestinians’ abstraction wells in the West Bank are characterized with low-capacity and produce 
about 65.5 MCM/yr (COHRE, 2008, 13-14)
19
. In the West Bank, there are 325 abstraction 
Palestinians water wells. Of these wells, around 21 are used for domestic purposes; the others are used 
for agricultural purposes. It is worthy to mention that since 1967 many restrictions imposed on 
Palestinians to not utilize the water resources in the Jordan valley area; preventing them from access 
                                                          
18 This includes 100 MCM used from Dead Sea Springs.  
19 The so-called Israeli wells in the West Bank are deeper with high pumping capacity producing about 56.9 MCM/yr 
(COHRE, 2008, 13-14). There are 42 “Israeli water wells”, mainly in the Eastern Aquifer Basin, near the Jordan Valley, 
providing water for extensive agricultural activities done by the settlers in the Jordan valley (COHRE, 2008, 13).   
Table 4.2: Water allocation according to so-called Oslo agreement and water utilization in 2011. Source: PWA, 2011 
edited by Halawani 
The West Bank (in the Occupied Palestine): Dimensions of control       
  
84 
 
Ch.4  
Fig. 4.4: Many deep water wells are near the “green line”. Source: http://www.lifesource.ps/english/water-
in-palestine/the-wall/ 
to water from the Jordan River, destroying 140 water pumps and numerous water wells around 
Jericho city and in the area of Jordan Valley (Rouyer, 2000, 47), declaring much of lands as military 
zones. Thereby, agricultural Jewish colonies were established, utilizing land and water (surface and 
ground) for the purpose of agriculture.   
 
Moreover, the occupying power drilled hundreds of water wells very close to the “green line” to draw 
underground water from the Western aquifer (fig. 4.4), at the same time it has prevented Palestinian 
from drilling any new water wells in the western basin of the mountain aquifer since 1967.  
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There is no gainsaying that the strategy of “Oslo agreement” is to let Palestinian Authority to control a 
limited area of the surface land with no authority over natural resources especially water. 
Consequently, Palestinians continue depending on the occupation in terms of water. COHRE (2008, 
15) reports that Palestinians in the West Bank, in the year 2007, purchased 49.4 million m
3
 of water 
from the “Israeli water company” Mekerot at a cost of 34-35 million US dollars.  
 
The discrimination polices regarding water lead to a gap between the use of water between 
Palestinians and Jewish settlers who consumes five times the amount of water as a Palestinians in the 
West Bank. Specifically, water consumption by Palestinians is an average of 73 LPCD (liters per 
Capita per Day) compared to about 369 LPCD for settlers residing in colonies in the West Bank. The 
a mount of water that is consumed by Palestinians in the West Bank is less than the recommend about 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) which recommends a minimum domestic consumption of 
100 LPCD (Al-Haq, 2013, 51). According to all above, the Palestinian water crisis is not due to the 
scarcity of water in the region, but rather expresses the systematic pattern of discrimination and 
exploitation existing as a result of occupation.  
 
4.6 Territorial Control of the West Bank 
The strategy of territorial control aims to influence heavily the demographic character of the West 
Bank, strengthening the presence of Jewish settlers who are dispersed in wide area to control as much 
land as possible. The process of that control includes construction of colonies, bypass roads, and the 
apartheid wall.   
 
4.6.1 Colonies  
4.6.1.1 Colonies policy  
Rarely the issue of colonies in the West Bank disappears from the headlines of local and international 
newspapers. The decision of colonies expansion is almost monthly headlines in local newspapers. It 
sometimes appears as main news in international media agencies. Recently, according to BBC news, 
In November, 2012 “Israel” declared to build 3,000 housing units for settlers. The plan is to build 
2000 housing units in area called E1 in Jerusalem in Ma'ale Adumim colony while another 1000 
housing unit will be built in other colonies in the West Bank (http://www.bbc.co.uk). 
  
The ongoing declarations and even implementation of building colonies without declaration have 
begun immediately following the war 1967. The occupying power has followed continuous steps to 
build and expand colonies and that process has never stopped in any “political atmosphere” such as 
the negotiation between Egypt and “Israel” after the Ramadan / War 1972 in which “Israel” signed an 
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agreement to withdraw from Sinai and also have never stopped since and after so-called Olso 
agreement.    
Two plans (Alon plan and Sharon Plan) were proposed to implant colonies. The major concern of the 
two plans is to control the Jordan Valley and top of hills and mountains in the West Bank.  After few 
weeks of the War 1967, Yigal Allon who was the “Israeli minister of agriculture” proposed a plan 
which divides the West Bank into two parts; the eastern part extends nearly adjacent to Jordan River, 
including areas around Jerusalem and the second part was the western part extends from the “green 
line” to mountain ridge. The plan suggests two areas for establishing colonies, one area in the eastern 
part of the West Bank which is a strip of land ten to fifteen kilometers wide along the Jordan River, 
and the second around Jerusalem. Palestinian villagers, who were living in the Jordan valley faced 
expulsion and dispossession from their lands. Following the plan “Israeli soldiers” destroyed and 
evacuated the Palestinian villages of the Jordan valley (except the city of Jericho) and fifteen colonies 
were established in eastern part between the years 1967 to 1977 (Weizman, 2007). During this period 
about 750 million U.S. dollar were invested to develop the colonies (an average of 75 million U.S. 
dollar per year) (Benvenisti & Khayat, 1988, 32).  
The plan (Alon plan) was a guideline for the Labor party until 1977 when the party lost power. 
Clearly the plan is an attempt to eliminate indigenous villagers and it may be considered as a practice 
of ‘Urbicide’ according to Graham’s term (2004)), and it also aims to create colonies in Jordan valley 
where there is a sparse Palestinian population, paving the way to declare most of the area as a military 
zone (fig. 4.5).  
Another key actor within the process of controlling the land of the West Bank is the political Ghush 
Emunim movement (block of the faithful) which has played a role in establishing colonies based on 
the belief of Torah. It was founded in 1974 from Elon Moreh group and other Jewish religious groups. 
Ghush Emunim has constructed many colonies in the West Bank, seeing itself as a continuer of the 
Zionist dynamic (Newman, 1985).  
In 1977 the “Israeli Likud party” came to power. By that date, about 5,023 Jewish settlers lived in 
thirty four colonies constructed exactly according to Allon plan. There were 21 of them in the Jordan 
valley and six established by Gush Emunim movement on the northern part of the West Bank 
(Benvenisti & Khayat, 1988, 32-33).  
In September 1977 Ariel Sharon put a plan - called Dorbless plan-, proposing to establish colonies in 
the form of network on the top of the mountains of the West Bank (Weizman, 2007). Under the 
pretext of “security”, he argued that the linear colonies that were constructed according to Allon plan 
would not provide an appropriate “defense and security zone for Israel”. Likewise to the Bar Lav line 
in Sinai which was destroyed by Egyptian army in the War 1972.  
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Clearly, the placement of colonies prevents geographical continuity between the Palestinian built-up 
areas. It also splits the territorial coherence of the Palestinians community and also with the 
surrounding Arab states such as Jordan. Large area of the Jordan valley was declared as military 
zones; preventing Palestinian construction and the use of this area (see 4.6).  
The militarization of the landscape is intertwined with the planning system. That is very obvious in 
the study prepared after the war in 1967 by Arieh Shalev who worked as a commander in “Israeli 
army” and as the officer responsible for intelligence evaluation and then as a regional commander in 
the West Bank. He linked between the location of colonies on top of mountains with military purposes 
Fig. 4.5: Allon & Sharon Plans. Source: Benvenisti, Khayat, 1988. Edited by Halawani 
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Fig. 4.6: Military zones in the West Bank. Source: Ocha, 
2007.  
by describing that these locations as “… thus the defense of that area so vital to Israel" (Benvenisti, 
1984, 24).            
Sharon Plan includes locations and distribution 
of tens of urban and industrial colonies in the 
West Bank. The plan promotes construction 
blocks of settlements to be connected to main 
roads of the West Bank (Weizman, 2007). 
According to the plan, it is noted that the groups 
of colonies are nearly and between heavily 
populated areas by Palestinians, causing 
restrictions of physical expansion in the future, 
breaking the spatial continuity of Palestinians 
communities and isolating them from each other.    
The leading concepts behind the allocation of 
colonies according to both plans (Allon & 
Sharon) can be summarized into two concepts; 
fortification and observation. These two concepts 
derived from the way in which early Zionist 
colonies in Palestine constructed. As Rotbard 
points out (2003, 48-49) that Homa Umigdal i.e. 
the wall and the tower are basic architectural 
elements in the early Jewish colonies in Palestine 
during the British colonization of Palestine 
(fig.4.7).  
Usually, the wall was built first then the tower, 
after that at the end the houses were built. Most 
of Jewish colonies had both elements and 
organized in a way to have eye contact with each 
other (Rotbard, 2002, 48-49). Both elements 
function as fortification and observation 
elements which they become later the main 
concepts (fortification & observation) regarding 
the location of colonies in the West Bank 
(fig.4.8).  
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Fig. 4.8: The colony is located on the top of mountain surrounded with fence, having a position of 
surveillance. Source: Halawani, May, 2013  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.7: The tower is one of main architectural element in the early Zionist and Jewish colonies.  
Source: http://www.jmeshel.com/109-daniel-zamir-shir-hashomer/#more-2487  
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In 1979, three regional Jewish councils in the West Bank were created by issuing the military order 
number 783. They were given planning “authority” over lands in the West Bank (Coon, 1992, 183). 
Then other two councils were added later (Benvenisti, 1984, 39). The military order number 783 
defines the jurisdictional and planning boundaries of regional Jewish councils as "the combination of 
all the built-up areas of the settlements belonging to each council" (Benvenisti, 1984, 40). Then the 
boundaries of the jurisdictional area were widely extended by the military order 848 which orders to 
include all lands classified as land for military purposes and “state land”. In 1981 five local 
(municipal) were established by military order number 982. The local councils were empowered to 
carry out large range of activities, such as levy taxes, “legislate” of local laws (ibid, 40).    
All the mentioned colonial policies (preparing plans and establishing regional councils) have paved 
the way to implant more and more colonies, changing the demography in the West Bank.   
4.6.1.2 Colony Models    
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2012) records that the number of Jewish settlers is about 
50,000 person who are living in 149 colonies in the West Bank and in about 100 outposts
20
, including 
“East Jerusalem”. Most of colonies in the West Bank are on the top of the mountains and Jordan 
valley without urban integration with Palestinian cities or villages, except into two cases. Firstly, 
Hebron city where about 600 settlers live in the heart of the old city (the previous city center) of 
Hebron. Their existence has led to many restrictions imposed on Palestinians such as: closing 
hundreds of shops and forbidding Palestinian movement in some streets (OCHA, 2007). 
Consequently, thousands of Palestinians forced to leave the city center which transformed from a 
space full of commercial activity to ghost center. Jerusalem is an example where many Jewish settlers 
live in houses that confiscated from Muslims and located within the urban fabric of the old city of 
Jerusalem.  
The following map shows colonies geographic location, classifying them chronologically in term of 
periods of construction; 1967- 1977, 1978-1993, 1993-2013.The table in appendix I details the 
chronological increase of settlers in West Bank and Jerusalem.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20  Outpost refers to the colonies that constructed without an “official approval” from “Israeli Government”.  
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Fig. 4.9: The chronology of the Jewish colonies in the West Bank. Source: Arij, 2014 
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As study conducted by B’Tselem (2002) about colony policy in the West Bank, classifies the type of 
colonies into four types as the following:  
 Cooperative settlements:  
 
They can be subdivided into three models; kibbutz, moshav and cooperative moshav. The building of 
this type of colonies (in the West Bank) began early in 1970s. In the occupied 1948 land, this type 
was constructed before 1948. In the West Bank, most of them founded in the first two decades of the 
occupation and they were constructed based on the Allon plan. The common features of all three 
models (kibbutzim, moshavim, and cooperative moshavim), especially during the early stages of their 
existence in the West Bank are their agricultural character (B’Tselem, 2002). In other words, they are 
communal farms, but with some minor differences in terms of ownership of mode of production and 
socialist concepts. The key features of kibbutzim are; equal sharing in the distribution of income 
between members, private no property, a noncash economy (Abramitzky, 2011, 185).But, now the 
socialist ideology totally changed.  
 
Cooperative Moshav consists of small separate farms which are divided into two types, the family 
farm unit which is the basic unit of production, and communally cultivated plots. Additionally, a 
multipurpose co-operative organization exists to handle joint purchasing of supplies and marketing of 
produce (Bittner, Sofer, 2013, 13). In other words, regarding the ownership it is a mixed between 
private and communal properties and marketing is done cooperatively. In the model of Moshav, 
people own their houses and cooperate together regarding the issue of marketing and there is no 
shared property.  
 
 Community settlements  
 
There are an initiative of Gush Emunim and its settlement wing (Amana). They are cooperative 
associations registered with the Registrar of Associations consisting of 100-200 families. Most of the 
members of community settlement are employed in nearby cities. There are about sixty-six colonies in 
the West Bank that has been classified as community settlements. Most of them are located in the 
mountain strip and Jerusalem Metropolis, comprising some 100-200 families (B’Tselem, 2002). Efrat 
colony which lies near Bethlehem on the road between Jerusalem and Hebron is an example of a 
community colony (4.10). The houses are mostly single-family homes of one or two stories with tiled 
roofs.  
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 Rural & urban settlements  
 
The distinction between these depends on the number of persons who live in a settlement. A 
settlement is classified as urban if it is inhabited with more than 2000 persons; otherwise it is 
classified as a rural (B’Tselem, 2002). In the year 2002, there are twelve settlements defined as rural 
and thirteen defined as urban in the West Bank, with a further twelve urban (ibid, 24). Ariel and 
Ma'aleh Adumim are examples of urban colonies (fig.4.11). They have high level service standards, 
including commercial centers, public spaces, civic centers, high schools, and sometimes even 
universities.  
 
 
 
 
Once a colony is constructed, it means that it will expand in the future. The “Oslo agreement” and the 
negotiations between “Israel” and “Palestinian Authority” have not stopped declarations of new 
housing units in colonies. After Oslo the number of settlers in the West Bank increased exponentially. 
They are doubled between the years 1993 and 2012, going from 257,700 to 500,000.  
Fig. 4.11: Ma'aleh Adumim in Jerusalem is an example of urban colony. Source: Halawani, 2006 
Fig. 4.10: Efrat colony is near the road which links between Jerusalem and Hebron. Source: Halawani, September, 2014 
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In parallel of speeding up the construction and expansion of colonies, “Israel” encourages and 
facilitates Jewish settlers to live in by providing “an automatic grant of a subsidized mortgage, wide-
ranging benefits in education, such as free education from age three, extended school days, free 
transportation to schools, and higher teachers’ salaries; for industry and agriculture, by grants and 
subsidies, and indemnification for the taxes imposed on their produce by the European Union; in 
taxation, by imposing taxes significantly lower than in communities inside the Green Line” (B’tselem, 
2010, 5).  
In order to provide a detail view of how fast the colonies are growing, the Areil colony located at the 
heart of the West Bank on series of hills provides a good example. This colony is considered one of 
the fast growing and one of the largest colony blocks in the West Bank. It was established in 1978. 
The colony's population has increased from 5,300 in 1987 to 17,849 in 2011. And the built up area 
increased from 1,043 dunums to 6,030 dunums in 2005 (fig. 4.12). Moreover, the apartheid wall 
surrounds it from three directions to be connected to other colonies in the occupied 1948 lands. Both 
Ariel and the wall have been limiting Salfit city from urban development. They separate seven 
Palestinians villages in the district from easy access to Salfit city, causing hardship of citizens to 
obtain their essential services (educational, medical, and commercial) and forcing them to travel long 
distance to reach Salfit which means that the journey that previously took five minutes, nowadays it 
takes more than 30 minutes (fig. 4.13).  
 
Fig. 4.12: The expansion of Areil colony. Source: OCHA, 2007  
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The area controlled by the Jewish colonies does not just include the built-up area which is 
approximately (in the year 2009) 55,479 dunums (10% of the total area of the West bank including 
the area of “East Jerusalem”) but it includes surrounding areas. They are surrounded by lands 
classified as jurisdictional areas which consist of two types; jurisdictional area of the colony and 
jurisdictional area of the regional councils. Both types cover a percentage approximately 43% of the 
total area of the West Bank including the area of “East Jerusalem” (B’tselem, 2010, 11). The 
percentage is very close to OCHA analysis, concerning Jewish colonies and other related 
infrastructures in the West Bank. OCHA reports more than 38% of the West Bank consists of Israeli 
settlements outposts, Israeli military bases and closed military area (OHCA, 2007, 8)   
 
All colonies in the West Bank are located in ‘area C’, they are woven together by a network of 
movement infrastructure in three-dimension space; bridges above the Palestinian lands or tunnels 
beneath them. In addition, the areas that surround colonies are buffer zones in which no Palestinian 
Fig. 4.13: Ariel colony, separating villages from the regional center (Salfit). Source: Arij.  
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can go to these areas because he/she will expose himself to risk. Actually armed outposts’ settlers 
often violently drive Palestinians farmers off from their lands (Weizman, 2007, 4).  
 
 
4.6.1.3 Outposts  
Th trem outpost means a colony that is constructed by Jewish settlers without any “formal approval” 
from the “government of Israel”. Generally, they have been built after the year 1991. By 2008 there 
were 100 outposts in which there are approximately 6000 settlers living their according to Peace Now 
organization. They consist of mobile houses (caravans) and infrastructure (roads, water, and 
electricity) (fig. 4.15). Since there are no real restrictions of building outposts, it is not difficult for a 
Fig. 4.14: Infrastructure was constructed to link the colonies together. Source: Halawani, September, 2014 
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group of settlers to plan and construct an outpost. Many lands in the West Bank are classified as a so-
called “state land”, so the dilemma of the ownership is not a major problem for occupiers, what really 
they need is a bulldozer for road construction and some caravans (fig. 4.16). Actually, most of the 
outposts are located very near to colonies. OCHA (2007) points out that 90% of the outposts are 
located within three kilometers of colonies and that facilitates their incorporation together to be one 
urban unit. Or they can serve as pioneer colony (nuclei), which then expand. In addition to that they 
are also positioned strategically on hilltops of the West Bank, having surveillance positions in relation 
with surrounding Palestinian villages.  
Despite that outposts have been set up without the required permits and considered unauthorized by 
the occupying power, they received indirect support of many of the “Israeli ministries”. The 
mechanism of building outposts can be implemented quickly by avoiding bureaucratic procedures 
such as official approvals of “Israeli ministers” and planning departments.  
 
Jewish settlers sometimes produce arguments for establishing outposts. For example, Weizman (2007, 
1-3) narrates a story behind establishing Megron outpost, one of the biggest outposts in the West 
Bank, highlighting the deceptive ways that were followed by Jewish settlers to build the outpost. In 
1999 many settlers asked the “Israeli military commander” of the West Bank to establish antenna 
Fig. 4.15: One of outpost consists of a few portable buildings or caravans. Source: Christian Middle East Watch. 
http://cmewonline.com/2012/04/04/why-all-the-fuss-about-an-outpost-called-migron/. 
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Fig. 4.16:  The main outpost components are roads and caravans. Source: B’Tselem, 2002   
tower of a cellphone beside the route number 60, a road connects Jerusalem with the colonies in the 
northern West Bank. The settlers determined the location of the hill top which is the same hill top that 
settlers claimed that it was an archeological summit goes back to a biblical town of Migron. On the 
contrary the excavations showed that the archaeological site dates back to Byzantine era. For the 
purpose of building the antenna, the water and electricity company provided the site with both 
services. Then in 2001 the settlers received the permission from the military commander to hire 24-
hour “security guard” who lived in a caravan and brought with him his family. After that, in March 
2002, other five families joined the guard's family. Gradually, the Megaron outpost had grown, having 
by the mid-2006 sixty trailer houses.   
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4.6.2 Bypass Roads 
In parallel of colonies construction in the West bank, road network has been established to connect 
colonies together and to bypass Palestinian towns and villages. Palestinians are restricted to travel on 
certain segments. The idea of separation between the occupiers and those who have been occupied can 
be found in many sectors in the West Bank such as planning paradigm and is also imbedded in the 
road network which was designed and managed on the basis of separation between colonizers and 
colonized after the War 1967. It is worth to mention that Palestinians who live in Jerusalem were 
given blue identity cards to have a free movement on the roads network. While other Palestinians who 
live in the West Bank are given green or orange identity cards and they have not been allowed to enter 
Jerusalem or the occupied 1948 lands since 1991.   
In the West Bank the main development of roads after 1967 comes to serve the colonies in order to 
make them more attractive to Jewish settlers. During the first decade of the occupation when the 
Labor party was in power (1967-1977) the planned roads was very convenient to Allon plan. During 
this period the roads were planned in the direction north-south to serve the established colonies in the 
Jordan valley. There were no planned roads in the horizontal direction crossing the West Bank, except 
the (so-called “Trans-Samaria road”) which was established for military purposes as (Benvenisti & 
Khayat, 1988, 35) points out "by the mid-1970s, planning began on the Trans-Samaria road mainly 
for military purposes".  
The bypass network influences the transformation of the landscape of the West bank; causing 
fragmentation of the land, making barriers between Palestinian communities, and limiting their urban 
development. It is worth to mention that (as clarified in the previous section) the network is not into 
two dimension space, but it was constructed to be in three dimensional spaces; there are tunnels and 
bridges, dominating the landscape such as the bridge and very long tunnels in the area south of 
Jerusalem.   
For the purpose of construction of bypass roads, large areas from the Land of Palestine have been 
confiscated by two laws issued by the occupation; “requisition for military needs” and “expropriation 
for public use.” Before 1990s the meaning of so-called military needs was defined as the presence of 
settlers is an aid to the army, and after 1990s the interpretation of the law altered to be defined as 
providing safe roads for settlers (B’tselem, 2004, 6). Laws were produced to confiscate lands from 
people of Palestine. When owners of lands petitioned to “Israeli court” against confiscation orders, 
what happened that their petitions were refused under the pretext of “security reasons”.  
 
B’tselem (2002, 50) reports one of those cases in which “Israeli army” issued orders for confiscating 
4,386 dunams of private land, for the purpose of constructing seventeen bypass roads. In one of these 
cases Palestinian residents petitioned to the “High Court” against the confiscation orders insisting that 
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bypass roads could not be considered a “military need” because the roads used to serve Jewish 
settlers. However, the court rejected the petition in the name of "security needs”.  
 
4.6.3 The Apartheid Wall  
The construction of the wall was begun in June 2002 after the second Intifada had erupted
21
. The wall 
was planned to be about 700 km length. In January 2013, two third of the wall was constructed. UN 
(2010) reports that by July 2010, about 61.4% of the 707 kilometer-long of the wall has been 
constructed, a further 8.4% is under construction and 30.1% is planned but not yet constructed. Parts 
of the structure consist of concrete wall with eight meters high and there are cylindrical concrete 
observers towers are implanted along it. The other part consists of fence which is made up of a 
concrete base with three to five-meters- high wire with electronic sensors to detect movement when 
touched, and patrol road surrounded by coiled barbed wire. The total width that includes these 
components ranges from 35 to 100 meters.    
The wall snakes through the West Bank to encompass  colonies, separating Palestinians farmers from 
their farms, restricting accessibility to lands, isolating Palestinian communities from each other, 
dividing people of Palestine by creating enclaves and cantons, and destroying the fabric of life (fig. 
4.17). Since the wall has been built thousands of Palestinians forced to cross it daily and waiting for 
long time period of time in front of military check points. 
 
 
                                                          
21 Second Intifada is a Palestinian uprising erupted in 2000 as a result of Sharon entering to Al Aqsa Mosque.  
Fig. 4.17: The wall separates the agricultural lands from Beit Jala town. Source: Halawani, September, 2014 
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The wall influences negatively the whole sectors of Palestinians life in terms of demography, socio-
economic, cultural, educational, and health sector. Importantly, the next chapter will highlight that the 
route of the wall was planned to allow colonies to expand in the future. This echoes the study by 
(Lein, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005), which concludes that under the guise of security the wall was planned 
to enable the colonies in the West Bank to expand. The study reviewed the planned route of the wall 
that surrounds sixty colonies in the West Bank including “East Jerusalem” to find that expansion 
plans of colonies played a significant role in determining the route “In most cases, the barrier’s route 
in the relevant sections was set hundreds, and even thousands, of meters from the built-up area of each 
settlement” (ibid, 12). Moreover, the route of the wall in some areas is nearly adjacent to Palestinians 
cities and villages; forming obstacles for the future development and also the wall separates people 
from natural resource (water and land) as the next chapters will details.  
The area that is located between the wall and the “green line” termed and declared by the occupation 
as a “Seam Zone”, covering about 137,936.6 dunams (2.46 percent of the area of the West Bank). 
This zone is considered a “closed military zones”, meaning that Palestinians are required a permit to 
enter (B’tselem, 2012, 25-26). OCHA estimates that the number of Palestinians who live in this area 
is approximately 7,500 people
22
 (ibid, 27). In effect, they live in a closed area where no Palestinians 
(even farmers who owns farms) can enter to the “Seam Zone” except by an “Israeli permit”23.   
 
According to the map (fig. 4.18), it is noted that the wall obviously penetrates the West Bank to 
encompass as many colonies as possible with other colonies that were constructed in the occupied 
1948 land, including the Ariel and Kedumim colonies in the north, all colonies in Jerusalem such as 
Neve Yacov, Ma'ale Adummim in the Jerusalem metropolitan, and Etzion block in the south. The 
penetrations of the wall take the form of 'fingers' into the West Bank, dividing it into three separated 
cantons. It separates Palestinians communities while it achieves geographical continuity between the 
colonies. The main casualty has been the agricultural sector because the wall cut off hundreds of 
Palestinian farmers and traders from their lands which are considered main economic resources. 
Indeed, the wall isolates thousands of hectares of agricultural lands owned by Palestinians from their 
villages and cities where they live. In order to have an access to go to work in their land, they have to 
take permission from “Israeli Administration of Civil Affairs”, which asked farmers to prove their 
                                                          
22 There are approximately 385,000 Jewish settlers live in the “Seam Zone” (UNWRA & UNOCHA, 2008, 6). And In this 
area there are 8 industrial zones and 82 colonies. 
 
23 There are 66 gates that organize the movement of farmers who have a permit to the “Seam Zone”. There are three types of 
gates; namely agricultural gates (12 gates) which open three times a day, secondly weekly gates (10 gates) which open one 
to three days a week only for those who own olive gardens, thirdly seasonal gates (44 gates)  which open only during the 
period of olive harvesting , generally between September to November (B’tselem, 2013, 28). There are some gates, however, 
are permanently closed.  
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ownership by documents. Then, if they have permission, farmers have to go through gates with 
limited time-work in their farms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The policy of control of land grows gradually by the wall construction; people of Palestine’s lands 
have been confiscating to build the wall. Additionally, the original landscape of the West Bank has 
 Fig. 4.18: The apartheid wall. Source: Arij, 2014 
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been vanishing; bulldozers cleared the way on which the wall was planned to be established. As a 
result thousands of olive trees growing along the planned route were uprooted. Up to November 2003, 
there were 100,000 olive trees uprooted, some of them were over 500 years old (Hopper, 2007, 93). 
Between the years 2004 to 2007, there are 166 structures near the wall demolished by “Israeli Civilian 
Administration” and there are also an additional 754 demolition orders issued against other structures 
near the wall (B’tselem (website), 2008).  
 
The continuous construction of the wall forced Palestinians to make petitions against the wall to 
“Israeli Courts” which ordered in few cases the “Israeli military” to provide alternatives and in many 
cases refused petitions
24
.  By 2012, Palestinian’s petitions against the wall reached approximately 150 
petitions, but most of them were denied (B’tselem, 2012, 9).  
 
Once the wall is constructed, and once it encompasses colonies, it becomes a sharp line and very 
obvious element of the landscape that separates between colonies and Palestinians communities. All 
changes to its route have not altered the meaning of oppression & injustice and the aim to Judaize the 
land.  
 
4.7 Manipulation of Laws in the West Bank  
The landscape transformation and the territorial control have been occurring through the domain of 
fabricated law which is playing a deceptive role in changing the character of the indigenous 
landscape. Through urban and regional planning laws the occupying power tries to divert the original 
meaning of landscape of prosperity and development to the meaning of oppression and control. In 
order to clarify this transformation, it is important to examine in depth, the development of planning 
policies in Palestine several decades ago. Because the previous planning laws that organize planning 
activities were not abolished; however, the occupying power made some changes and amendments to 
them. And on other occasions, it gave the laws specific interpretations that suit its colonial goals.  
After the 1948 war, which resulted in the occupation of the first part of Palestine, the law of absentees 
was issued to confiscate the properties of people of Palestine who were expelled outside their home 
country. Then, in 1967 dual planning systems were created in the West Bank; one for establishing 
colonies and another for Palestinians communities. In order to legalize the territorial colonization, the 
occupying power used some inherited laws in a selective manner, imposing its own colonial 
interpretation.   
                                                          
24 As an example in September 2005 the “Israeli Supreme Court” ordered reconsideration of the route around Alfei Menashe, 
south of Qalqilya. Details will be examined in the next chapter. 
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As a result planning laws contain manipulated laws from Ottoman, British, and Jordanian periods, as 
well as new laws specifically aimed at containing and controlling Palestinian communities. This 
section will discuss the way in which these manipulated laws have been deployed.  
4.7.1 Ottoman Laws  
Palestine was part of the Islamic Ottoman State between (1516 - the end of the First World War), 
during that era there was a tenure system organizing property and possession of land and dividing it 
into five categories: mulk (private), miri (state), waqf (reserved land), matruka (abandoned), and 
mawat (not usable). The occupying power made a tenure system by manipulating some of the 
aforementioned classifications especially the mawat land, which means land that is not in the 
possession of anybody, and is far more than a mile and a half from the borders of the inhabited zone: 
according to the Islamic law anyone who cultivates it has the right to possess, but if he/she neglects 
the land for three consecutive years without cultivating, it would be given to another one (Meron, 
1981, 4).  
In other words, individuals can own mawat lands (uncultivated and not-inhabited land located around 
cities and villages) by cultivating it, but the ownership of the land would revert to another person if 
the land is left uncultivated. This law was manipulated to make the entity of occupation the only 
owner of the land and suspending the individual property rights, as in Ottoman period when 
individuals had the right to own the un-owned land around cities and villages by cultivating it 
(Alexander, 2010). In other words the law was changed; however the name was kept to be used as a 
facade (“legal tool”) behind it oppression actions occur.  
After the second intifada (Palestinian uprising against the occupation) in the year 2000, Palestinian 
farmers were prevented from cultivating their own lands near Jewish colonies, and that resulted in 
leaving their lands without cultivation for a period of time (three years or more) which enabled the 
occupying power to confiscate their lands and to change its classification into a “state land” according 
to the manipulated Ottoman Land Law (Weizmen, 2007, 118). Paz-Fuch and Cohen-Lifshiz (2010) 
points out that “Israel” declared 1.6 million dunums as "state land". 
4.7.2 British Laws  
During the British colonization and after the division of Palestine into six administrative districts, 
three regional plans were prepared covering the land of Palestine; plan RJ/5 for the Jerusalem region, 
plan S/15 for the north region (Nablus), and plan R/6 for the south region. Despite that those plans 
were on the regional scale, they were a statutory tool for the authority to issue building permits in the 
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villages in which no detailed plan had been prepared during the British period
25
. The plans included 
some detailed regulations, concerning building permits such as specifying the minimum lot size, the 
maximum built-up area on a lot, and the building lines (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 55-57).  
The British regional plans are still in force in these days in 'area C'
26
, despite they are prepared in 
1940s.  For example, the S/15 regional plan covers the northern part of the West Bank which consists 
of three different zones; agriculture, development, and natural reserve zones. The development zone 
includes the main cities such as Tulkarem, Nablus, and Jenin, represented by a diagrammatic circle in 
which building permission was permitted under specific regulations
27,
 while the small circles 
represent the locations of villages
28 
(fig. 4.19).  
The agricultural zone does not mean a prohibition of any type of building, but it means that the 
development has restrictions on construction. In other words, the agricultural zone which is the main 
component, covering most of the area in plan S/15, directs the development towards agricultural 
activity. The plan authorizes to construct farming buildings, green houses, recreation buildings, 
stables, and dwelling housing with low density (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 60-61). However, the 
ability to construct in the agricultural zone depends on the approval of land subdivision by planning 
authorities, thereby enabling a limited construction in the agricultural zone (ibid, 73). Consequently, 
the British planning authorities legalized residential construction on those lands which were classified 
as agricultural zone.  
 
The regional plans have never been abolished in Palestine after the end of British colonization
29
. 
Paradoxically, the “Israeli civil administration”30 uses regional plans to prevent any Palestinian 
development in agricultural zone. According to Coon (1992, 79-80), “Israel” used the British regional 
plans to limit Palestinians growth and indirectly to create opportunity for Jewish colonies to expand in 
two ways: namely, it has prohibited Palestinians from building more than one unit on a plot of land by 
not authorizing the parcellation of lands. Secondly, it has prevented Palestinians from development 
outside their villages and cities, because all the surrounding lands were classified as agricultural 
                                                          
25 Only three detailed plans for three Palestinians villages were prepared during British period. However, master plans were 
prepared to all cities in the West Bank (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 79).  
 
26 'Area C' is a classification of lands in the West Bank according to “Oslo agreement” B. 
 
27 According to S/15 regional plan the maximum percentage of building is 50% (Benvenisti & Khayat, 1988, 55). 
28 In some cases the plan did not mark small number of villages that existed during the British period (Shalev, Cohen-
Lifshitz, 2008, 74). 
 
29Despite that, during the Jordanian period, there was no attention given to the British regional plans. 
 
30 In 1981 “Israel” established the "Civil Administration" which is operated under the authority of military commander. Its 
task was to deal with the affairs of Palestinian civilians (water, electricity, planning and so on) in the West Bank. 
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zones, although, in legal terms, there is no obstacle to issue building permits in agricultural zone. 
Later on, it has been clearly unveiled that the restrictions on building construction in the agricultural 
zone were for reserving lands for colonial purposes.  
 
 
4.7.3 Jordanian Law   
During the first decade of the Jordanian rule, the British law (136 ordinance) was kept in force for 
organizing the development of cities and villages. After that, this was replaced by the ‘Jordanian local 
authorities' law’ to be applied in both Jordan and the West Bank. In the year 1966, a new law ("the 
law of cities, villages and buildings no.79") was enacted in the West Bank (Coon, 1992, 41-42) and it 
is still in force until present time in 'area C', although “Israel” amended it by issuing the military order 
number 418. This amendment aimed to transfer the power of planning to the “Israeli military 
commander” as this section explains.  
According to law no. 79, there are three levels of planning authorities, on national, district, and local 
level. The first level (national) is represented by the High Planning Council (HPC), which is headed 
by the minister of interior who is responsible of declaring or cancelling planning areas based on the 
Fig. 4.19 British regional plan (S/15). Source: Coon, 1992 
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HPC recommendation
31.
 According to the article 6 of law 79, the roles of HPC are to declare the 
boundaries of planning areas and to approve districts and local plans. The second level (district) is 
represented by the district planning committee. The third level (local) consists of municipal or village 
councils.  
At the Jordanian period, there were three district commissions (Nablus, Jerusalem, and Hebron) 
(Coon, 1992, 42). According to article 8 of law 79, the responsibility of district commission includes 
approving master plans, reviewing objections to regional, master, and detailed plans, and reviewing 
appeals against the decisions of local committees in the district. The third level (local) consists of the 
municipal or village councils. According to article 9 (1) of law 79, the responsibility of the councils 
includes, preparing master plans and detailed plans, approving the parcellation schemes, issuing 
building permits, and inspecting the construction of buildings. According to the law all plans 
(regional, master, and detailed plans) should be published for a deposit of two months, in order to give 
people the right of objection during this period.  
The Jordanian planning law No.79 remained in force till 1971 when “Israel” amended it by issuing 
military order number 418. Referring to article 2(1) of the military order, the power of planning, 
which was in the hand of the minister of interior during the Jordanian period, should be transferred to 
the commissioner appointed by the “Israeli military commander”; accordingly the commissioner had 
the full authority to declare the boundaries of planning zones. The same article abolished District 
Committees and transferred all their powers to the High Planning Council (HPC). Moreover, it also 
abolished the village councils as local planning committees, which were replaced by sub committees 
known as Village Planning Committees. In this case, the abolitions of two committees were not 
directed toward a more efficient planning system but instead aimed to centralize power in one 
committee to ensure an ultimate control.  
According to those amendments, the power of development and planning in 'area C' was concentrated 
in one central body (HPC), whose members - in addition to village planning committees - were totally 
appointed by “Israeli military commander”, as article 4 of M.O. 418 points out. Thus, urban planning 
in 'area C' had become a tool in the hand of military occupying power. According to Khamaisi (1997) 
the Israeli amendments to the Jordanian planning law was to restrict Palestinian urban growth.   
The HPC consists of six military officers, including the demolitions committee, the settlements 
committee, and the general committee. The responsibility of the development of Palestinian cities and 
villages is devoted to the general committee, while the settlements committee has the responsibility 
                                                          
31 Source: article 4 of law 79. The law of Cities, Villages and Buildings no.79 are available in Arabic language on the web 
site: http://www.dft.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_dataentry&pid=12&leg_id=223 (accessed in 2 Feb. 2013). 
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for the development of colonies in the West Bank. The demolition committee has the responsibility 
for issuing demolition orders for houses built by Palestinians without building permits (Coon, 1992, 
60-61). It is worth mentioning that by 1987, no planning scheme concerning Palestinians were 
approved except the Beit Jalla master plan (Benvenisti, Khayat, 1988, 57).  
4.8 New Laws of Control  
 
In an effort to establish a “juridical” system for the purpose of confiscation of land of Palestine and 
for strengthening the existence of Jewish settlers in Palestine, special laws were enacted; law of 
absentees and military orders. The restrictions and confiscations occur by the amendment and 
misrepresentation of inherited laws as explained in previous section and also by enacting new laws 
(law of absentees and military orders) as this section explains.  
4.8.1 Law of Absentees (after 1948) 
 
After the 1948 war, many Palestinians (about 750,000) were expelled from Palestine; from their 
original villages and cities to the neighbouring Arab countries or to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The properties left by Palestinian refugees were used to house Jewish settlers. And, in order to 
legitimize the confiscation of this property, “Israel” made a law to confiscate land of Palestine, called 
Law of Absentees’ Property. This law was approved by the “Israeli parliament” (Knesset) in 
1950.”This law stated that any person, who at any time after November 29, 1947, had been a citizen 
of any Arab state or an inhabitant of one of them or of any part of Palestine outside the boundaries of 
the State of Israel, was an absentee, and his property was entrusted to the Custodian of Absentee 
Property “(Benvenisti, 1976). This law has been used also after the War of 1967, in order to possess 
private properties of Palestinians who were expelled outside West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
4.8.2 Military Orders (after 1967) 
 
Group of military orders, after 1967, were issued to divide the West bank planning system into a dual 
system: one to establish and develop the colonies and another to administrate the Palestinian 
communities. As an example, the military order number 783 was issued in 1979 to establish regional 
councils for Jews in the West Bank. The jurisdictional and planning boundaries of regional councils 
were defined as "the combination of all the built-up areas of the settlements belonging to each 
council" (Benvenisti, 1984, 40). Then the boundaries of the jurisdictional area were widely extended 
by the military order 848 in order to include all lands classified for military purposes and state land 
(Ibid, 40).  
 
Furthermore, in 1981 five local (municipal) councils were established by military order number 982. 
The local councils did not just function to provide services, but they were empowered to “legislate” 
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local laws. The Jewish regional councils in the West bank were established in order to participate in 
high planning decisions in terms of economy, infrastructure, laws, and water matters in the West Bank 
while at the same time the military order number 418 abolished the regional committees from the 
structure of planning related to Palestinian communities, concentrating the power of planning in a 
single body (High Planning Council) in order to ensure that any planning decision is taken by the 
“Israeli military commander”. Additionally the same military order transferred the power of planning 
from a minister of interior as the previous Jordanian law stated to a commissioner appointed by the 
“Israeli military commander”, accordingly the commissioner has the full authority to declare the 
planning area boundaries. There are other hundreds of military orders issued to fully control many 
aspects of Palestinian life in terms of water and agriculture.  
 
4.9 Manipulation of planning  
As illustrated in the part of theories, planning emerged out as an urgent need to deal with the ills of 
urbanization after industrial revolution. Consequently, many planning theories tried to look for good 
and workable cities. However, in the case of the West Bank as this thesis highlights, planning have 
been deviated from its original role of development to the role of arresting development as the 
following sections illustrate:  
 
4.9.1 Manipulation of Palestinian Villages Master Plans  
As mentioned in 1981 “Israel” established the Civil Administration to deal with the affairs of civilians 
(water, electricity, planning and so on). The Civilian Administration prepared master plans concerning 
Palestinians villages in the West Bank. However, by 1987 “Israel” had not approved any master plan 
for Palestinian villages. Before Oslo (1993), the civil administration operated twenty-five 
municipalities excluding “East Jerusalem”, and 87 village councils in the West Bank (Coon, 1992, 
38). However, after Oslo it has the responsibility of administrative aspects in the ‘area C’ where 149 
Palestinian communities are located. There are also 150 villages, its buildup area are located in ‘area 
B’, while they have lands in ‘area C’ (Cohen-Lifshift, Shalev, 2008, 10).   
The process of preparing and approving master plans were accelerated before so-called Oslo 
agreement: the Civilian Administration in the West Bank approved around 400 master plans for 
Palestinian villages all over the West Bank. Nevertheless, after “Oslo agreement”, by 2004 no master 
plan was approved or deposited (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 101-102). The first step toward the 
preparation of master plans was to set plan boundaries. For that purpose, on aerial maps Civilian 
Administration's planners drew blue line as a boundary adjacent to the Palestinian built-up area, but 
not including the isolated building on agricultural lands (Ibid, 102). Coon (1992, 85) describes the 
process of preparation of the plans: "the most significant feature of these plans is the 'plan boundary': 
this does not, as might be supposed, define the area for which planning policies were to be prepared, 
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Fig. 4.20: The master plan of the Batillue village. Source: Batillue local Council    
 
but rather the zone within all urban development is to be confined". Thus, the Civil Administration 
prepared master plans for Palestinian villages which were not based on reforming planning 
consideration but were consistent with its policy of limiting the development of Palestinian cities and 
villages. According to the civil administration, between January 2000 and September 2007, 
Palestinians who live in ‘area C’ applied 1,634 applications to obtain building permission. However, 
only 91 applications were approved which form just 5.6 percent from the total number of applications 
- an average of 13 a year- (Shalev & Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 10). Consequently, the civil administration 
restricts Palestinians from building in ‘area C’, leading them to build without building permits, while 
the colonies construction has been continuing all over ‘area C’.  
The following master plan of 
the Batillue village (fig.4.20) is 
an example about the way that 
followed by the Civilian 
Administration to restrict 
villages development. In 1994 
the master plan was approved. 
The small village was divided 
into three parts in order to 
confine the built-up area and 
exclude all the areas where 
development has not yet taken 
place. Moreover, the plan 
boundary (the blue line) is 
nearly adjacent to the built-up 
area and was drawn in order to 
not include the scattered houses 
in agricultural lands. In addition 
to that it is clear that the plan 
allocates no land for public 
services (such as schools, medical centres), and no gardens or parks. It was designed only for 
residential services which represented by three type of zones differs in terms of construction density; 
high density (blue colour), medium density (yellow colour), and law density (orange colour).  
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4.9.2  Manipulation of Green Zones Policy  
Green zones in the discipline of planning mean lands to remain as preserved zones or agricultural 
lands. Practically, in the case of the West Bank, some lands that were classified as green zones 
whether in British regional plans, Jordanian master plans, or the occupation’s planning schemes 
would eventually be confiscated to play a 'double edged policy' to block the Palestinian development 
in one hand, whereas to expand the Jewish growth on the other hand. 
According to British regional plans of the West Bank, most of the areas outside the Palestinian 
villages and cities have been classified as agricultural zones. However, most of Jewish colonies were 
constructed on these lands, while the same plans were used to prohibit Palestinian construction due to 
the classification of land as agricultural zone.  
Some colonies were built totally on the land classified as natural preserved lands such as Har Homa 
and Shilo. Others were built partially on the lands that were classified as a natural preserved land. 
What is important to say that building on green zone and uprooting trees occurred in the name of the 
law as in the case of ‘Abu-Ghnaim' mountain. This mountain is located within the boundaries of “East 
Jerusalem”, having an area of about three thousand dunums (each dunum equals 1000 m2). The 
Jordanian government considered it as a natural preserve area before 1967, and even after this year 
“Israel” classified this mountain as a green area in which any kind of construction is prohibited in 
order to preserve the natural beauty of the city. 
On the sixth of June 1991, “Israel’s Minister of Finance”, Isaac Modu’ee, ordered the confiscation of 
land on and around the forested mountain of Abu-Ghnaim in order to construct Har-Homa colony. 
Accordingly, Jerusalem municipality reclassified the mountain to a housing zone then a master plan 
prepared (fig. 4.21), providing an area of about 2056 dunums with high-density housing zones. The 
master plan allows building 6,500 housing units, in addition to many different developmental projects 
such as (industrial, recreational, commercial projects and so on). The construction of this colony 
continues until the time of writing of this thesis. 
What happened is that the scene of the green pine trees was totally removed from the scene and was 
replaced by a forest of concrete buildings (fig.4.22). The confiscation of the mountain was based on a 
British inherited law (acquisition for public purposes, ordinance of 1943), which gave to an authority 
the power of expropriating lands for public use. However, in the case of Har Homa, the land 
expropriation based on this law was for the benefit of Jewish settlers, not for the public use (as the law 
states).  According to Holzman-Gazit (2007, 12), this law empowers “the minister of finance” to 
apply the expropriation without passing it through a bureaucratic process of planning.  
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 Fig. 4.22: Vanishing of green zones. Source: Jerusalem Municipality. Edited by Halawani, 2015 
 
Fig. 4.21:  Har-Homa colony master plan. Source: Jerusalem Municipality, edited by Halawani, 2015  
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4.10 Annihilation of Names of the Palestinian Landscape  
Valleys, cities, villages names have been affected by the context of occupation and many of them 
were changed from the Arabic names to Hebrew names. The annihilation of Arabic names regarding 
the features of landscape goes back before the year 1948 when Jews established a committee in that 
period to drew a Hebrew map in which the Arabic names of places and features of landscape were 
replaced by Hebrew names.  
Maps participate to create ‘facts on the ground’ because the ‘mapmaking’ and ‘cartographic 
knowledge’ is a powerful method to normalize what is happening on the ground. Maps spread 
knowledge about geography.  Hebrew map was prepared before 1948 to establish ‘facts on the 
ground’, as Benvenisti pointed out that “the creation of a Hebrew map was an extremely powerful 
means of doing so, no less important than the building of roads or the founding of settlements. It was, 
of course, also easier, quicker, and cheaper” (Benvenisti, 2002, 14).    
4.11 The Practice of Urbicide  
As illustrated the planning laws in the West Bank were developed not to promote Palestinians 
communities development, instead the law has been used as a vehicle of limiting their communities 
growth and development. In many cases, Palestinians are forced to build without “Israeli permits” 
then their houses face the risk of demolition. Sometimes the civil administration publishes demolition 
orders not for just one building, but for all buildings of a village. According to Graham (2004) the 
destruction of urban environment the city is termed urbicide. This violence against elements of build-
up environment can be described as urbicide.  
In 2011, a total of 622 Palestinian structures were demolished in the West Bank and Jerusalem, 
resulting in the displacement of 1,094 Palestinians (ICAHD, 2012).  A clear example of the 
destruction a village is the Susya village which is located to the south of Hebron. It consists of 58 
houses, a clinic, and a community centre in addition to that it includes solar energy panels and water 
cisterns because it is not connected to water and electricity network. This village was established 
decades ago before the establishment of the nearby colony (established in 1983) and that named with 
the same name of the Susya village. 
Series of demolition orders issued from 1994; firstly in 1986 when the occupying power declared the 
site of Susya village to be a national park. Thereby, residents of Susya were expelled and transferred 
to nearby lands registered by their names since the Ottoman era. Secondly, in 2001, they were 
forcefully removed from that land. In July, 2012 the Civil Administration distributed demolition 
orders regarding all structures of the village. But, this order was frozen by a High Court injunction 
(Jerusalem Post Newspaper, 27 August 2012). The civilian administration argues that the structures of 
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the village were built without permits, hiding that it is impossible to gain a permit in this area. And 
also it did not stop building Jewish outposts nearby (Haaretz, 27 June 2012).  
This village is one example of villages that are located in ‘area C’ where many restrictions on building 
houses have been imposed on Palestinians. “According to data obtained by Israeli NGO Bimkom 
from the Civil Administration for the years 2000-2007, every month it issued 60 home demolition 
orders, actually demolished 20 homes and issued only 1 construction permit” (B’Tselem, 29 Aug. 
2012)  
Demolitions are common in the Jordan Valley as “Israeli policy” is to strengthen the existence of 
Jewish settlers while weakening the existence of Palestinian. Large area in the Jordan valley was 
classified as a military zone. According to OCHA this area is about 1,919 Hectare (approximately 
18% of the total area of the West Bank). Close to this zone the Palestinian Bedouin village (Khirbit 
Makhoul) was destroyed in 30 September  2013 for the third time, destroying dozens of tin shacks and 
leaving over its families homeless (International Middle East Media Centre, 30 September 2013). 
Usually villages in the Jordan valley have been threatened to be demolished. Indeed, they have no 
right to get building permissions from the Civil Administration.  
4.12 Conclusion  
This chapter investigates the landscape transformation of the West Bank, providing a comprehensive 
analysis of the relation between the transformation of the landscape of the West Bank with planning, 
laws, and strategies of territorial colonization. It also highlights the different tools, methods, and 
procedures of control that have been adopted by “Israel” to sustain its absolute control over the 
landscape of Palestine.   
For the purpose of constructing a domain for control, “Israel” did not deactivated the inherited spatial 
plans and laws, but it made amendments in a deceptive way to make them suite its colonial activities. 
Through new planning laws (invented by the occupying power) “Israel” stripped of Palestinians 
properties and prevented Palestinians to build on their lands and develop their cities and villages. 
Through the manipulation of laws the original unique landscape was destroyed, depriving the 
Palestinians from their cultural, social and natural heritage.   
 
As demonstrated, in the domain of the misrepresentative law there is unfair power exercise upon 
Palestinians. The occupying power determines when and where to give them permissions to move and 
live. To hide partially the mentioned systematic devastation “Israel” makes possible for those whose 
land confiscated to make petitions and finally most of them will be rejected under the pretext of 
“security”.    
The West Bank (in the Occupied Palestine): Dimensions of control       
  
115 
 
Ch.4  
As a result of misuse of planning, the meaning of landscape is changed from the meaning of 
development to the meaning of control and domination; colonies locations (on top of mountains) play 
a role of surveillance, the apartheid wall divides the West Bank into enclaves and cantons, the bypass 
roads shape a barrier between villages and agricultural lands. Consequently, the new features in the 
landscape become an active force, exercising unfair power over its users.  
Water (ground and surface water) is also under control. Under fabricated laws, Palestinians have been 
restricted to take use from water resources. Immediately after the occupation of West Bank in 1967, 
series of military orders issued to control all water resources, denying Palestinians access to surface 
and underground water, and limiting the future possibility of utilizing surface or ground water by 
Palestinians. 
The strategies and methods of territorial colonization would lead eventually to elimination of some 
Palestinians communities from the geographic map. 
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Chapter 5: The Case Study Analysis (Qalqiliya District)  
__________________________________________________ 
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Case study (Qalqiliya district) selected to be analyzed 
in order to explore the way in which the landscape is transformed from a harmonious scene to a 
medium of exercising unfair power. Although this transformation has been occurring across all parts 
of Palestine, of course with different levels of intensity, this chapter examines the district of Qalqiliya. 
There are many characteristics distinguishing the Qalqiliya district from other districts in the West 
Bank:  
- The wall fragments the Qalqiliya district, creating enclaves and isolating villages from their 
surrounding environments and also from the remainder of the West-bank, causing a hard 
socio-economic situation for residents.  
- The wall was constructed around three sides of Qalqiliya city. Moreover, it was constructed 
closely adjacent to the build-up, limiting the future urban development of the city.    
- Agricultural lands are no longer continuous with their mother villages and cities, separating 
farmers from their lands. 
- Water resources (springs and water wells) are also isolated behind the wall.  
This chapter answers a central question about the way in which the landscape may be reconfigured for 
the purpose of full control over Palestinians. The chapter is divided into three parts; the first part 
focuses on the spatial changes that have taken place in the district after 1967, and discusses the 
procedures which are employed by the occupying power to sustain and expand its control over the 
land. It also examines the colonies development, analyzing their master plans and their future 
expansions. The second part is a descriptive analytical study of qualitative data gathered from the 
field which focuses on the impact of the wall on Palestinian communities, highlighting its role in 
deteriorating Palestinian quality of life in terms of economic, social, cultural, educational, and health 
issues. This section highlights the experience of people living in the local and regional confinements. 
For this purpose, in-depth interviews were conducted with twenty farmers and two group meetings. 
The interviewed sample covers all the communities affected by the wall. The third section examines 
the tactics adopted by Palestinians (specifically farmers) to alter the route of the wall at a local level. 
 
5.1 Qalqiliya/ Overview   
The Qalqiliya district is located about 75 km to the north of Jerusalem. It consists of a central city 
(Qalqiliya) that provides regional services for surrounding villages, in terms of commercial, health, 
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and administrative services. The region is attached to the so-called green line from the West, and is 
surrounded by the Tulkarem district from the north, from the south Salfit district, and from the east 
Nablus district (map 5.1). The first municipality in Qalqiliya was established in 1968. The district has 
never been considered a separate governorate until the emergence of the Palestinian Authority which 
re-demarcated all the governorates in the West Bank, adding a further two (Tubas and Qalqiliya in 
1995).  
 
 
The district spans approximately 22 Km from west to east, covering an area of about 166,373 
dunums
32
 in which there are (according to statistical work in 2007 done by Palestinian Central Bureau 
of Statistics) approximately 91,200 Palestinian residents living in 34 communities consisting of three 
                                                          
32 Source: GIS data 
Fig. 5.1: The Qalqiliya district. Source: Halawani, 2014  
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categories; urban, rural, and Bedouin tribes, occupying only 11,438 dunums
33
 forming about 6.9% 
percent of the total area of the district. The only urban populations in the district live in the city of 
Qalqiliya, estimated to be about 41,740
34
. There are no refugee camps in Qalqiliya, however despite 
this there are 58,000 refugees who were expelled from their cities and villages in 1948 (an event 
called by Palestinians as al nakba (catastrophe) and nowadays in the Qalqiliya city approximately 
36,000 refuges
35
 live in the city. Refugees account for 80% percent of the city’s residents. There are 
30 rural communities in which 49,040 people live, representing approximately 54% of the population. 
In addition, the Bedouin group who live outside the municipality and local council borders is 
estimated to be about 420 residents. According to the Oslo the district is divided into three zones: 
zone A (3,802 dunums), zone B (9,163 dunums), and zone C (121,178 dunums)
36
.  
The district’s hills in the east (700 meters above sea level) descend gradually westward to an elevation 
of about 50 meters above sea level. The annual rainfall is about 700 mm with the rain starting usually 
in November and continuing until the end of February. It is rich of ground water wells, giving a good 
opportunity for agricultural activity. Therefore, orchards and fields full of fruit and olive trees are a 
common scene. The natural flora is hills covered with olive trees, while valleys and flat lands are 
cultivated lands of a mixture of fruit trees (especially citrus and guava trees) and vegetables. As 
discussed above, the landscape of the district began to change at a rapid rate after the 1967 war, which 
resulted in the occupation of the West Bank, a direct result of the occupying power policy that aims to 
strengthen Jewish existence in the West Bank. This policy has never changed despite the signing of 
the so-called Oslo agreement between “Israel” and the PLO in September 1993. The expansion of 
colonies has continued across the whole districts in the West Bank and also in this district of Qalqilya. 
Nowadays (according to peace now statistics in 2011) there are about 27,200 Jewish settlers, living in 
seven colonies. In order to clarify the evolution of the colonies development in the Qalqiliya district, 
the following section focuses on two areas specifically, Tzufim and Alfe Menasha.   
5.2 Territorial Control   
The strategies of territorial colonization of the district have been occurring ever since the occupation 
of Palestine in 1948, when part of the district was separated and confiscated as a result of the 
demarcation of the “Green line”. After 1967 the continuous construction of colonies intensified the 
fragmentation of the landscape. More recently, the apartheid wall has played the most destructive and 
active role in fragmenting its landscape.   
                                                          
33 Source: GIS data 
34 Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2007).  
35 Source: United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRW, 2012).  
36 Source: GIS data 
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The continuous process of controlling people becomes an available practice by territorial or physical 
control of Palestinians’ lands. Through this type of control, lands belonging to the people of Palestine 
have been confiscated to build colonies, roads and other colonial features.  These new features of the 
landscape serve only the occupiers, producing Jewish only settlements and Jewish only roads. At this 
stage, it is valuable to unveil the way in which decisions are taken to build a colony in the West Bank 
before turning next to examine specifically the case study of Qalqiliya.  
This decision is not a matter related only to the Settlement Committee of the “Israeli Government”, 
but also a decision secured by the World Zionist Organization. Thereby, a committee which is 
composed of equal numbers from both has responsibility to issue the permission for the building of a 
colony (this committee is called Ministerial Committee for Settlement) and also the responsibility of 
deciding upon the location of the settlement (B’tselem, 2002, 20). In order to plan and build on the 
location specified by the committee, the second stage is to receive permission from the Custodian for 
Governmental and Abandoned Property. After receiving this permission, a contract is signed between 
the Ministerial Committee for Settlement and the Ministry of Construction or Housing which has the 
responsibility to sign contracts with a cooperative association. Then, after the cooperative association 
prepares the outline plan, the Ministry of Construction or Housing works secures an approval from the 
Supreme Planning Committee of the civilian Administration (ibid, 21).   
5.2.1 Jewish Colonies in the Qalqiliya District   
Since the Oslo agreement between the P.A and “Israel” in 1993, the number of settlers has doubled 
and the colonies are still expanding. As such there can be no debating the fact that political 
negotiation plays as a cover of territorial colonization. Given this atmosphere, one must say the 
landscape in the West Bank (including Qalqiliya distrcit) is under continuous change with its natural 
environment under constant jeopardy.  
In the Qalqiliya district, there are approximately 27,000 Settlers according to Peace Now statistics in 
2011, living in seven colonies. The built-up environment in which they now reside is approximately 
9,091 dunums
37
 (table 5.1). Some of these colonies are distinguished by low housing density. These 
are more commonly known as ‘rural settlements’ where single-family houses are built on adjoining 
lots of land and the style of a house is characterized by a tiled roof with a surrounding garden. One 
clear example is that of Kedumim (fig. 5.2), and Zufin, located to the North of Qalqiliya city.  
 
                                                          
37 Source: GIS data 
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Name Established 
year 
area (square 
meters) 
Population 
1985 
Population 
1987 
Population 
1993 
Population 
2000 
Population 
2011 
Tzofim 1989 785,162.7229 0 0 474 857 1338 
Oranit 1985 1,512,972.795 232 1100 3160 5070 6600 
Alfei 
Menashe 
1983 2,575,656.254 1260 1910 3720 4580 7423 
Sha'arei 
Tikva 
1983 986,989.3666 228 5z62 1810 3380 4930 
Ma'ale 
Shomron 
1980 855,916.5981 0 0 360 527 860 
Karnei 
Shomron 
(part of it 
about 
30%) 
1978 3,131,263.703 1,490 2,610 4,330 5,890 6,449 
Kedumim 1977 2,100,054.512 1110 1390 2050 2660 3904 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: The number of Jewish settlers in Qalqiliya Distract. Source: www.peacenow.org (edit by Halawani) 
 
Fig. 5.2: Kedumim –Jewish Colony- . Source: Halawani, May, 2013 
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To have a detailed view about the evolution of colonies, two examples are examined (Zufin and Alfei 
Menashe). These two examples are particularly noteworthy because they are in close proximity to the 
mother city of the district, Qalqilya and the wall totally encompasses them, influencing the landscape 
of the district.   
 The Zufin colony  
In 1989 the colony was founded on the Jayyus village lands. It is located two kilometers to the north 
of Qalqiliya and it is not too far from Tal-Alrabea’ (Tel-Aviv) (approximately 35 kilometers to the 
North-east of Tel-aviv). Zufin benefits from the well-developed infrastructure behind the “green line”, 
most notably the road networks such as the high way number 6, connecting Jerusalem with the 
northern city of Nazareth. In addition, the high way connects also with Tal-Alrabea’. Zufin is located 
near the regional number 55 road which connects it with other colonies in the West Bank.  
According to the Peace now association (2010) Zufin has 1251settlers and 300 housing units. To the 
east of Zufin lies the Palestinian village of Jayyous which has about 3000 residents. The gaps between 
the two areas are obvious in terms of public services and infrastructure, with the people of Jayyous 
living without civic centers, sport centers, and public gardens.  
The different outline plans of Zufin aim to expand it and deepen the existence of Jews beside the 
“green line”. The jurisdictional38 plan of Zufin covers an area about 2,000 dunams, while the built up 
area is approximately 200 dunums (ten times larger than the actual built-up area) (fig.5.3). In order to 
guarantee maximum potential future development for Zufin various master plans (about four plans) 
have been prepared since it was established in 1989. The second master plan, referred to as ‘North of 
Zufin’ has a number 149/2, and was approved in 1998 nine years on from the start of the building of 
the colony of Zufin (fig.5.4). It allowed for the practical opportunity to expand to the north by 
providing an additional area of 460 dunums encompassing over 1100 housing units, four nursery 
schools, an elementary school and a high school, a number of synagogues, a cemetery, and recreation 
and sport facilities (Lein, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005). What should also be noted is that the same area on 
which the Plan (149/2) covers is considered agricultural land according to Regional British Plan 
(S/15).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 The jurisdictional area is defined by the “Israeli Central Command”, including land identified as a “state land”.   
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Fig. 5.3: The extension plans for Zufin colony. Source: Halawani, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third master plan is a revision plan of the first (149) and an expansion of the existing built-up area 
to the south. It was approved in the year 2000 and covers an area 300 dunums, including the existing 
built up area of Zufin (fig. 5.5). No wonder, the main change in the revised plan (149/4) is that the 
housing density was increased in the zone classified as residential area in the original plan (149), but 
where construction has not yet begun. The revised plan (149/4) entails building 600 housing unit: 400 
new units plus the existing 200 units (Lein, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005, 22). Another obvious change is 
altering zones from farmlands and open spaces use to residential use.  
 
The fourth plan (149/5) covers almost the entire Jurisdictional area of Zufin, including all the previous 
master plans. It has not approved, even though it was prepared in 1999. According to this plan an 
industrial zone is proposed to the East of the Zufin, near Jayyous village. Later, the detailed plans for 
the industrial zone was postponed due to the altering the route of the wall.    
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Fig. 5.4: The master plan (149/2) of Zufin. Source: Bimkom    
 Fig. 5.5:  The master plan (149/4) of Zufin. Source: Bimkom 
149/2 
149/4 
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The route of the wall was planned to secure the colony expansion. Clearly, according to the map (5.3), 
much of the route is alongside the border of jurisdictional area, giving planners (in the future) an 
opportunity to suggest master plans for the purpose of expansion.  At the same time, the wall has 
disconnected the agricultural lands of Jayyous from the village, causing great harmful to the economic 
situation of villagers. Therefore, since the existence of the wall they have follow any available course 
against it; they did petitions to the “Israeli Courts” and engaged in weekly protest (every Friday) with 
other people including residents from surrounding villages and international volunteers. This pressure 
makes the occupation in a very few cases to change the route of the wall, but not to dismantle it.  
 
Another point must be added that, Palestinian residents of ‘Azzun and a-Nabi Elyas did a petition 
against some segments of the wall (constructed to the east of Zufin) in October 2002. The court, 
however, denied the petition and the wall was constructed according to the planned route. Again, in 
July 2003, the residents applied another petition due to the problem of inaccessibility to their farms, 
asking for dismantling the wall or at least changing its route to not prevent them from reaching their 
lands. The court, however, refused the petition (Bimkom, B'tselem, 2005, 16).  
 
 The Alfe Menashe Colony 
It is located three kilometers southeast of Qalqiliya and five kilometers to the east of the “green line”. 
It was founded in 1983 and around 7423 settlers are living in the colony (according to statistics of the 
Peacenow center in the year 2011). The aerial map from google earth does not reveal how many 
master plans were prepared for Alfe Menashe and it might be understood that there is only one master 
plan. After investigation, however, one discovers that series of master plans were prepared (fig.5.6).  
In general, the policy of occupation is to control as much land as possible in order to securing the 
spatial development of colonies and to strengthening the existence of settlers. For both purposes, (in 
the Qalqiliya district) an industrial area was constructed, covering an area about 53 dunums and 
master plans have been prepared and approved. The master plan (115/8), (see fig. 5.8 & fig 5.9), 
which was approved in 1998, covers an area 1,008 dunams, allows to build other 1,406 housing units 
as a future extension of Alfe Menashe. Some of zones are devoted to housing use, allowing 
construction of houses five to seven stories high. Furthermore, it suggests an animal zoo (100 
dunams) and commercial centers, encouraging and supporting settlers to live in Alfe Menashe.    
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Fig. 5.6: The series of master plans for Alfei Menahse: Source: Halawani, 2014 
  
 
Fig. 5.7: Alfei Menashse Colony. Source: Halawani, June, 2013 
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Fig. 5.8:  The extension of Alfei Menashe: Source: Bimkom edited by Halawani  
Fig. 5.9: The master plan (115/8 o) of Alfei Menashe. Source: Bimkom edited by Halawani  
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The major goal of the series of master plans is the connection of Alfi Menashe colony with other 
colonies located in the occupied lands in the year 1948 (lands behind the “green line”). The plans 
provide large areas for high quality residential development by securing all housing components such 
as lots of lands, providing public service and essential infrastructure. Detailed plans were prepared, 
facilitating the construction of colonies. For example, the plan below is a detailed plan (known as Nof 
Hasharon (115/16/4)) which was approved in the year 2000 (fig. 5.10). It covers an area of 
approximately forty dunums. For residential purposes the plan area was divided into fifty plots of 
approximately 500 square meters each. 
 
 
According to above, one of the main methods of territorial colonization is the land use plans. As 
explained, the continuous and fast urban development of Alfe Menashe provides and facilitates the 
provision of the housing (in the colony) with a high living standard.  Therefore, this policy is used to 
attract Jewish settlers to live in Alfe Menashe. According to “Israel Central Bureau of Statistics” the 
number of settlers in the colony in 1995 was 4000 settlers, who (after that)  have been increased 
gradually from 6300 in the year 2008 to 7100, and 7400 in the years 2010 and 2011 respectively. 
Fig. 5.10: Master plan of Alfe Menashe (Nof Hasharon which number is 115/16/4) 
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The analysis of the master plans of Zufin & Alfei Menasha, reveals that the master plans offer a high 
standard of living; swimming pool, gardens, open space public services and so on. In addition, the 
successive expansions planned between the Palestinian communities are diluting the possibility of 
expansion of Palestinian communities, confining the communities to a tight geographical area, and 
widening the gap between colonies and the Palestinian communities in terms of services and the 
quality of spaces.  For example, Arab Abu Farda community suffers from the lack of most services 
such as water, sanitation, paved roads, schools, and parks and so on. Such conditions have caused 
extreme difficulties such as overcrowding and absence of health and education facilities (fig. 5.11). 
  
 
 
5.3 The Unfair Confinement Mechanism  
In our case, the separation between the occupiers and those who have been occupied does not mean 
that the occupying power is far away from controlling the resources of indigenous population, but the 
concept of separation is that the occupation does not take responsibility for civilian affairs, excluding 
occupied people from its civilian services. While, at the same time controls them and exploits their 
natural resources.  
Neve (2008) points out that after the first intifada (Palestinian uprising against the occupation) 
“Israel” adopted other forms of control, altering its control mechanism over Palestinians in the West 
Bank. The previous mechanism of control was to manage the affairs of inhabitants and at the same 
time exploits their natural resources. After the end of the First Intifada, however, “Israel” altered its 
Fig. 5.11: The sharp gap of the quality of built up environment between colonizers and those who have been colonized. 
Source: Halawani, June, 2013  
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mechanism of occupation by transferring the responsibility of management the affairs of some 
Palestinians to the Palestinian Authority (P.A.) by signing Oslo agreement, while keeping control of 
underground, above, and around the land classified as Zone B & Zone A. In this sense P.A functions 
merely as a large municipality to administer the affairs of Palestinians.   
In 2002, the work of building the apartheid wall was started, representing the policy of land grab. The 
wall does not just separates Palestinians from settlers, it also confine Palestinians into small spaces, 
isolating them from their natural resources (water & land), grabbing the most fertile agricultural lands, 
and weakening the territorial contiguity between the Palestinian villages and cities. For example, the 
wall surrounds Qalqiliya city from three sides, separating it from its lands and surrounding 
environment. One of the worst and strangest cases of unfair confinement mechanism in Qalqiliya 
district is the case of Hani A’amer.  
 
Hani’s house is located in Masha Palestinian villages. Hani narrated his family’s story with the land, 
unveiling the meaning of struggles, and steadfastness. Hani said that “the beginning of my story was 
the expulsion of my grandfather from his land, located in Kufr Kasem village in Palestine; he lost his 
land and lost his life ….  the land robbery by the occupation has continued until today when Israeli 
bulldozers destroyed my tree nursery and confiscated my land”.   
At the beginning of the work of building the wall to separate Masha from EL-kana Jewish colony, 
bulldozers destroyed Hani’s garden, tree nursery, and flower shop. The wall also separated him from 
his land (335 dunums) which handed down over many generations. The wall was build right up close 
to his house, and it completely surrounded his house. At the end, his house was confined between 
concrete walls and fences of coiled barbed wire, and the view of the village was replaced by a giant 
concrete wall of eight meters height (fig 5.12 & fig. 5.13).  
Before building the wall, Hani refused the occupation attempts to enforce him to leave his house 
where he has lived before the establishment of Elkana Colony. In an interview recorded in August 
2013, he said: “It is common in all part of the world that once a person owns a land, then he/she has 
the right to utilize it. But in our case that means a very big dilemma”. He emphasized that his 
persistence on his right and with the help of the international and local institutions such as Works 
Agency for Palestine refuges (UNRWA), the risks of expulsion had decreased. 
Despite his refusal of “Israeli temptation” and the help of international institutions, the prison was 
established and became as a fact on the ground. When it was decided to build the wall that separates 
his house from the colony, “the Israeli military commander” blatantly proposed to him many spatial 
suggestions about the ways he can enter to his house; suggesting a path surrounded with fences ended 
with a gate without any surrounding spaces of his house, or a gate to be opened in a very limited time 
during a day which only can be opened by “Israeli soldiers”.  
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Fig. 5.12:  Hani’s house is sandwiched between walls and totally isolated from surroundings. Source: 
Halawani, Aug., 2013   
Fig. 5.13: Hani’s house is surrounded between walls which cut his family off from the Palestinian village of Mas’ha. Source: 
Halawani, 2014 
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Moreover, the house is under surveillance by cameras twenty four hours a day. Consequently, the 
family life has been transformed to be included in the unjust mechanism of bio-politics, in which they 
experience bare life by having been subjected to continuous surveillance and unfair restrictions. 
As a result, the family (two parents with seven children) has been cut off from friends and neighbors 
and a few people visit the house because of fear. The family has to pass through two gates, living in 
isolation and in a situation similar to a jail. During the interview, Hani insisted not to stop living in his 
house or to abandon it under any circumstances, despite all suffering.  
Persistence on his right, helped to improve the prison conditions in terms of the gate opening time. He 
was insisting to be given an access without any time limitation. Therefore, that put a pressure on the 
occupation authorities to reconsider their suggestion and then they erected a small steel door on the 
wall with a key given to him (fig. 5.14).  
 
The scale of unfair confinement varies between household scales to a regional scale. The so-called 
Seam zone (the area that is located between the wall and the “green line”39) is an example of a 
regional scale unfair confinement system. In Qalqiliya district, this zone contains three communities 
where approximately 800 inhabitants live under restricted rules, and their movements depend on gates 
                                                          
39 The route of the wall confines about 10% of the West Bank lands between the wall and the “green line”. This area has not 
been a just matter of control, but a matter of confinement. Palestinians who live in the West Bank have been prohibited to 
enter to the so-called “Seam zone” which is declared as a closed military zone.  
Fig. 5.14: Hani and his family must pass through gates to reach their house. Source: Halawani, Aug., 2013  
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and permit regime. Firstly, they cannot exceed the “green line” if they do that they will be punished. 
Secondly, they are separated from other communities located in Qalqiliya district; nobody can visit 
them except by obtaining a permit from the “Israeli Civilian Administration”. Thirdly, their daily 
needs that purchase from the regional center (Qaliqiya city) such as food are under inspection: when 
they pass through the “Israeli military check point” (el-yaho), they upload all things from their cars to 
be inspected through machines (similar to airport inspection measures). Moreover, if they need to buy 
electrical machines such as a refrigerator, they must apply to have a permit from “Israeli civilian 
Administration”. Fourthly, construction materials (such as cement, steel bars, gravel) are prohibited 
from entering this zone: indeed they are not allowed to build any building and even paving their 
roads. According to the interview held in August 2013 with Ashraf (the spokmen of A’rab ar Ramadin 
al Janubi), he said: “we have been prevented by Israeli soldiers from paving the main street of our 
community by base course”. Indeed, the occupation authority deliberately lets them without planning 
laws. In other words they are unrecognized communities in term of planning; no master plans, and no 
building permits to be issued. 
As explained the wall has created a closed zone where inhabitants found themselves isolated in closed 
area (“Seam zone”) and have been cut from education and medical services.Today, their life depends 
on gates, checkpoints, and permit regime. They have been forced to wait long time at the military 
checkpoint (El-Yaho) to reach their houses. Obviously, the occupation policy is to make life 
intolerable for them, and as a result, push them to leave the area and find another place elsewhere in 
the West Bank. 
5.4 The Impact of the Wall in the Qalqiliya District  
The wall was described by the occupation as a “security fence”. Many studies explain that the wall 
was established in the name of security for the purpose of expanding colonies such as the study 
conducted in 2005 by Bimkom and B’tselm titled ‘Under the Guise of Security’. Other studies 
describe the wall as an apartheid element that violates the Palestinians human rights. Halper (2009) 
describes the wall as apartheid because of two reasons; namely it supports a “privileged group” to 
dominate other groups. He also adds that “security” is used as a pretext to oppress and discriminate 
weak groups. Following this debate, this section will highlight the impact of the wall on the people of 
Palestine who have been separated from their lands.   
As illustrated in the previous chapters, current territorial control of the Qalqilya has been a result of a 
process began since the occupation in 1948
40
, however the most harmful period in Qalqilya district 
began with the construction of the wall and it continues to the present days. The planned route of the 
wall is approximately 90 Km long; of which 42.4 Km was constructed, and 4.4 km is under 
                                                          
40 Mohammad Abo El-Sheikh (an administrator in Qalqiliya governorate) pointed out that in the process demarcation of the 
“green line”, there are 1500 dunums grabbed from the land of Qalqiliya city.   
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construction, and the length of the projected route is 43.2 km
41.
 The wall separates 40,000 dunums 
(classified as agricultural lands) out of 170,000 that resemble the whole area of the district. Thereby, 
the wall divides villages in two portions: the first includes agricultural lands which were incorporated 
into colonies, and the second where Palestinians populated villages was remained outside the wall. 
Other negative influences affect other sectors such as water, social, economic, and health issues. 
    
In urban areas, a concrete wall seven to eight meters in height was constructed, full with surveillance 
cameras and cylindrical observer towers (function similar to panoptic principles) (fig. 5.15). Other 
segments of the wall consist of electronic fences (approximately three meters high), with electronic 
surveillance devices, a deep trench, coiled barbed wire and a patrol road (fig. 5.16). There are also set 
of electronic detections and sensory system embedded in the wall. The route of the wall frequently is 
next to houses in the villages and city of Qalqiliya, encapsulating most of the colonies, but there are 
some cases in which some Palestinian communities are combined with colonies in one space without 
any barrier between them as it will be described in the area so-called “Seam Zone”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Source: GIS data 
Fig. 5.15: The concrete wall in Qalqiliya (about eight meters height). Source:  Halawani, June, 2013 
Occupied Land 1948 
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The wall encircles towns and villages, turning them into prisons, isolating owners from their lands, 
and confiscating vast areas of Palestinian lands. Additionally, in the Qalqiliya district, the wall 
influences negatively the territorial cohesion; creating four enclaves and splitting them into cantons 
(fig.5.17). As a result of these drastic affects, thousands of residents have been severely affected.   
 
Maps are not sufficient for complete understanding of landscape transformation and its impact upon 
people of Palestine; despite that it is a good tool to highlight the elements of restrictions which arrest 
the urban and rural development. Therefore, fieldwork (in-depth interviews with farmers and key 
persons, observation, discussions, and group meetings) have largely provided the researcher with a 
comprehensive perspective about the impact of the wall on agricultural, economic, social, educational, 
and health sector as the following.    
 
 
Fig. 5.16: The wall in Qalqiliya (fence of coiled barbed wire). Source: Halawani, June, 2013 
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  5.4.1 Agricultural Sector  
 
Since old ages the Qalqiliya district has been known for its fertile land. It is famous by being fruit and 
citrus basket of the West Bank; lands are planted with citrus, oranges, clementinas, and lemon trees. 
The agricultural sector contributes in 45% of the region economy. Farming is deeply rooted in the 
culture and daily life of Palestinian people in the Qalqiliya district. As an example, people in Jayyous 
village (one of villages in Qalqilya region) work in agriculture in addition to other professions. It is 
not surprising to meet people who teach in schools or work in administrative offices and in parallel, 
they are also farmers. Shawket Samha
42
 from Jayyous village one of those people, who worked as a 
teacher and he still works as a farmer. He mentioned in the interview that before the construction of 
the wall he used to work in his farms every day after school, “I was working daily in my olive farm 
and citrus garden, ploughing the soil, and irrigating plants and trees”. Astonishingly, new realities and 
                                                          
42 Shawket Samha is a farmer and retired teacher (72 years old). The interview was conducted with him in July, 2013.    
Fig. 5.17: The wall in Qalqiliya district. Source: Halawani, 2014 
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new way of life began to affect his personal life (used to live more than half century). Almost farmers 
in Qalqiliya region are negatively influenced; communities are separated from their fields, orchards, 
and olive-covered slopes (fig. 5.18). 
The fieldwork (interviews & researcher’s observation) enable to gain insights into what is happening 
actually on the ground, to observe and to examine data which cannot be gained by aerial photos. The 
interviews with groups of farmers from various communities in the region display their sufferings that 
feel like they are in prisons. To illustrate the impact of the wall over agricultural sector), two cases 
will be listed and discussed (Qalqiliya city and Jayyous village) as the following:  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.18: The classification of agricultural lands in Qalqiliya district. Source: Halawani, 2014 
1948 
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Qalqiliya City   
Since the year 2002, the wall has been separating farmers from their private lands; resulting in the loss 
of agricultural income and employment. Of the city’s 6000 dunums of agricultural lands, about 5000 
dunums has been separated by the wall.  In the first two years of separation, access to lands was 
not permitted. Therefore, it was very hard for people to reach their lands because no permits issued to 
them by “Israel”. Usually farms need a daily care, irrigation of crops, collection of ripe fruits, and 
trimming trees. The situation of separation, however, excludes any possibilities of cultivating, 
irrigating, harvesting trees, and taking care of farms and crops. Ali Hasan a farmer from Qalqilya city 
told the researcher that more than two years, ripe fruits had been uncollected, and therefore fruits had 
dropped on the ground, trees had hardened, and crops had ruined (fig. 5.19). Ahdaf Soueif (2004, 141) 
an Egyptian writer who visited Qalqiliya district in the year 2003 described the situation in the date of 
October 20, 2003 by writing:
43
 
“Now their harvest is routing before their eyes and they cannot get to it …. Harvesting is a family affair 
so the soldiers face a crowd of men, women and children. What they do is this: first they collect all 
their identity papers. Then they call the people out one by one. Today they have decided that no male 
between the ages of twelve and thirty-eight will be allowed on his land. Also, no women will be 
allowed unless she is over twenty-eight and married. So, the majority of the farmers, men, women and 
teenagers stand at the gate, the Israeli soldiers and the barrier between them and the harvest that is their 
sustenance and income for the coming year”.  
As far as local concern about the wall problem is increased, it is noticeable that things began to 
change not about discontinuing construction of the wall or dismantling the segments that were built, 
but about mechanisms and procedures of control concerning access to lands. After creating a de facto 
situation by “Israel” through which Palestinian farmers must deal with it, local and international 
voices were raised against the injustice created by the wall.  
On local level, Palestinian protesters demonstrated against the wall especially in the threatened area 
by the wall. In order to deal with the growing international criticism and local pressure, “Israel” began 
to partially ease restrictions imposed on movement of farmers by allowing them to have limited 
access to their lands. But the access is fully controlled by permit system which determines who might 
enter to his/ her land and how long he/she might stay. Indeed, limited numbers of farmers have been 
allowed to work into their farms.  
Theoretically, permits should be issued to those who own lands behind the wall. Practically, however, 
many farmers who own lands behind the wall and who applied for having a permit were prevented to 
go to their lands. Their requests for permits were refused because of “security reasons” which was no 
                                                          
43 She described what was happening in front of a gate which is located in Jayyous village and almost similar situation was 
happening to all gates in the district of Qalaqiliya.  
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more than an excuse to prevent farmers to plant their lands. In many cases if one member of a family 
is refused by the occupying power because of so-called “security reasons”, all family members are 
refused to obtain a permit as a “collective punishment”. B’Tselem (June, 2004) reports that as of 
March 2004, some 2,240 residents from Jayyous and surrounding villages asked to obtain access 
permits while approximately 700 were rejected (i.e., 25% of the applications were denied)” and most 
of refusals were based on “security reasons” (B’Tselem, 2004, 11). Due to that situation, some lands 
were totally neglected (fig. 5.19).  
   
 
The permit system allows some farmers to work into farms, but with limited time. Additionally, they 
have difficult situations regarding the movement; there are gates through which they must pass. There 
Fig. 5.19: At the first years of the closure (from the year 2002 to 2004), Guava fruit were dropping on the ground and trees 
hardened because of inaccessibility to farms. Source: Qalqiliya Municipality  
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are crops behind the wall which need daily irrigation and daily care such as greenhouses in which 
tomatoes and cucumbers are grown. After the wall was built, many farmers were no longer able to 
plant the same kind of crops that need daily irrigation. They planted trees instead of vegetables 
because they are uncertain about their accessibility to their farming lands.  
Additionally, due to the increase of production price of citrus fruits, many Palestinian farmers 
changed the type of trees from citrus to other types of trees to cope with the farm-to-market 
challenges they face. Mohammad Asa’d a farmer from Qalqilya who owns about 300 dunums of lands 
behind the wall, pointed out that he replaced the citrus trees to the guava trees, insisting that it is 
because of Palestinian market is full of “Israeli” agricultural product which extensively has spread in 
the market , resulting in inability to compete. This context increases supply of citrus fruit and 
consequently consumer’s cost decreases which make hard competitive situation for Palestinian 
farmers to market their citrus fruits. He added: “I am wondering how we can compete with Israeli 
farmers who do not have restrictions like us. And if we decrease the consumer’s cost we will have no 
financial revenue”. 
Moreover, the restrictions on movement towards farms and the work-time restrictions and the increase 
of journey times to farms promote some farmers to change type of crops usually planted to other types 
that need less time to take care.   
 
Jayyous village   
This village is famous of citrus fruits, guava trees, and vegetables. The village’s lands measure 
approximately 13,500 dunums and most of its lands are fertile which farmed intensively with much of 
human investment in time and energy.  Over time, fruits and vegetables have been produced not only 
for the village itself, but also for the whole West Bank. Therefore, its 3000 inhabitants have depended 
on farming as a main source of income.  
The wall has affected severely the agricultural sector; the route of the wall was set far from Tzofin 
colony build up area, isolating Palestinian agricultural lands from the village of Jayyous (fig. 5.20, fig. 
5.21, fig.22). Hence, there is about 8,600 dunums isolated by the wall, 75% of the villages’ total 
area
44
.  The agricultural sector has declined due this isolation of fertile agricultural lands.  In an 
interview with Adul-Latif Khaled (a Palestinian hydrologist expert), he declared that by August 2004, 
a year after the wall was completed around the village, local production had fallen from 7 to 4 million 
kilograms of fruits and vegetables, and 15,000 trees had died and the number of farmers cultivating 
their land declined from 300 to 100 (Dolphin (2006, 95).   
                                                          
44 Source:  Jayyous village council.  
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Fig. 5.20: The wall separates fertile agricultural lands from the village of Jayyous. Source: Halawani, June 2013.  
It is worth mentioning that approximately 4000 trees were uprooted because of the wall
45
. The wall 
route’s width varies from 40 to 80 meters, consisting of patrol road surrounded by trenches and 
barbed-wire fences. In the case of Shawket Samha (a farmer from Jayyous), during the construction of 
the wall which has a width of approximately  90 meters in his land, “Israeli bulldozers” uprooted one 
hundred olive trees on Shawket’s land. A report of United Nation published in March, 2005 points out 
that on 9 December 2004, “Israeli bulldozers” uprooted 117 olive trees on Jayyous land, west of the 
barrier. Ten days later the work resumed and some 300 to 350 olive trees were uprooted in total. 
                                                          
45 Source: Jayyous Village Council.  
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Fig. 5.21: The wall snaking through the agricultural lands in the village of Jayyous. Source: Halawani, June, 2013 
Fig. 5.22: The wall separates agricultural lands from villagers. Source: Halawani, June, 2013   
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Zufin colony was built on confiscated lands of the village of Jayyous. Approximately 1362 dunums of 
lands were confiscated
46
. According to the following map the wall was established surrounding the 
colony, but with a view to offer a high potential for future expansion (fig. 5.23), encircling large 
areas; amounting about ten times more than its built-up area
47
. The jurisdictional area (which is a 
purple color in the map below) is about 2,493 dunums
48, allowing “Israeli planners” to prepare 
extension plans and assuring the expansion and growth of the colony.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 Source: Jayyous Local Council.  
47  It is about 75 % of Jayyous fertile lands and irrigated farmlands have been isolated by the wall, amounting to some 9,000 
dunums.  
48 It is worthy to note that the route of the wall was re-planned around Zufin colony according to two decisions of the 
“supreme court of Israel”. The first decision was issued in 2006 to release about 1,500 dunums and return it back to the 
village of Jayyous. The second decision was issued in 2009 which ordered to release about 2,000 dunums and to be attached 
again to the land of Jayyous.    
Fig. 5.23: The map shows the relation between the wall and the Zufin colony. Source: Halawani, 2014  
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Many farmers, as mentioned, were dispossessed from their own land
49
; they have not been given 
permits to attend their olive trees and agricultural lands. The two concepts of dispossession of farmers 
and isolation of farms have a wider meaning more than mere difficulties of reaching farms or 
prevention of working in fields.  They are also methods of depriving farmers from land which is very 
precious physically and emotionally. Not surprisingly, some of those farmers, who were not given a 
permit to access through gates in the wall, cried bitterly during the interviews. One of them did not 
see his land more than ten year, even that he was never accused by “Israel” in any case.  
  
Fear from confiscation and feeling of belonging urge many farmers to keep cultivation and to reclaim 
neglected lands located behind the wall. If a land is neglected and uncultivated, eventually it will be 
confiscated by the occupying power based on misrepresentation of laws and will be used for the use 
of colonies. In the group meetings with farmers, they emphasized that they inherited their lands from 
their ancestors, who invested time and efforts in cultivation. Despite the siege around their villages 
because of the existence of the wall they take the risk to go to lands in order to work and irrigate trees 
and crops. Keeping their lands green may avoid them the risk of confiscation 
  
Farmers face severe difficulties 
to reach their lands; firstly they 
must apply to have an access 
permit. If they succeed to have a 
permit, the second difficulty will 
be the limited time to work. 
There are gates in the wall for 
access control (fig. 5.24, 
fig.5.25). For example, there are 
two gates in the wall in Jayyous 
village, the northern gate which 
is the main gate and the southern 
gate through which a few 
farmers were allowed to pass; 
just those who cultivates olive 
trees.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Before the wall, farmers used to sleep in their lands at the time of harvest. After the wall some of them were prevented to 
go to their lands and those who have a permit they cannot do that anymore.  
Fig. 5.24: The Jayyous North Gate: a 
farmer is under inspection by “Israeli 
soldiers” while going to his farm. 
Source: Halawani, June, 2013  
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The northern gate opens in the morning one hour from 6:00 to 7:00 in order to allow farmers to pass 
through and after that it locked to open again in the midday from 12:30 to 13:00 and it locked again to 
open in the evening one hour (from 17:00 to 18:00), allowing farmers to return back to their village. 
In front of the gates, farmers must stop for inspection and showing their identity card and permit 
papers (fig. 5.25). The meaning of subjection, separation, and disenfranchisement accompany with the 
existence of gates which completely control the movement of farmers. The gates are manifestation of 
the prison and unfair confinement mechanism which are clear in multi-levels in the Palestinian life.    
 
The gate system is one of the major methods of restriction imposed over farmers, resulting in 
weakening the agricultural sector. The best time for farmers to work (especially in summer time) is 
early in the morning and late in the afternoon. Farmers, before the existence of the wall, used to reach 
their farms at 5:30 and work until midday. Then, they have a rest time and after that they work in the 
evening when the sun is less intense. Today, this previous system does not work at all because of the 
gate opening system.   
  
 
 
Fig. 5.25: Farmers are passing through the gate. Source: Jayyous village council  
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5.4.2 Water Sector 
As it turns out in chapter four, one of the most important water resources in the West Bank is the 
Western Aquifer Basin, on which the city of Qalqiliya and surrounding villages stand. This unique 
location facilitates drilling water wells and facilitates intensive cultivation practices. The direct threat 
of water resources in the region has been occurring after the construction of the wall; restricting 
access to water resources, and limiting water usage from the Western Aquifer. Mohammad Abo EL 
Sheikh (the director of health and environmental issues in Qalqiliya governorate) emphasizes that the 
wall has isolated nineteenth ground water wells from the villages of the district and the city of 
Qalqiliya, leading to a lack of water (fig. 5.26).   
The Western Aquifer has been exploited as mirrored in some “Israeli politician’s”, emphasizing to 
keep usurpation of water resources and depriving people of Palestine to access water.  Benjamin 
Netanyahu (Prime Minister Of Israel) declared in 17 May 1998: “and when I talk about the 
importance to Israel’s security, this is not an abstract concept … it means that a housewife in Tel Aviv 
can open the tap and there's water running to it, and it's not been dried up because of a rash decision 
that handed over control of our aquifers to the wrong hands.” (Amnesty International, 2009).  
The narratives regarding the water issue change according to situations to suit the purposes of the 
occupation. For example, before the constructions of the wall, the occupying power  claimed that 
restrictions imposed on Palestinians water utilization (water quotas, permit system and military 
orders) aim to protect the aquifer from overexploitation and consequently maintain the future food 
security of “Israel” (Rouyer, 2000, 3). What it seems obvious that “Israeli” Politicians’ declarations 
are reflected into the route of the apartheid wall (see the map above), which plays a role in reducing 
the Palestinians water utilization. Therefore, this policy aims to preserve the majority water for the use 
of Jewish settlers. The following paragraphs will set out how the wall relates to the restriction of 
Palestinian consumption of water.    
During the construction of the wall, water networks that transfer the water from wells to farms were 
damaged, causing a great harmful to the farmers whose crops depends mainly on water supply from 
wells
50
. Some farmers during the interview point out that they change the type of crops they plant, 
emphasizing that this change is due to the lack of water. They changed types of crops that depend on 
irrigation to other types that depends on rainwater such as olives trees.  
In Jayyous village, the wall separated the only six water wells from the village. What do residents of 
Jayyous do to deal with the problem of inaccessibility to the water wells? Actually, they are forced to 
go to obtain water from another water wells from the nearby village of Azzun. The new situation 
                                                          
50 Source: an interview with  Mohammad Abo EL Sheikh (director of health and environmental issues in Qalqiliya 
governorate in the date July, 2013 
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influenced them harshly, creating a new way of life in relation with water issues; before the wall it 
was easy to access water wells and to provide the village with water tanks whenever it is necessary 
but after the wall there is no possibility to do that. There is no one case after the existence of the wall 
in which a permit is given to a farmer to bring water from isolated wells to the village. Not surprising 
that, the water consumption in the village of Jayyous dropped to a mere 23 liters per person per a day 
(Amnesty International, 2009, 54).  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.26: The wall isolates tens of water wells. Source: Halawani, 2014  
Occupied land  
   
1948 
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Those communities which suffer from the lack of water are forced to purchase expensive water tanks 
to satisfy their needs. For example Arab Abu Farda community does not have a water network 
(fig.5.27). Before the wall people depended upon water wells from the nearby village of Habala, but 
as a result of the wall which isolates them from water wells, they forced to purchase water tanks for 
the purpose of domestic use and also to water their flock of sheep and cows.   
 
 
 
 
5.4.3 Cultural & Social Issues  
Farms are not just places of work; instead, the relation between farms and villagers is manifested in 
various ways, like crop-tending, practicing social activities, preserving cultural values, and also 
promoting struggle against oppression. Of course, beside their positive contribution to aesthetic 
dimensions of the landscape of villages and to economic status of people, it is also an integral part of 
culture of people. For villagers the fertile land is an area, facilitating the meeting between farmers and 
Fig: 5.27: Purchased water tank in Arab Abu Farda community in order to water animals. Source: Halawani, Aug., 2013  
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other inhabitants, where people are engaged in exchange of feelings, and where sense of belongings 
and good values are manifested. For example, the olive tree does not just have a utilitarian dimension, 
but it has a symbolism dimension (the symbol of steadfastness for people of Palestine). It means 
Summud (steadfastness) and adherence to the land, which is reflected in paintings in which olive tree 
used as a symbol of struggle and resistance against the occupation.   
 
Villagers of Qalqiliya district experienced this unique relation with the land.  Generation after 
generation used to take care of the land and to cultivate it, therefore, it is deeply rooted in their 
culture. Moreover, olive orchards, citrus gardens, and fields are part of daily talk where (before the 
wall) they used to organize social activities (such as communal picnics) in addition to the main 
activity (farming). This positive domain where activities can be practiced by families (communally) 
strengthens social bounds. Before the wall, farms were an environment for the purpose of work and 
for social purposes; family members were used to meet together, talking, eating, doing picnic under 
olive trees and children used to play together.  
 
Today, the mentioned social activities transformed to memories; people cannot reach their lands 
anymore. People have been prevented to go to their lands by the wall, except a few of them only for 
the purpose of work. Farms are no longer included as a main feature of social and recreational 
activities (picnic parties, morning and evening walks, and playground for children). The social and 
communal activities totally disappeared from fields and orchards. Um A’zzam, grandmother who has 
three sons, four daughters, and twenty eight grandchildren, sees that their social activities decreased 
because the majority of relatives have been deprived from access to farms.  She says: “before the wall, 
we had many chances to go to our orchards with relatives without any restrictions. Our social 
activities are highly influenced harshly by the wall. We lost our chances to invite them into farms“. 
Consequently, the wall is not just a matter of deterioration of their economic situation, but also a 
threat to their traditional way of life and culture.  
 
The knowledge about cultivation is socially transmitted from one generation to another; what fathers 
learned about farming and taking care of land are transmitted to children through practice (when sons 
help fathers in cultivation and picking fruit from trees). According to farmers, the work of cultivation 
by families facilitates transmission of knowledge about farming and sense of belonging of the land to 
their sons. It may be described as a cumulative knowledge. After the wall however, the chain of 
transmission of knowledge is broken.  
Despite that, farmers are worried about the future; many farmers in the group meetings expressed 
their persistence to keep farming, irrigating their land because the land symbolizes the life for them. 
One of farmers wrote a short story titled ‘The Sad Olive Tree’, expressing his love to his land and his 
helplessness facing the destruction of his land. He described his happiness while working in his farm, 
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describing his feeling by writing: “He was very happy to work in his farm. He looked after his trees as 
his sons”. Then he described his powerlessness facing uprooting his trees by writing: 
“One day, a year ago, when he was working hard, he saw a paper hanging on a branch of an olive tree. 
It was an order from the Israeli military officer. It was written in bad Arabic by saying that he would 
confiscate the farm to build a wall and a fence through it. A month later the Israeli bulldozers were 
brought to the farm and uprooted the hundred olive trees”.      
What is lost as a result of the wall is a vast environment that had positive influence in generating and 
preserving good social habits in Qalqiliya communities. The destruction of the physical link between 
people and land decreases social meaning of agricultural activity; communal activities have 
transformed to individual activities. Nevertheless, people are strongly have the sense of belongings to 
the land. Nowadays, the knowledge related to agriculture passing from generation to generation 
cannot be gained by practice and observation except by narratives and storytelling.   
Nowadays, people who live in the “Seam Zone” face difficulties in keeping their social relationships 
as past time (before building the wall). Indeed, their social and economic networks extend to 
communities in the whole Qalqiliya region and they have strong family ties linking them to other 
villages and cities in Palestine. On one hand, they view the wall as an element of disenfranchisement 
and marginalization. On the other hand, the wall prohibits people from visiting their relatives and 
friends living in the “Seam Zone” and consequently creates a space of unfair confinement and space 
of exclusion.  
 
Accordingly, new social relationships might be defined which are not optional at all (not with the 
hand of people). New meaning of space has been shaped; the notions of outside and inside dominate 
the narrative of people. For example, the desire to marry a woman from outside becomes a hard 
decision. Because the system of control influences them obviously; it is not just wedding ceremony 
time is totally controlled by gates and checkpoints, but also the free access between the “Seam Zone” 
and the rest part of the West Bank is prohibited. This context would prevent any two families to keep 
in contact together. According to the interviews with people in A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi, they 
points out that their social occasions such as wedding ceremony are totally influenced by the permit 
system. Asraf from A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi told the researcher: “we can invite our friends to 
participate in wedding ceremony, but they will not be allowed to reach the community”. This 
expected context could lead to tremendous hardship for families in which one spouse is from “Seam 
zone” and the other from the West Bank.   
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5.4.4 Economic Sector  
The agricultural sector is a corner stone in the district’s economy. The interviews which was 
conducted seeks to uncover the way in which economic situation has been deteriorated, highlighting 
the restrictions imposed on farmers that participate vigorously in the decline of the economy of the 
district.  
 
The restriction policy had many dimensions including difficulties in movement to the agricultural 
land, coupled with a serious obstruction of Palestinian development in agricultural sector as well as 
process of control (time control and permit system), already explained. In this way, the economy of 
the district has been deteriorated; unemployment rate increased among farmers. In the late of 2003, 
the unemployment had risen to 75% and more than 4000 citizens from Qalqiliya city had migrated to 
other West Bank towns (Dolphin, 2006, 73).   
  
Framers interviewed by the researcher described the marketing process before the construction of the 
wall. They emphasized that they did not need to engage in a marketing process, because traders were 
coming to their fields in the time of harvest; putting fruits in boxes and shipping them to markets. 
After the wall, however, traders are not allowed to reach farms (they are not given permits). Thereby, 
farmers have responsibility to transport agricultural products to markets. Difficulties in the sale 
process and transport of products increase the production cost, and decrease the ability of marketing 
(especially with existence of “Israeli agricultural products”).  
There are complains among participants (farmers) about the existence of “Israeli agricultural product” 
in Palestinian markets, influencing negatively marketing process. They points out that “Israeli 
farmers” have an easy accessibility to water, support from their government and there is no 
restrictions against them of doing farming but full of support. The central question they asked how 
could they compete with “Israel agricultural product”? Some of them changed the type of crops they 
planted to deal with this problem.  For example, one of farmers changed the crops from mandarin 
orange (which is extensively produced by “Israeli farmers”) to lemon in order to avoid the assured 
loss.  
Due to the policy of restriction, the allowed work time is very limited. Additionally, there is a limited 
opportunity to increase the number of farmers. Therefore, agricultural productivity has been declined, 
and quality of agricultural product has decreased. This circumstance prevents real investment in 
agricultural sector which can play a significant role in developing the Palestinian economy. Obstacles 
imposed on this sector forced farmers to deal with the problem of accessibility and not to think 
strategically of reclamation of uncultivated lands or to improve the quality and quantity of agricultural 
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products in order to increase the production as well as economic growth.
51
 The lack of strategic 
economic perspective regarding agriculture causes decline of Palestinian economy (no new job 
opportunities, law rate of wages, and high rate of unemployment).   
Qalqiliya city was an important regional market before the establishment of the wall, many 
Palestinians who live in the West Bank as well as Palestinians who live in the occupied 1948 land 
used to go to Qalqiliya for day-to-day needs. But after the wall which cuts off main streets that 
connect the city with surrounding communities (fig. 5.28), the commercial activity was declined and 
half of the 1200 shops in Qalqiliya city were closed as a direct result of the wall (Hopper, 2007, 93). 
Another example of the deterioration of the economic situation as a result of the wall is the village of  
Mas’ha (located south of Qalqiliya city). The main street was blocked by a military gate and it 
transformed to an inner street inside the Elkana Jewish colony. Accordingly, the agricultural and 
commercial activities were sharply declined; the weekly commercial market which was full of shops 
on the both sides of the main street was totally disappeared.    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51 According to the interview with the administrator of Agricultural Department in Qalqiliya Governorate, it is obvious that 
there is no clear strategy of developing the agricultural sector in the region. The way that they follow to support farmers is 
just by providing them with new plants with low cost.     
Fig. 5.28: The upper photo and the below on the left side: the wall blocks one of main streets in Qalqiliya city. 
The below photo on the right side shows the closed shops because of the wall which deteriorate the economic 
situation. Source: Halawani, June, 2013   
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5.4.5 Health  Sector  
Qalqiliya is one of the main cities in the West Bank, serving as center of the district. There were no 
obstacles, preventing people who live in surrounding communities to benefit from health services of 
the main hospital located in Qalqiliya city. Since 2000, however, many obstacles such as checkpoints 
and the wall have been disrupting the health services. In this context, the life of people is under 
danger because of two reasons; namely there are elven communities suffer from the lack of any minor 
health services even a small health clinic, except a weekly mobile health clinic. Secondly, there are 
three communities are separated behind the wall and the people forced to pass through gates to benefit 
health services. If there is an emergency case in one of those communities, an ambulance has to pass 
through gates and checkpoint. Moreover, an ambulance must have a permit to be allowed to go into 
“Seam Zone”.  
Yediot Ahronot reported in 2010 that a Bedouin- Palestinian pregnant women was forced to deliver a 
baby in the house because the inability of ambulance to reach here (fig.5.29). It is not allowed for 
ambulance to enter the “Seam zone” except by obtaining a permit in advanced by “Israeli Civilian 
Administration”. When a woman felt associated birth pain she called a taxi from the city of Qalqiliya 
and the taxi was stuck at the checkpoint. During that time she began to deliver a baby and one of 
women from the community cut the umbilical cord for the baby. According to the interview with 
Kassab (the spokesman of the community) he said that the women died because she was poisoned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.29: Yediot Ahronot reports the story of Aliya who forced to deliver a baby in the house because she lives in 
the so-called “Seam Zone” where there are isolated Bedouin communities 
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Fig. 5.30: The upper part of the document issued by “Israeli Civilian Administration” in which was declared 
that a local committee will discuss the destruction of building in a court session   
5.4.6 Educational Sector  
As mentioned those communities who have been separated from the rest of the West Bank   have been 
cut off from regional services in terms of health and education. Therefore, in order to obtain these 
services, they must go out of the “Seam zone”. As an example, pupils of three Palestinians 
communities (A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi, A’rab ar Ramadin ash Shamali, and A’rab Abu Farda) 
have to travel outside the “Seam Zone” in order go to schools each day. There is a bus to transport 
them back and forth to go to school outside the enclave. Each time the pupil’s bus on its way back, it 
get inspected thoroughly at the checkpoint. Pupils cannot attend class after one o’clock or participate 
in extra-curricular activities for their fear of missing the bus. Basic services which are very essential 
to facilitate education do not exist in the community A’rab Abu Farda (where 200 Palestinian 
Bedouins residents live); there are no electricity, no sanitation network, and no water networks. 
Due to difficulties of pupils to reach their school in surrounding villages and in Qalqiliya city, in 2012 
the people of A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi community constructed an elementary school using light 
materials. They used the same material that used to build a tent (fig. 5.31). The school consists of 
three classes and an outdoor yard. Teachers from outside the enclave have to apply for a permit to 
teach the school. What is important to say that the people built the school without having a building 
permit. Kassab points out that “they build the school without a permit because they are prevented at 
all to build any kind of buildings (houses, schools, and so on)”. What people have to do to cope with 
the absence of any method to build (emptiness of law)? Of course, as Kassab said: “we are compelled 
to build without a permit because there is no possibility to obtain a permit”. Indeed, there is no 
planning framework in which Bedouin can deal with in order to apply for a building permit. It can be 
said they are un-recognized communities in term of planning. Nowadays, the school is under threat of 
demolition according to the following document issued by the “Israeli civilian administration” in 16-
10-2012 (fig. 5.30).   
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Fig. 5.31: The elementary school in A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi. Source: Halawani, June, 2013  
5.5 The landscape of Control   
 Territorial Control  
The territorial control of Qalqiliya region is premised on a continuous process of control that started 
by establishing colonies. One aspect that keeps the territorial colonization intact is the continuous 
confiscation of land as well as the construction of the wall. Private lands belonging to individual or 
group of people are encircled by the wall. This means that people of Palestine are being relentlessly 
confined into smaller and smaller areas. It is possible to say that Qalqiliya district has never faced 
such territorial control as in the context of the wall; no construction is allowed within a distance of 
300 meters of the wall (Dolphin, 2006, 40). 
 
The transportation planning is also linked to the territorial control, engaging in separation and 
division; there are roads only for the use of the Jewish settlers and others for the use Palestinians. 
Moreover, space of movement is also divided into three dimensions.  As an example, for Palestinians 
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Fig. 5.32: The road is divided into two parts; the tunnel is for the use of Palestinians and the bridge is 
only used by Jewish Settlers.  Source: Halawani, May, 2013 
 
 
 the researcher  
who want to go to Habla village from Qalqiliya city, they must travel through a tunnel under a bridge 
which is exclusively for the use of Jewish settlers (fig. 5.32).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Time control  
Control over time is a core issue to be considered as part of the control system in the Qalqiliya 
district. This type of control makes a new system of work for the whole residents especially for 
farmers, due to the fact that the time is in the hands of “Israeli soldiers”. After the outbreak of the 
Gulf War in 1991/ the aggressive attack against Iraq, checkpoints  were erected between Palestinians 
cities in order to control people movement; additionally partial curfews were imposed on people at the 
beginning of the attack. Policies of restriction have been intensified by the establishment of the wall. 
People times are totally under control by a permit regime.  
  
Control over time in the West Bank began to take shape obviously after the establishment of the wall. 
Since policies of restrictions were placed on the movement (between people and their private land), 
controlling time of people by creating a permit system and time schedules of gates. Many checkpoints 
were established in which the procedures of inspections and registrations are similar to airports 
inspection system. Qalandiya checkpoint (located to north of Jerusalem) is a clear example, and El 
Yaho checkpoint (which connects Qalqiliya city with Bedouins communities in Qalqiliya district) is 
another example.  
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The Permit system has become the main domain through which farmers are forced to deal 
with to be able to reach their private lands behind the wall. The permits are issued for small 
number of person with a limited time (usually from three months to one year). To have a new 
permit, new application should be applied before the work permit expires. In some cases, the 
renew process to having a new permit takes months, leaving expired permit holder in the 
context of continuous uncertainty.  
 
Usually, permit holders are in doubt; how long can stay without a new permit, and even if 
they will succeed to have a new one or not. For example, in the interview with Ali (farmer 
from Qalqiliya city), he mentioned that he had not been given a permit for three successive 
years, and then a permit was issued for six months. After expiry of the second permit, he had 
waited three months to have another one. It is clear that the permit system is such a domain 
that controls time, behavior, and activities of farmers. In the context of uncertainty, at any 
moment the military commander could cease issuing work permits and totally cripples the 
access to lands behind the wall.  
    
Farmers have to travel more distance than previous. Some farmers point out that before the 
wall daily journey to farming land took fifteen minutes. After the wall, however, daily 
journey takes more than hour; they must wait longtime to pass through the gate. Many of 
them emphasize that they are inspected while passing through gates (body inspection as well 
as checking of documents)52, and tractors’ cargo (fertilizers and seedlings) are under 
inspection also. “Israeli soldiers” ask them to empty their tractors’ cargo in order to look into 
a cart for inspection. Moreover, some of them are not given a vehicle permit and 
consequently they waste their time depending on primitive means of transportation (horses, 
donkeys ... etc.).  
 
Farmers were not allowed to stay as long as they want in their farming lands. When they have 
a permit, their lengths of stay are under control. All of agricultural gates are controlled by a 
time schedule. There are three periods of time to allow farmers to pass through gates; one 
hour in the morning to allow farmer to go to work, one hour in the mid of a day, and one hour 
in the evening to let farmers return to their houses after the work. Many farmers emphasized, 
during the group meeting held in the municipality of Qalqiliya in August, 2013, that in 
summer time, one of the best period to work is after five o’clock (when the weather is fair). 
However, the time work is no longer flexible because the gates system, already described.    
 
The problem of uncertainty is disturbing for farmers. The critical period in which permit may 
not be issued is the harvest time when fruits must be picked from trees. If this occurs they 
                                                          
52 During inspection, sometimes farmers are asked to remove shirts and Jackets.  
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will lose all their seasonal investment of time, energy, and money. Thereby, their economic 
life is not secure any more.  
 
 Procedural control  
In ‘Area c’, planning power is in the hand of the higher planning council (HPC) which is part of 
“Israeli civilian administration”. The members of the higher planning council (HPC) are appointed by 
the military commander. There are two separate planning systems, one for Jewish colonies and 
another for Palestinian communities. British regional plans (prepared in 1940
s
) are still in force and 
used to issue building permits in ‘Area C’ for Palestinian communities. The British plan allows a very 
low building density; according to  the Plan S/15 the maximum building area on a lot of land (for 
residential use ) is 180 square meters, while the plans RJ/4 and R/6 permit less area compared with the 
plan S/15 (only 150 square meters) (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 79). Even though the “Israeli 
civilian administration” allows Palestinians to apply in order to get building permits, and even though 
it has prepared plans for most of their communities, the process of obtaining a permit is a complex 
one and the process of preparing and approving an outline plan takes a long time (Coon, 1992).   
Obtaining building permit is a complicated issue facing Palestinians who live in ‘Area c’. The 
procedures include land survey, proving the ownership of land, and having approvals from various 
departments (survey, antiquities, and absentees departments). Despite, people of Palestine own the 
land, but the occupying power make this step (proof of ownership) very complex, because of   most of 
the lands in the West Bank are registered in the property tax records and not in the Lands Registrar. 
The registration appears under the name of the original owners (dating back to Jordanian era)
53
 
(Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 82).  
In most of cases, the names of heirs have not written as owners in property tax and the procedure to 
prove ownership requires them to make a surveyed map of land with a signature of all heirs. Without 
all heirs’ signatures, the “Israeli civilian Administration” refuses to issue building permits considering 
that a partial ownership of lands.  
The absence of any development plans for some Palestinians communities is another way in which 
procedural control is secured. For example, there are no plans prepared for some communities in 
Qalqiliya district (especially Bedouin communities). Therefore, the absences of master plans are the 
main obstacle for their future development, causing many spatial problems in different dimensions; 
housing, transportation, and public services and so on.  
                                                          
53 Jordanian government began a process of registering land in the West bank in Lands Registrar, but because of the War in 
1967 this was stopped process and the process had registered only about 38% of the lands (Coon, 1992, 114).Then in 1968, 
the military order number 291 suspended the process of land registration initiated by Jordanian Government (ibid, 115).  
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Bedouin communities are prevented from the right of building new houses; even extensions to the 
existing one are also prevented. For example, A’rab Abu Farda is a Bedouin tribe arrived to the 
Qalqiliya district in the year 1948 as Palestinian refugees, after that they bought the land on which 
they live. After 1967, discriminatory regulations imposed by the occupying power prevented them to 
develop their community (establishing roads and building houses), on paradoxically, in a short time 
(less than ten years) Alfe Menashe colony which was established in 1989,  became a town where there 
are gardens, paved streets and public swimming pools. Moreover, successive master plans had been 
prepared, strengthening the existence of settlers and providing other public services such as (zoo and 
commercial centers).   
The provision of housing for settlers in the West Bank, in comparison with Palestinians, is not an 
individual issue; it has been entirely managed by the “Israeli ministry of housing”. The so-called 
“state lands” (which originally confiscated from the people of Palestine) have been devoted for 
building colonies while Palestinians were deprived to take any benefit from land classified as a “state 
land”. There is no gainsaying the fact that settlers have no obstacles to own a house. There are 
extensive efforts of “Israeli ministry of housing” to facilitate establishing colonies on “state lands” by 
offering lands to cooperative association contractor & developers) at reduced prices to building 
houses exclusively for Jews. While the provision of housing for Palestinians who live in ‘area c’ 
depends, to the large extent, on private sector and people face complicated process to build a house, as 
already explained.  
Another type of the procedural control is the permit regime. The only way for farmers to have access 
to their agricultural lands (which are located behind the wall) is to apply to have a permit. 
Nevertheless, farmers that had been interviewed emphasized that in some cases it is not easy to obtain 
a permit, as Fayaz Saleem, a farmer from Jayyous village and also former mayor of Jayyous village 
council between the years 1999 – 2005, emphasized that obtaining a permit is a complex process; 
there are numerous conditions to meet and many hardships to face. The procedures start by preparing 
ownership documents of a land then to be submitted for “Israeli Civilian Administration” in order to 
be checked. The point is that despite farmers inherited their farms from their fathers and grandfathers 
many lands are not registered in the land registrar. In this sense, the major difficulty is to have 
ownership documents of land. He added that many of applications were refused by in the name of 
“security” even that most of those people who were refused a permit have never been accused by the 
occupying authority.   
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5.7 Citizens Against the Wall (Rebel Villages) 
The elements of control extensively implanted in the landscape of Palestine, leading to a wide spread 
of feeling of oppression among people of Palestine. In the group meeting recorded in July 2013, 
farmers expressed anger and the feeling of injustice in the face of territorial colonization. They 
complain about the hardship of their life, and the cruelty and maltreatment while they pass through 
gates to reach their lands. Since its construction, the separation wall which has separated farmers from 
their agricultural lands has triggered various waves of protests among villagers who oppose the 
construction of the wall, and they have been struggling against dispossession, fragmentation, and 
confiscation producing a ‘lived space” (in Lefebvre’s terminology) or a space of struggle.   
 
The struggle against elements of control (specifically the wall) has developed from an idea of 
complaints about the wall to state of social actions including demonstrations, making economic 
sanction of colonies products, and searching for international support which is embedded into 
grouping international volunteers against the wall and occupation. Since the establishment of the wall, 
many international activists have come to the West Bank especially to those places where the wall is 
under construction, in order to stand in solidarity with those people who have been oppressed. 
(Hopper, 2007, 58) who was one of international anti-wall activist mentioned that their main task is to 
report violation of human rights and support acts demonstration against the wall.  
 
The People have protested to break the modality of control imposed upon their lands and to raise their 
own voices against the wall (fig. 5.33). The protest started in Jayyous village where 75% of its land 
has been separated by the wall. At the beginning, demonstrations took place every day, after that 
every week. They started by a small number of villagers from Jayyous, then more people went to the 
streets, and other people from other villages joined them.  
 
The idea of protest spread quickly among the Palestinians (specifically farmers who live in threatened 
villages). During demonstrations protesters hold signs, and shout against the wall and occupation. 
Sharif Omar (a leader of the Local Land Defense Committee) and one of the main organizers of 
demonstration against the wall in Jayyous village mentions that protesters in some places constructed 
tents on the land threatened by confiscation. He added “we are resisting the wall by continuing 
farming and planting trees alongside protesting”.  
 
The Organizers of demonstration used to urge people to participate by printing posters against the 
wall, reminding villagers about the destructive effect of the wall. The organizers used to call people 
by microphones to meet at a central public place in the village and then to go in groups to protest in 
front of gates. One of the organizers would make a speech to raise the morale of marchers. After that 
protesters would march towards the site of construction of the wall, standing and shouting near 
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Fig. 5.33: Protesters were marching towards the site of wall construction. Source: Jayyous Village Council 
“Israeli bulldozers” and soldiers. In many cases, the demonstrators were attacked by tear-gas, and 
noise bombs, and bullets (rubber and metal) (fig.5.34). Sometimes “Israeli soldiers” imposed curfews 
on the rebel villages and arrested protesters.  
 
The ongoing protest has aimed to raise voices against oppression. Accordingly, it can be said that 
Palestinians (specifically farmers) are trying to play a role in change by many tactics; demonstrations, 
and trying to create a public opinion supporting their rights in the space, and asking civil 
organizations and institutions to make an action. What Palestinians aim by these tactics? They try to 
diffuse the only single power (the occupying power) that engaged in producing their landscape, 
embedding other minor powers to be involved in producing the landscape and in reducing the 
mechanism of control over them. It is worth to note that demonstrations aim just to raise voices 
against the oppression and the only way to get rid of oppression is the liberation of the whole 
Palestine.  
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Fig. 5.34: Protesters were attacked by tear gas. Source: Jayyous Village Council   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.8 Conclusion     
 
The ongoing transformation of the landscape in the West Bank is the result of the colonial process that 
began since the establishment of the Zionist colonies in Palestine as a result of British colonization. 
However, various methods have been used to deprive Palestinian farmers from their lands. In 1948, 
farmers were forcedly expelled from the land occupied in 1948, and at the present time their lands are 
confiscated in the name of the law which is used as a pretext of territorial colonization.  
Planning is supposed to achieve prosperity and progress in communities. Planning theories addresses 
various types of planning for the aim of fair development. However, in the case of occupied Palestine 
planning is used as a weapon for the aim of control. Planning plays double standards; on one hand it is 
deployed for promoting progress and consolidating the existence of settlers, on the other hand it is 
used as a tool of territorial colonization. Laws and spatial knowledge are not to order things or 
facilitate the life of people of Palestine, but they are methods and ease the judaising process.    
The ongoing fragmentation of the landscape of Palestine including the West Bank (as a result of 
colonies, bypass roads, the separation wall … etc.) is going in parallel with different narratives to 
justify the attempt of fragmentation. For example, when the wall is mentioned by “Israeli politicians” 
they deploy “security” as a pretext of confiscation and injustice, while ignoring the mention of 
robbery of lands, or of the housing demolition, or of trees uprooting, or of the lands confiscation, or of 
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the Palestinians dispossession, or of the isolation of tens of ground water wells, or of the prevention of 
access to private lands. 
This chapter is an attempt to examine the consequences of using planning as a control tool which 
plays a clear role in stretching the meaning of landscape from a natural scene people interact with, to 
the meaning of domination and exploitation.  In this context, there are two images in conflict with 
each other; they are struggling between two identities and two cultures: the culture of occupation and 
the culture of resistance. Villagers as explained try to resist the hegemonic image imposed by the 
occupying power, attempting to be minor power and to raise their voices against oppressor.      
Clearly, the land according to the people of Palestine is deeply rooted and intertwined with the faith. 
The land plays a major role in Palestinian rural life; it is not just source of income, but it is also part of 
their culture. This fact reveals that the wall is not just the matter of denying accessibility of farmers to 
their lands, but it harshly changed the way of life of people. However, farmers show steadfastness and 
adherent to the land.  
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Chapter 6: Conceptualizing the Landscape as an Exercise 
of Unfair Power 
_________________________________________________ 
 
The aim of this chapter is to construct a model, based on the theoretical and the practical analysis, 
already illustrated in the previous chapters. Through the suggested model, the process and mechanism 
of landscape manipulation can be understood. Despite the context of Palestine is the context of 
colonization, where foreign colonial powers who decided about the geographic order of the region, 
but in other contexts (especially in conflict zones) this framework may be helpful.  
 
This chapter highlights three main points; firstly it re-conceptualizes the notion of exception and its 
relation with the landscape? This part aims to unveil the mechanism through which the landscape has 
been transformed and manipulated in the case of the West Bank (in occupied Palestine). The first part 
is undoubtedly vital to address how Palestinian planners cope with the context of the landscape of 
exception where people live in closed spaces and separated from their lands. Secondly, this chapter 
highlights the way is which oppressed villagers seek to make what I call ‘space of steadfastness’ as a 
counter action of territorial colonization. Finally, challenges and role of planning in the context of 
exception will be examined. This part answers a main question, in the context of exception is there ‘a 
planning failure’? 
6.1 The Production of the Landscape of Exception  
This section answer a central question: what does the landscape of exception mean? Another question 
will be examined: what is the relation between planning laws and the production and reproduction of 
the landscape in Palestine?  
The planners who work with the occupation entity practice their own political ideology, considering 
planning as an un-substitutable opportunity to achieve control over land and people of Palestine. In 
the case of Palestine, this is clearly manifested where planning is exploited to the utmost limit to keep 
the occupying power superiority and control over people of Palestine. Consequently, landscape has 
been constantly transformed and changed, as it turns out, up to a complete change of its indigenous 
image. Today, the landscape is saturated with elements of control (colonies, walls, and bypass roads), 
losing its liveability and geographical continuity.   
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The landscape of exception is a material scene as well as non-material narratives which have been 
reproduced for the purpose of the territorial and mental colonization. It is a real object, but it is also a 
process through which the landscape is transformed to play a role of an exercise of unfair power over 
its users. In our case, the landscape has been restructured by creating domains and frameworks in 
which people (mental) and space (physical) are controlled by a machinery of fabricated and order 
(such as laws and courts) imposed by the occupation.   
This chapter shows the employment of the context of exceptionalism for the desire of continuous 
control and subjection on Palestinians. The landscape of exception produced and reproduced by a 
misrepresentative “system of law” which is fabricated to normalize and “legitimize” the exception. 
‘Landscape of exception’, as this study highlights, is produced through three inter-connected 
processes: firstly, destruction of the indigenous landscape; Secondly, manipulation of laws (especially 
inherited laws); thirdly, enforcing the executive power (military orders) and fourthly, constructing 
elements of control for the purpose of exercising unfair power. 
 Destruction (urbicide) of the indigenous landscape 
Scattered stones and few crumbled houses are what remained in most of the sites of the Palestinian 
villages that were demolished in the year 1948. Urbicide did not skip also part of cities such as Alquds 
(Jerusalem) and Yafa (Jafa). The obliteration trials of Muslims culture had been intensified by 
converting ancient mosques to restaurants in some cases, while in other cases they have been put to 
use as bars, night clubs, and art galleries.  For example, the mosques of Majdal and Qisarya were 
turned to restaurants, and the mosque of Al-Naqab into shop. The Ayn Hawd mosque is used as a bar 
(Pappe, 2006, 219). The village of Deir Yassin has been used as a mental hospital. This 
transformation was driven for the desire to wipe out people of Palestine history and culture and 
replace it with fabricated version.  
Some sites of destroyed villages are changed to parks planted with unoriginal pine trees which  were 
used to chance the original character of the landscape as Pappe’ (2006, 272) described the change of 
the landscape of Palestine (specifically the occupied 1948lands) “pine trees were planted not only 
over bulldozed houses, but also over fields and olive groves”. It is worth to note that green zones are 
not escaped from being destroyed; some of preserved lands protected for environmental 
considerations were devastated, and then within few years were exploited to build Jewish colonies.  
This situation is clear in the case of Abu-Ghnaim Mountain (see 4.9.2). In addition, large areas of 
agricultural lands have been neglected due to farmers’ inaccessibility to them. Indeed, the indigenous 
landscape is no longer there.  
Landscape, as examined, represents culture, values, and memories. The practice of urbicide in 
Palestine, specifically to the villages in the land 1948 has aimed to abolish roots and memories. As 
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described in (section 1.2) that enormous number of villagers had their villages destroyed. After that, 
the landscape was restructured by creating a new order, new appearance, and new spatial structure 
which deny and obliterate the indigenous landscape.   
Urbicide had been going in parallel with the process of making new colonial culture. The process of 
renaming the landscape features is part of this culture. And hebronization is a major approach behind 
this process through which Arabic names of places such as valleys, villages, cities have been 
abolished and given Hebrew names. A committee was established by David Ben Gurion on 7
th
 of July 
1949 for the purpose of hebracization of Palestine (Benvenisti, 2002, Al-Shaikh, 2010).  Therefore, 
maps were used as an intellectual weapon to make “new culture” and new narrative of the landscape, 
serving to naturalize the “colonial culture”. According to Benvenisti (2002, 14): “the creation of 
Hebrew map was an extremely powerful means of doing so, no less important than the building of 
roads or the founding of settlements. It was, of course, also easier, quicker, and cheaper”. Clearly, 
drawing a Hebrew map of Palestine was used to obliterate the history and create facts on the ground 
in which Arab names of places were abolished.  
 Manipulation of inherited laws 
The occupying power manipulated and misrepresented the Islamic Ottoman Law which in its original 
form aimed to give opportunities for individuals to cultivate uncultivated lands. In other words, the 
Islamic laws concerning agriculture encourage the process of reclamation of unused lands in 
Palestine, and that laws were applied before in Palestine before the British occupation in 1917 
(Amiry, Rahhal, 2003, 21). The Islamic law was changed and manipulated by the occupation entity as 
it was examined in section (4.7.1), for the purpose of making new system of laws which aims to 
confiscate lands.     
Consequently, confiscation of lands from Palestinians' farmers was done based on the manipulated 
laws. In this sense, many confiscated lands were classified as a “state land”, which have been devoted 
for the benefit of Jewish settlers. It is worth to mention that, hundreds of thousands of dunams of 
“state land” have been allocated to building colonies under the responsibility of the World Zionist 
Organization. Therefore, thousands of housing units for Jews have been built on these lands 
(B’Tselem, 2011, 5). This strategy of manipulation served into shifting the aim of land laws from 
enlarging and developing agricultural lands into declining and vanishing the agrarian landscape of 
Palestine.  
 
 Manipulation of planning  
 
Agamben (2005) specifies that ‘an emptiness of law’ is a major feature of the context of exception in 
which executive power dominates other branches of authorities. In this sense, norms are deactivated. 
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Clearly, planning has been manipulated in many cases in the West Bank; “Israeli planners” arrested 
the development of Palestinians communities by deploying the discipline of planning. In most of 
villages’ schemes, the boundaries were drawn close to build up areas, limiting horizontal expansion of 
residential zones. What is also significant to emphasize is the way in which planning is twisted for the 
desire of territorial colonization. For example, the same agricultural zones in British regional plans 
have been employed in two contradictory approaches. On one hand, it is used to prevent expansion of 
Palestinians villages; on the other hand it is used as reserve lands for colonies. Most of colonies were 
established on lands classified as agricultural lands (according to British regional plans). The 
aforementioned process of manipulation crystallizes clearly Agamben's viewpoint of the role of power 
in circumventing laws in order to create the context of exception.  
Accordingly, the planning policies are not based on reform basis and real planning considerations. 
Instead, the policies are based on discriminative considerations in order to serve the occupiers, and to 
create a landscape of domination and fragmentation. Through this mechanism of discrimination, 
planning becomes a repression tool despite that planning is a field of study structured around progress 
and reform issues.  
 Issuing military orders   
Obviously, planning decisions have taken the shape of executive actions. This is one of the features of 
the state of exception, as Agamben (2005, 18) describes the state of exception by writing: "the 
executive power has in fact, at least partially, absorbed the legislative power". Thus, planning 
regulations which never existed before were issued suddenly by military order mechanism, ensuring 
full control of space and the whole planning structure. As shown, in the West Bank, military order 
number 418 concentrated and centralized the power of planning into one body (High Planning 
Commission), which was headed by the “Israeli military commander”. Hence, planning decisions 
such as preparing master plans have to pass to the “military commander” in order to be approved. The 
military commander of the West Bank has a wide range of authority. Immediately, after the 
occupation of the West Bank in 1967, a military proclamation was issued, stating that "every 
governmental, legislative, appointive and administrative power in respect of the region or its 
inhabitants shall henceforth be vested in me alone and shall only be exercised by me or by persons 
appointed by me for that purpose or acting on my behalf" (Benvenisti, 1984: 37).  
 Implanting elements of control for the purpose of exercising unfair power 
The apartheid wall separates Palestinian villages from their farming lands. The wall (as chapter five 
details) has separated farmers from their private lands, subjecting them to a situation where access to 
their farms depends on permit regime and gates. This system determines who can go to work and how 
long might stay, influencing (negatively) the agricultural activity.    
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Accordingly, many lands have been neglected and some of them confiscated based on the 
manipulated laws. It is worth mentioning that, many trees especially olive trees were uprooted during 
the construction of the wall. A report of United Nations published in March, 2005 pointed out that on 
9 December 2004, “Israeli” bulldozers uprooted 117 olive trees on Jayyous land, west of the wall. 
Cities and villages where Palestinians live have been transformed into cantons under restricted rules. 
As illustrated in the analysis of the case study (Qalqiliya district), the wall encircles Qalqiliya city 
from three sides and separated it from surroundings, producing what is called ‘seam zone’ where the 
life of Palestinian Bedouins has been severely affected in terms of socio-economic, health, education 
services … etc. These new principles are similar to the plague and leprosy principles explored by 
Foucault, confining people into cantons and determining their activities, controlling their behaviours 
with restricted rules. The apartheid wall functions as a physical tool for subjecting people and 
controlling people’s time and space; it determines when and how they move where they should go and 
where they should not. These principles, as a ‘mechanism of disciplinary’, become a superior power, 
forcing Palestinians either to obey or to be punished.  
 Producing Urban and Regional Prisons 
There are multi-levels of unfair confinement mechanism in occupied Palestine, because the matter of 
occupation is not limited to the control over a geographical area, but it is also the matter of producing 
zones of urban and regional prisons, where Palestinians have been categorized into different 
categories such as those who live behind “the green line” (who live in 1948 areas) and those who are 
not (who live in 1967 areas), those who live behind the apartheid wall and those who are not, those 
who are Jerusalemite and those who are not. Since building the apartheid wall in 2002, many regions 
have been divided into enclaves and enclosures.  
When Palestinians move between mentioned zones
54
, they are forced to move through checkpoints 
and gates. While they move between cities and between villages, “Israeli soldiers” may register all 
information related to them; their names and purpose of visit. That policy integrates their life (work 
and movement, and so on) into a domain of control to the degree that the colonial feeling is subject to 
the daily life for them. 
Villages and cities have been confined and villagers are asked to seek a permit if they want to go and 
work in their farming lands. It is impossible for villagers to reach their lands that are located behind 
the wall without permission. In this sense, villages are run like prisons, its inhabitants placed under 
                                                          
54  It is worth to mention that not all people are able to move from one zone to another for example Palestinians who live in 
Gaza cannot go to the West Bank and vice versa.  
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restricted rules of movement, and under supervision and surveillance of soldiers when they work in 
farming lands.  
Accordingly, Palestinian’s life is reduced to bare life; body scanner, and inspection of identity 
become a permanent mechanism that they face daily. As it was described by Abu-Zahra (2009), 
Israeli-issued ID cards for Palestinians are colour-coded, signifying the geographic zone to which 
each person is confined. Then, different degrees of unfair power exercising over them have been 
implemented in relation to these codes. 
These strategies are deployed to make “disciplinary society", according to Foucault power aims to 
control behaviors of people through what he called disciplinary power (see section 2.2). In the case of 
Palestine, the disciplinary mechanisms of occupation consist of surveillance system. Therefore, the 
landscape is saturated with surveillance devices; cameras, observer towers … etc. The apartheid wall 
plays also a role of surveillance because it is full of watching towers which have small windows 
through which “Israeli soldiers” can see people, while people do not able to see soldiers who might or 
might not be inside the watchtowers. This mechanism is exactly similar to the Panopticon mechanism 
(see 2.2).  
The apartheid wall divides the geography of the West Bank into cantons, making closed zones, and 
separating villages and towns from each other. In the case of Qalqiliya, people find themselves forced 
to travel long distances more than previous to other surrounding villages due to travel difficulties 
produced by the wall. In addition to that (as examined in the case study analysis), people found 
themselves isolated in a closed area called ‘Seam Zone’. Therefore, people have been cut off from 
regional services due to the existence of gates and checkpoints.    
This mechanism (mechanism of division) is not just a physical division, but it is also a social isolation 
and social separation. It is  similar to the Panopticon mechanism in which prisoners cannot contact 
each other as Foucault wrote “each individual, in his place, is securely confined to a cell from which 
he is seen from the front by the supervisor; but side walls prevent him from coming into contact with 
his companions" (Foucault, 1977, 200).   
As a result there are two spaces; the space of colonizer which is separated from the space of people 
who have been colonized. The ways of the two spaces function are totally different: the space where 
colonized people live takes the form of cantons and fragmentation, losing its norms and continuity, 
while the space where colonizers live hegemonies landscape. This situation resembles what Foucault 
(1984) refers to as ‘heterotopia’, where norms are abolished and suspended in the space. 
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 Militarization of the landscape  
The concept of surveillance and fortification are leading concepts of spatial distribution of colonies. 
Top of mountains were transformed to fortified Jewish colonies surrounded with fences and 
surveillance cameras, having buffer zones which are considered danger zones for Palestinian farmers 
who will be in danger when they go to their lands inside these zones. What is important to note that 
top of the mountains have been also transformed into surveillance points, reminding us of the 
panoptic principle explored by Foucault; through the panoptic principle observers carry out a full 
surveillance over others continuously. 
In this sense, “security” is used as a pretext to reshape the landscape. According to Sharon plan (see 
4.6.1.1), colonies were proposed in the form of network, arguing that the liner from of colonies would 
not provide a suitable “defense”.  In addition, large area of lands in the Jordan valley was usurped by 
the occupation to establish military closed zones.   
 The double standard of green zones  
On one hand, green zone is a method used in the West Bank to obstruct and prevent Palestinian spatial 
development, on the other hand is used as a land reserve for colonial purposes (especially for 
constructing colonies). In fact, most of the areas in the West Bank that surround Palestinians 
communities have been classified as agricultural lands (according to British plans) where spatial 
development is prevented and no construction is allowed. Indeed, most of building permit applications 
have been refused by the occupying power. At the same time on the same land that classified as 
agricultural zone, Jewish colonies were constructed or expanded.   
In this sense, a green zone is a double standard tool, consisting of two contradictory approaches: 
progressive mechanism regarding colonies, serving the current and future rapacity of the Jewish 
settlers; and regressive approach which hinders the current and the future development of the 
Palestinian residents. Landscape planning (in the case of Palestine), therefore, is a discriminatory tool 
used for the desire of occupiers.   
6.1.1 Absence of Master Plans   
Agamben’s theory – the state of exception theory– describes those contexts where the deactivation of 
norms do occur, having as result the production and reproduction of spatial areas as zones which are 
characterized by a void of law (see section 5.4.6). This condition is found in the so-called “seam 
zone” where the emptiness of law is very clear by the absence of any outline plan concerning 
Palestinians communities.  
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Indeed people are not allowed to build any building and even paving roads. In an interview recorded 
in August 2013, Ashraf (the spokesman of A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi) said: “we have been 
prevented by Israeli soldiers from paving the main street of our community by a base course”. 
Intentionally, there are no planning laws in which people can deal with to have a building permission. 
In other words they are unrecognized communities in term of planning; no master plans, and no 
building permits to be issued.  
According to what has been mentioned, the emptiness of law, which is clear by the absence of any 
outline plan concerning Palestinians communities located in the “seam zone” in Qalqiliya district, 
cripples the use of planning. Clearly, planning is used when it benefits the occupiers as in the case of 
determining the route of the apartheid wall to ensure future expansion of the colonies, while it is 
deactivated in the case of Palestinians communities for the purpose of making their life intolerable. In 
this sense planning has been used to limiting and hindering Palestinian community development, 
leaving them with shrinking spaces. This reflects the Agamben's theory about the model of exception 
in which there is no law and norms are deactivated.  
6.1.2 Attempts of “legalization” and “Legitimization” of the landscape of Exception 
What happened to colonise Palestine unveil the deceiving role of occupying power in the formation 
and enactment of control, subjection and discrimination.  Domains and frameworks were constructed 
to “legalize” the reordering and reproduction of its landscape. The process of making laws since the 
occupation of the first part of Palestine in 1948 reveals that “the legal structure” has been 
institutionalized for the purpose territorial colonization. The absentees’ property law which was 
enacted in 1958 by the “Keenest” is a clear example. According to Forman and Kedar (2003, 809) “ 
the Israeli authorities gradually but rapidly created legal structures to seize, retain, expropriate, 
reallocate, and reclassify the Arab lands appropriated by the state”. Therefore, clearly the use of this 
law was to “legalize” the confiscation lands of Palestinians who were expelled outside Palestine. 
After the occupation of the West Bank, new method of “legalization” has been adopted to confiscate 
lands. The construction of new “system of law” took the form of selective and amendment manner of 
inherited laws. Thus, “a new juridical structure” emerged, consisting of manipulated inherited laws 
and new laws of occupation to facilitate territorial, socio-economic, and cultural control. For example, 
and as mentioned in section (4.7.3) Jordanian law was amended to centralize the planning decision in 
the hand of the “Israeli military commander”.   
In the name of “security” Palestinian farmers have been prevented to go to their farming lands after 
the construction of the apartheid wall in the West Bank. Many farmers were not given permits as 
reported by B’Tselem in June, 2004 (see section 5.4.1). The report indicated that many applications 
by farmers were refused in the name of “security”. In an interview with Fayaz Saleem (the previous 
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mayor of Jayyous village council between the years 1999 – 2005), he emphasized that many of 
applications were refused by the “Israeli civilian administration”, despite that most of applicants had 
not been accused by the occupying authority (see section 5.5).    
As a result of the wall, oppressed Palestinians who live in the influenced villages and cities made 
petitions to “Israeli Courts”. Nevertheless, in a very few cases the court ordered to change the route of 
the wall, this so-called “legal frame work” that is invented by the occupying power is used as an 
attempt to normalize and neutralize the existence of the wall.  
  
One of the main attempts that have been used in the process of “legitimization” of landscape of 
exception is the so-called political agreements between Palestinian liberation Organization (PLO) and 
the occupying power specifically the so-called “Oslo Agreement” (see section 1.2) in which this 
“agreement” has become a turning point in which the production of knowledge by “Palestinian 
Ministries” is limited and tied to its terms. Therefore new terms emerged; instead of the term occupied 
Palestine a new term appeared which is ‘occupied Palestinian territories’ for indicting the West Bank 
and Gaza strip. It is an attempt to deny and veil part of the landscape of occupied Palestine.   
6.1.3 The Meaninglessness of law in the Landscape of Exception  
Clearly, landscape planning and landscape are inseparable from the domain of politics and struggle. 
Landscape of exception does not mean that there is no “system of law” shaping the landscape, but law 
becomes in the form of spectrum and are made for the desire of colonization. Schmitt (2005, 12) 
insists that "the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the juristic sense still prevails 
even if it is not of the ordinary kind".  
Planning regulations, laws and outline plans are used as vehicles for sustaining oppression in the 
landscape. Nevertheless, the law as examined in the case study is very ambiguous and blur, having as 
result the production and reproduction of landscape as zones/areas which are characterized by a void 
of law. According to Agamben (2005) when the context of exception is produced, ‘an emptiness of 
law’ becomes the form of the juridical order. Then, the exception becomes a rule (Hagmann and Korf, 
2012: 207). In the context of exception, the force of law transforms to a force without a law.  
There are many cases in which the occupying authority abandons the law (which was issued by itself) 
to the advantage of its expediency and for the purpose of ensuring its full control. As an example is 
the case of Har Homa colony, the confiscation of the mountain was done in accordance to 'AO' law, 
which permits expropriation of the land for public purpose. However, all the plots of land that were 
confiscated under this law were for the purpose of establishing housing for Jewish settlers. Despite 
that the area of the mountain was classified as a natural preserved zone by “Israeli legislators” 
themselves, the colony was constructed. Under these circumstances the occupying authority allows its 
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will not just of undertaking actions out of the so-called “juridical order”, but of becoming the law 
itself. These practices indicate that the law could be changed suddenly, revealing the meaninglessness 
of law versus the occupying power. 
All the discussions and examples above illustrate that the occupying power is not bound by the rule of 
the fabricated laws, because it becomes the law itself, allowing itself to reshape the landscape by 
eliminating natural preserve zones and constructing elements of dominance and control. What seems 
logical and coherent with the basic principles of planning and landscape, such as preserving forests 
and satisfying people’s needs are separated from planning decisions, therefore planning has been 
denied and ignored but used when necessary for control. Consequently, the landscape of exception is 
separated from norms, as Agamben asserts that "the state of exception separates the norm from its 
application in order to make its application possible" (Agamben, 2005: 36).  
6.2 The Spatial Consequences of the Landscape of Exception 
There is no doubt that under the pressure of colonization paradigm as illustrated, the meaning of 
landscape deviates from its original meaning as a delightful medium that people interact with, to a 
medium that is full of control, exploitation and domination. This paradigm becomes an atmosphere 
for domination of Jews; in which the ongoing manipulation of law limits the development and 
demographic growth of people who have been occupied (people of Palestine), while at the same time 
it strengths the existence of colonizers. In this context, there are two images struggles with each other; 
they are struggling between two identities and two cultures: the culture of occupation and the culture 
of resistance. 
Despite that the landscape is full of elements of control; it is still possible for those who are under 
oppression and subjection to create their own images to form a counter-hegemonic image and actions, 
trying to persist on their rights to the space and landscape. The persistence of that right is called 
steadfastness (Summud), because they live under unfair confinement and restriction mechanisms, and 
at the same time they practice farming under severe restrictions and living with what is available to 
them.   
 The space of steadfastness (Summud)  
Much of the debate about space in theories (see chapter 3) neglects the interrelation between the roles 
of oppressed and exploited people with the production of the space, as many conceive space in terms 
of beauty and enjoyment, or as a medium for representation of hegemonic and dominant powers. 
Consequently, this section highlights  the role of oppressed villagers as one of the actors of the 
production of space who are engaged in space of steadfastness, countering hegemonic orders imposed 
by the occupation authority (what Lefebvre called a ‘lived space’). 
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Despite the fact that the landscape of Qalqiliya has been fragmented and segmented, and the elements 
of control dominate the landscape, the farmers have shown various ways to resist the fragmentation of 
their landscape especially after the construction of the apartheid wall. The wall has been separating 
agricultural lands from farmers, causing a new way of life and a wave of protests.  
The intensifying elements of control in the landscape of the district has led to a wide spread of feeling 
of persecution among the people. The interviews and group meetings unveil these negative feelings 
among farmers who complain about the hardship of their life, and the cruelty and mistreatment they 
face when they pass through gates to reach their lands, insisting on their right of movement and of 
living in dignity. It had never happened before that an element of control received so much public 
attention as the wall, because it has been influencing directly and harshly the daily life of people and 
abusing their rights by separating them from their private owned lands.   
 
Palestinians (specifically farmers) have been trying to take action regarding the change and 
manipulation of their landscape. They have tried to counter land confiscation and the elements of 
control that engaged in producing their landscape by adopting different tactics such as  
demonstrations, applying petitions (against confiscation of lands, and the wall), and trying to make an 
international public opinion that supports their rights of the space. These are reactions against the 
‘conceived space’ where the occupying power reproduced it to control Palestinians.   
One of actions of steadfastness that have been adopted by farmers is persistence on keep farming 
despite all suffering; for example Sharif Omar (a leader of the Local Land Defense Committee) 
mentioned in the interview that: “we are resisting the wall by continuing farming and planting trees 
alongside protesting”. Hence, reclamation of land by planting trees is a counter action against 
confiscation and uprooting trees. In this sense, farmers’ acts give the space a unique meaning. The 
practice of agriculture becomes act of steadfastness and a struggle against the occupation.  
 
Palestinian farmers who have been oppressed and prevented from their right to use their private 
owned land as explained, practiced what Lefebvre called ‘lived space’ which is the space of 
inhabitants where the imagination of people seeks to change; they refused the hegemonic image 
imposed over their landscape and have tried to resist that to change the actual space (perceived space) 
where it was transformed to sustain oppression and exploitation as a result of the occupation. They 
have attempted to re-grasp the mental image that resembles the original image of their landscape (the 
landscape without the wall). The point is that the imagination of people regarding space clarifies what 
space should be, and plays a role as a generator to change and counter the elements of control 
implanted within their landscape.  
Despite that the occupying power denies the indigenous narratives and trying to abolish them, in our 
case users of the space have been trying to play an active role in the struggle against the dominant 
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stories produced by the power. Farmers who were separated from their farms are still holding the 
image of their original landscape. As mentioned (see 5.4.3), one of farmers, who was not allowed to 
see his land since ten years ago, except for a few months, cried bitterly and expressed that the land 
symbolizes life for him. He wrote a short story, titled ‘The Sad Olive Tree’.   
 
According to the interviews, Palestinians’ mental image is still alive, despite the fact that the 
‘perceived space’ is full of features and elements that reflect the image of occupation such as colonies 
and the apartheid wall. For example, the farmer Hani Amer described his tragedy as a continuous 
process of occupation of Palestine. Hani Amer began his speech by indicating that he is a refugee and 
his father was expelled from Palestine in 1948, unveiling that the land was deeply entrenched in his 
life and memory.  
6.3 The Challenges of Future Spatial Development of Palestinian Communities  
As described with the support of international colonial powers and as a result of the collapse of Al-
Khilafa, Palestine has been occupied. The year 1917, was the starting point of confiscation and 
usurpation of lands.  New cities and agricultural villages exclusively for Jewish settlers were built, 
changing the face of original landscape.  
 
With the passage of the time, the landscape of Palestine has been fragmented. In this context, the main 
question is; how planning can cope with the endless spatial problems caused by the occupying power? 
Planning theories do not answer the question, or offer clues to understand how planners cope with this 
situation, or offer roles and approaches that planners might adopt to solve problems.  
 
Indeed, Palestinian planners find it difficult to prepare regional plans, because there is no sovereignty 
on the ground and the wall encircles many communities, cutting them off from the land reserves 
available for their future urban development. Additionally, the so-called Oslo agreement participates 
in the division of the West Bank. It is worth mentioning that uncertainty and unpredictable situations 
are major problems and obstacles in the face of planning. 
 
Concerning these circumstances, regional planning cannot be employed as a tool of development. For 
instance, cities and villages extensions could not be proposed on ‘Area C’ as well as roads that might 
be proposed for regional services. Not surprise that there is no effective urban and rural development 
without a continuous territory. Palestinian regional planners are powerless, facing fragmented 
geography. Moreover, at local scale planners hardly find suitable solutions for community’s future 
development in terms of agriculture, housing, and public services. 
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Shrinkage of agricultural land is expected due to the problem of confiscation, the wall construction, 
and the lack of land for future housing development. Recently, planners of the new master plan of 
Qalqiliya city proposed to change the use of agricultural lands to residential use. Planners found the 
only practical solution to satisfy the needs of inhabitants (particularly the housing problem) was to 
change the use of agricultural land that surrounds the city to residential use. There are no vacant lands 
to be used for the purpose of housing extension except the agricultural lands.  
Regarding the transportation from communities to surroundings, there is one entrance that connects 
them to a main road. This is similar to the bottle neck concept, easy to close by the occupying power. 
For example the wall in Qalqiliya city (the center of the region) cuts all transportation links with 
surroundings except two roads one links to Habala village and another link to Nablus city. In any 
moment, the occupying power may close entrances, making cities and villages similar to the situation 
of prison. For this purpose, there is a gate on each main entrance of many of Palestinian villages; 
therefore they can easily be transformed to a prison with no access to outside (fig. 6.1).  
 
 
 
These spatial circumstances would lead to some expected spatial problems. Namely, the prices of 
lands are expected to increase at high rates, because of successive restrictions of urban development in 
terms of local and regional scales. Secondly, existing neighborhoods might turn to such 
neighborhoods with bad housing qualities; high density, lack of gardens, and lack of public spaces. 
Thirdly, slums and informal housing could be emerged, causing social and environmental problems. 
Fig. 6.1: Yellow steel gate is on the entrance of villages A’azuin in Qalqiliya district. Source: Halawani, June, 2013  
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Fig. 6.2: The future planned route of the wall, divides the Qalqiliya district into three completely separate cantons. 
Source: Halawani, 2014    
Consequently, all that would lead some people in the future to view their city as not an appropriate 
place to live due to the expected overcrowded, deterioration of spaces, housing shortage, and high real 
estate prices that would drive them to leave the city to live in suburbs.  
The future planned route of the wall, according to the map below (fig. 6.2), separates and divides 
completely the northern part from the southern part of the region. People would travel a circuitous 
route to go from south to north and vice versa. The journey that requires people minutes to travel and 
few kilometers would require hours and tens of kilometers. This expected situation would exacerbate 
hardship for thousands of residents who need to travel between the two sides (north and south). This 
separation might lead to emerge a new regional center (spontaneously) to satisfy the needs of people 
who would be cut from the existing center.  
 
 
Occupied Land 1948 
Occupied land  
   
1948 
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The people who live in the “Seam zone” (especially Palestinian Bedouin communities) express their 
worries (during the interview) not only about restrictions of movement and inaccessibility to their 
lands, but also about expected future threats of their existence on their lands. The colonies were built 
very close to their houses which might cause a risk of disposition in the future. They express the fear 
of land robbery by the occupying power and anxiety to be expelled from their place of residence, 
insisting that dispossession is not an imaginary situation but it may be a real situation because 
Palestinian Bedouins in Jerusalem and Al-Naqab desert has been facing practical steps of expulsion 
and dispossession. Cook (2003) in his article titled ‘Bedouin in the Negev Face New Transfer’ 
mentions the way in which “Israel” controlled the Palestinian Bedouin community in the dessert of 
Naqab in 1950s by transferring then into places attached to towns where they work as a labourers with 
low-wages and also by building Jewish colonies around their communities. Yiftachel (2012, 298) 
points out that Bedouins in Al-Naqab region faced dispossession and displacement. He notes: “The 
most visible and painful interaction between Bedouins and the Israeli state has been the practice of 
land dispossession. This has involved a denial of ancestral land rights, massive forced relocation, and 
persistent segmentation”.   
   
In the case of Ma’ale Adummim colony, the area was inhabited by hundreds of Palestinians of Arab 
El-Jahalin Bedouins and part of the confiscated land was planted by Palestinian farmers. When 
“Israel” decided to build the colony, it dispossessed Palestinian farmers and uprooted the Bedouins 
from tents and tin buildings. Nowadays, two thousands Bedouins are threatened with eviction from 
the vicinity of Ma’ale Adumim, for the purpose of its expansion (B’Tselem, 2009, B’Tselem, 2013).  
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Chapter 7: Epilogue 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Space outlines complex set of spatial relations; therefore questions about the relation between type 
of regime and production of the space is central for understanding the way in which the physical space 
is structured. Generally speaking, across the world space is restructured for the benefits of people; 
political powers seek to build infrastructure to take advantage of natural resources, satisfying the 
needs of people. However, in the occupied Palestine, the space has been restructured to make unfair 
confinement and restriction mechanisms in multi-level.    
In this sense, landscape is transformed from a delightful scene that people interact with to a scene that 
has the ability to exercise unjust power over its users. This is occurred by using planning as a control 
tool rather than a reform tool and by deployment of the paradigm of exception ‘emptiness of law’ in 
order to provide the occupying power a situation to serve its ideological perspective and desires. 
Accordingly, the whole meaning of landscape has been changed from the original meaning of 
enjoyment or development into the meaning of surveillance, repression, and punishment.  
This study shifts the focus on landscape planning (which is branch of spatial knowledge) from a 
progressive knowledge to a destructive knowledge which has the role of subjection, exploitation and 
control. This thesis examined the process through which knowledge is reconfigured by examining the 
relations between: the occupying power, concept of exception, landscape, and planning. It answers 
questions concerning the way in which the occupying power can deploy spatial knowledge (which is 
in our case planning and landscape planning) to achieve control over the people of Palestine. The 
occupying power uses fabricated and misrepresentative “systems of law” as a source of “legitimacy” 
to deprive people of Palestine from their land and their basic rights (right of work, houses, movement 
…etc.).   
Clearly, according to the analysis, the occuping power did not just concentrate on controling the land 
and natural resources. But, also it has been seeking to make systems of control  to sustain its capture 
and occupation of the land of Palestine and to reproduce the indiginious landscape by strengthening 
the exitence of Jewish colonizers and waekning the existence and demography of indigenous 
Palestinians. 
Mechanisms, such as categorization of people of Palestine and green land policy, have been designed 
to facilitate the process of confiscation, obstructing the growth and development of the Palestinian  
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communities. Planning is used as a progressive tool for the colonizers (facilitating the constrcution of 
colonies) and as a repressive tool for clonised. It can be said that Palestinian spatial space (cities, 
villages, and Bedouin communities) are frozen through deployment of the context of exception, and 
deployment of spatial knowledge to exircise of unfair power.  
The discipline of Planning (as a branch of spatial knowledge) is used to arrest the development of 
Palestinian communities. For example, demarcation of the route of the wall highlights how planning 
is used, on one hand to promote a progress of settlers by enabling a future expansion of colonies while 
on the other hand it limits urban development of Palestinian communities. The apartheid wall aims to 
prevent Palestinins from two esentail features (water and land). This patently shows what in the mind 
of occupying authority, concernning the exitence of Palestinins as a “demographic danger”.   
Despite that the narratives of the occupying power dominate other narratives; farmers in Qalqiliya 
constructed their own counter narratives and actions. They have been trying to persist on their rights 
of the space; their right to cultivate and live on their lands. They are following tactics of steadfastness 
until the liberation of the whole Palestine. For them, the apartheid wall besides its meaning of 
oppression and unfair confinement, it also fosters the meaning of steadfastness (Summud). These 
tactics have given voices to them and power to resist the manipulation of their landscape and to be 
unavoidable layer in influencing the transformation of landscape.  
The notion of land in Palestine as the study examined is linked and revolved around faith and struggle 
against the occupation. Specifically, the Islamic faith led, as described, the last Ottoman Caliphate 
Sultan Abd-al Hamid II to resolutely refuse to sell Palestine to Jews under any circumstance (see 
section 4.1). The Caliphate was the major obstacle to Jewish plans, when it was collapsed Palestine 
occupied by the international colonial powers. From this perceptive, It is clear that planning is highly 
intertwined with politics and type of regime, and the way in which planning is used in Palestine 
proves that it has little regard for Palestinians life, only strengthening the Jewish settlers. 
Consequently, the real change of the role of planning in Palestine and the end of oppression in 
Palestine means liberation of the whole Palestine by unification of Muslims (as they were before the 
so called Sykes–Picot borders).   
One of steps to support farmers is to make agriculture profitable for them by providing plants, helping 
them in marketing process, providing practical training for young men. Of course, those 
recommendations neither enable the development of the agriculture sector nor reducing the exercise 
of unfair power. But, these steps will increase farmers’ enthusiasm, endurance, and willingness to 
make sacrifices till the end of occupation of Palestine.   
Finally, the situation of people of Palestine may go from bad to worse; continuation of land 
confiscation, land division, land fragmentation, and housing demolition, but the real risk is the 
distortion of the mental image regarding the indigenous/ original landscape. Therefore, scholars, 
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intellectuals and decision makers should concern seriously about the mental image which is associated 
with Palestine (all Palestine) as geography, landscape, and land to stay alive in the mind of future 
generation. Consequently, people of palestine who are the salt of the land will continue their adherent 
to land –Summud-. 
 
Proposed future research – Can counter planning help in the context of landscape of 
exception?  
The thesis examined the question (what has been done?), rather than the question (what should be 
done?). The thesis paves the way to other researchers who may focus on a main question: what 
Palestinians planners should do?. This part invites other researchers who are interested in this subject 
to take into consideration the following points:  
 How to develop a framework of a counter planning?  
There are lack of planning strategies and policies concerning people who are living in enclosed and 
colonized spaces. Despite the fact that planning as an instrument may not be effective, it is important 
to find out practical steps to support people in those places and to strengthening their demography. 
This theme is important in the atmosphere of land confiscation. Because, the geographical 
fragmentation may not stop; the future planned route of the wall as shown will encompass colonies 
together and at the same time separates the Palestinians’ communities. What is important to note that 
the proposed counter planning should propose methods and ways to reduce the risk of deprivation and 
confiscation.  
 The importance of faith and culture.  
The land of the whole Palestine is part of the Islamic faith and Islamic culture. This land is mentioned 
in Al Quran. Therefore, counter planning should take into consideration the ways and methods to 
strengthen the Islamic culture which plays an important role in the practice of steadfastness and 
adherent to lands.   
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Appendix A: 
Fig. a1: Palestinian Refugees expelled in the year 1948. Source: Khalidi, 1992 
 
Appendixes       
  
 
 
186 
 
Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
 List of Interviewees (key persons)  
Name of interviewee Date Position 
Dr. Jamal Amro June, 2012 
Planner & Lecturer in Birzeit  
University/Palestine, 
Department of Architecture  
Dr. Ali Abdelhamid July, 2012 
Planner & Lecturer in Al-Najah 
University/Palestine, 
Department of Architecture 
Mohammad Abo EL Sheikh May, 2013 
Director of health and 
environmental issues in 
Qalqiliya Governorate 
Dr. Yousuf Jabareen August, 2013 
Planner & Lecturer in Haifa 
University  
Mr. Anthony Coon April, 2014 
Planner & the author of the 
book “Town Planning Under 
Military Occupation” 
Prof.  Brendan Murtagh June, 2014 
Lecturer in School of Planning 
in Queen’s University/ Belfast, 
UK 
Prof. Gehan Selim June, 2014 
Lecturer in Architectural  
Department in Queen’s 
University/ Belfast, UK 
 
 List of Interviewees (farmers)  
Twenty farmers  
Between May, 2013 -
September, 2013 
Those who have experience of 
work before and after building 
the wall 
Two group meetings with 
farmers from Qalqiliya district  
June, 2013 
Those whose lands were 
separated and isolated because 
of the wall  
 
 
 
 Bibliography     
 
187 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
Abramitzky R. (2011), “Lessons from the Kibbutz on the Equality–Incentives Trade-off”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, v.25, n.1, pp. 185–208.  
Abu el-haj N. (2001), Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli 
Society, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Abu-Zahra N. (2009), “IDs and Territory Population Control for Resource Expropriation”, in D. CownE. Gilbert 
(eds), “War, Citizenship, Territory”, Taylor and Francis Group, New York, pp.303-326.   
 
Agamben G. (2005), State of Exception, University of Chicago press, Chicago. 
Alatout S. (2006), “Towards a Bio-territorial Conception of Power: Territory, Population, and Environmental 
Narratives in Palestine and Israel”, Political Geography, v. 25, pp. 601-621.  
Aldabag M. M. (1991), Palestine, Dar Al-Huda, Palestine, (in Arabic).  
Alexander E. (2010), “Planning, Policy and the Public Interest: Planning Regimes and Planners' Ethics and 
Practices”, International Planning studies, v.15, n. 2, pp. 43-162.  
Al-Haq (2013), Water For One People Only: Discriminatory Access and ‘Water Apartheid’ in the opt., 
(available online: http://www.alhaq.org/publications/Water-For-One-People-Only.pdf), (accessed 25 Oct. 2013). 
Al-Shaikh A. (2010), “The Columbus Syndrome and the Veiling of Palestine: A Genealogy of the Israeli 
Politics of Toponymy,” Journal for Palestine Studies, v. 21, n. 83, pp. 78-109 (in Arabic).  
 
Amnesty International (2009), Troubled Waters Palestinians Denied Fair Access to Water, Amnesty 
International, London.  
ARIJ (2010), Socio-Economic and Food Security Atlas, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jerusalem 
Ashcroft B., Ahluwalia P. (1999), Edward Said, Routledge, New York.   
 Bibliography     
 
188 
 
Attaya N. (2005), Agriculture is a Key Pillar in the Palestinian Economy, PARC, Jerusalem, (available on line: 
http://www.grassrootsonline.org/news/articles/agriculture-key-pillar-palestinian-economy), (accessed 19 Oct. 
2013).  
Baker A., Biger G., (eds.) (1992), Ideology and Landscape in Historical Perspective, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Basu P. (1997), Narratives in a Landscape: Monuments and Memories of the Sutherland Clearances, (available 
online: http://www.btinternet.com/~paulbasu/narratives/nl-frame.html), (accessed 25 Oct. 2012). 
Benvenisti M. Khayat S. (1988), The West Bank and Gaza Atlas, Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem. 
Benvenisti M. Khayat S. (1984), The West Bank Data Project: a Survey of Israel's Policies, American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington.  
Benvenisti M. (2002), Sacred Landscape: Buried History of the Holy Land Since 1948. University of California 
Press, California. 
Bermingham A. (2002), “System, Order and Abstraction:  The Politics of English Landscape Drawing around 
1795” in W. Mitchell  (eds.), “Landscape and Power”, second edition, the University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, pp. 77-101.  
Bittner C., Sofer M. (2013), “Land use changes in the rural–urban fringe: An Israeli case study”, Land Use 
Policy, v.33, pp. 11-19.  
Bond S. (2011), “Negotiating a 'Democratic Ethos’: Moving Beyond the Agonistic- Communicative Divide”, 
Planning Theory, v.10, n.2, pp. 161-186.  
Butterfield D., Isaac J., Kubursi A., Spencer S. (2000), Impacts of Water and Export Market Restrictions on 
Palestinian Agriculture, (available online: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/kubursi/ebooks/water.htm), (accessed 17 
Oct. 2013).   
Bryman A. (1998), Quantity and Quality in Social Research, Unwin Hyman Ltd., New York. 
B’tselem (2002), Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, Jerusalem. 
B’Tselem (2004), Forbidden Rods: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank, Jerusalem.    
 Bibliography     
 
189 
 
B’tselem (2009), The Hidden Agenda: the Establishment and Expansion Plans of Ma’ale Adummim and their 
Human Rights Ramifications, Jerusalem.  
B’tselem (2012), Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel‘s Separation Barrier in the West 
Bank, Jerusalem.   
B’Tselem (2013), Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C. the West Bank, Jerusalem.  
B’Tselem (2004), Not all it Seems: Preventing Palestinians Access to their Lands West of the Separation 
Barrier in the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya Area, Jerusalem.   
COHRE (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions) (2008), Policies of denial: Lack of access to water in the 
West Bank, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions Geneva.  
Cook J. (2003), Bedouin in the Negev face new ‘transfer, in “The Middle East Research and Information 
Project” (MERIP), (available online: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero051003), (accessed 3 Oct., 2013).   
Coon A. (1992), Town Planning Under Military Occupation: an Examination of the Law and Practice of Town 
Planning in the Occupied West Bank, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot.  
Coward M. (2004), “Urbicide in Bosnia”, in S. Graham (ed.), “Cities, War, Terrorism: Towards an Urban 
Geopolitics”, Blackwell Publishing, pp.154-171. 
Davidoff P. (1965), “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning”, Journal of the American Institute of Planning, v.31, 
pp.331-339.  
Davies M. (2006), Planet of Slums, Verso, London.  
Davies M. (1990), City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles, Vinatge Books, New York.  
Dikeç M. (2002), “Police, Politics, and the Right to the City”, GeoJournal, n. 58, pp. 91–98. 
Downey A. (2009), “Zones of Indistinction Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Bare Life’ and the Politics of Aesthetics”,  
Third Text, v. 23, n.2, pp.109–125.  
Dolphin R. (2006), The West Bank Wall: Unmaking Palestine, Pluto Press, London.  
 Bibliography     
 
190 
 
Duncan N.,  Duncan J. (2010), “Doing Landscape Interpretation”, in D. DeLyser, S. Herbert, S. Aitken, M. 
Crang , L. McDowell (eds.), “Qualitative Geography”, SAGE Publications Ltd.  
Enteman W. F. (1993), Managerialism: the Emergence of New Ideology, the University of Wisconsin Press, 
Wisconsin.  
Europe Council (2000), European Landscape Convention, Florence, CETS No. 176, (available online: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=176&CL=ENG), (accessed:15 Oct. 2012).  
Fainstein  S, Campbell S. (2011). Theories of Urban Development and their Implications for Policy and 
Planning, (available online: http://media.johnwiley.com.au/product_data/excerpt/10/14443308/1444330810-
63.pdf), (accessed 6 Apr. 2014). 
Flyvbjerg B. (1996), “The Dark Side of Planning: Rationality and (Realrationalita't)”, in S. Mandelbaum, L. 
Mazza, R. Burchell (eds.), “Explorations in Planning Theory”, Center for Urban Policy Research, New Jersey, 
pp.383-393 
Fanon F. (1963), The Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, New York.  
Forester J. (1989), Planning in the Face of Power, California press, California.  
Foucault M. (2003), Society must be defended: lectures at the College of France 1975-76, (D. Macey, trans.), 
Picador, New York.  
Foucault M. (2000), Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, (J. Faubion, ed.), (R. Hurley, trans.), v.3, 
New Press, New York.  
Foucault  M. (1989 a), Madness and Civilization, Routledge, London.  
Foucault  M. (1989 b), Power/ Knowledge :Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, (C. Gordon, 
ed.), New York: Pantheon.  
Foucault M. (1984), “Des Espace Autres (Of other spaces)”, Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuité, Miskowiec 
J. (trans), pp.46-49.  
Foucault M. (1981), “The Order of Discourse”, in R. Young (eds.), “Untying the Text: a Post-structuralist 
Reader”, Routleage & Kegan Pul Ltd., Boston, pp.51-78.  
 Bibliography     
 
191 
 
Foucault M. (1977), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison, (A. Sheridan, trans.), Penguin Books, 
London.  
Forman G. Kedar A. (2004), “From Arab Land to ‘Israel Lands’: the legal dispossession of the Palestinians 
displaced by Israel in the wake of 1948”, Environment and planning D: Society and space, v.22, pp. 809-830.   
Gordon N. (2008), “From Colonization to Separation: exploring the structure of Israel's occupation”, Third 
World Quarterly, v. 29, n.1, pp. 25-44. 
Graham S. (2004), “Cities as Strategic Sites: Place Annilation and Urban Geopolitics”, in S. Graham (ed.), 
“Cities, War, Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics”, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, pp.31-53. 
Habermas J. (1984), Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Volume 1 of the Theory of Communicative 
Action, (T. McCarthy, trans.), Beacon Press, Boston. 
Halper J. (2009), “Isarel’s “Separation Barrier:” Apartheid, Occupation and International Law”, In M. A. 
Mulhim (ed.) “The Aparthied Wall in Palestine: a Searching Journey into Israel’s Genocidal Intentions and 
Practices against the Palestinian”, Alfurat for publishing, Beirut, pp. 17-62.    
Hanafi S. (2009), “Spacio-cide: Colonial politics, Invisibility and Rezoning in Palestinian Territory”, 
Contemporary Arab Affairs, v.2, n.1, pp.106-121.  
Harvey D. (2012), Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution, Verso, London.  
Harvey D. (2008), The right to the city (available online:  http://newleftreview.org/II/53/david-harvey-the-right-
to-the-city) (accessed 2 Apr. 2014).  
Harvey D. (2003), “Debates and Developments, the Right to the City”. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, v. 27, n.4, PP. 939-941.  
Harvey D. (2001), Spaces of Capital: towards a Critical Geography, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.  
Harvey D. (1989), “From Managerailism to Entrepreneurialism: the Transformation in Urban Governance in 
Late Capitalism,  Geografiska Annaler B: Human Geography, v. 71, n. 1, pp. 3-17.   
Healey P. (2006), Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies, 2nd edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York. 
 Bibliography     
 
192 
 
Holzman-Gazit Y. (2007), Land expropriation in Israel, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire.  
Hook D. (2001), “Discourse, Knowledge, Materiality, History: Foucault and Discourse Analysis”, Theory 
Psychology, v.11, n.4, pp.521-547.  
Hopper M. (2007), Working in the Silence: an Analysis of a Short Period of Human Rights Witness in the 
Palestinian West Bank, The Ebor Press, New York.  
Humphreys S. (2006), “Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception”, The European 
Journal of International Law, v. 17, n.3, PP: 677-687. 
ICAHD (2012), The Judaization of Palestine: 2011 Displacement Trends, (available on line: 
http://www.icahd.org/sites/default/files/The%20Judaization%20of%20Palestine%20(2)_1.pdf), (accessed 6 May 
2013).   
Khalidi W. (1992), All that Remains: the Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948, 
Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington  D.C.   
Lein Y. (2002), Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy on the West Bank, B’tselem. 
Lefebvre H. (1991), The Production of Space, (D. Smith, trans.), Blackwell, Oxford.   
Lefebvre H. (1968), Le Droit à la ville (The right to the city), Economica.   
Marcuse P. (2003), “City of Quarters”, in G. Bridge, S.Watson (eds.), “A companion to the city”, Blackwell 
Publisher Ltd., Oxford, pp. 270- 280.     
Martin D. (2008), “The Violence within the Sovereign Decision”, ANAMES: an Interdisciplinary Journal, v.6, 
n.1, pp.75-92.   
McCarthy J. (1990), The population of Palestine: population statistics of the late Ottoman period and the 
Mandate, Columbia University Press, New York.  
Meron Y. (1981), Waste Land (Mewat) in Judea and Samaria, (available on line: 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol4/iss1/2), (accessed 23 Jan. 2013).  
 Bibliography     
 
193 
 
Messerchmid, C. (2007), What Price Cooperation? Hydro-Hegemony in Shared Israeli/ Palestinian 
Groundwater Resources, International Conference on Sustainable Development and Management of Water 
Resources in Palestine, Amman, Jordan, House of Water and the Environment, pp. 347-363.   
Mitchell T. (1991), Colonising Egypt, University of California Press, Berkeley.  
Mitchell W. (2002a), “Holy landscape: Israel, Palestine, and the American Wilderness”, in W. Mitchell, (eds.), 
“Landscape and Power”, second edition, the university of Chicago press, Chicago, pp.261-290. 
Mitchell W. (2002b), “Imperial Landscape”, in W. Mitchell (eds.), “Landscape and Power”, second edition, the 
university of Chicago press, Chicago, pp.5-34. 
Morrison A. (1999), Space for Maori in tertiary institutions: exploring two sites at the University of Auckland, 
Unpublished Master Thesis, University of Auckland. 
Murdoch J. (2006), Post-structural Geography, SAGE Publication, London.   
Murtagh B. (2002), The Politics of Territory: policy and segregation in Northern Ireland, Palgrave, London. 
Newman D. (1985), The impact of Gush Emunim: Politics and Settlement in the West Bank, Croom Helm, 
Sydney.  
OCHA (2007), The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and other Infrastructure in the 
West Bank, (available online: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/TheHumanitarianImpactOfIsraeliInfrastructure TheWestBank_Intro.pdf),    
(accessed 19- Oct. 2013).  
O'Keefe T. (2007), “Landscape and Memory: Historiography, Theory, Methodology”, in N. Moore, Y. Whelan 
(eds.), “Heritage, Memory and the Politics of Identity: New Perspectives on the Cultural Landscape”, Ashgate 
Publishing Company,  Hampshire, pp.3-18.  
O' Tuathail G. (1996), Critical Geopolitics, Routledge, London.   
Paz-Fuchs A., Cohen-Lifshiz A. (2010), "The Changing Character of Israel's Occupation: Planning and Civilian 
Control", Town Planning Review, v. 81, n.6, pp.585-597.  
 Bibliography     
 
194 
 
Pappé E. (2006), Ethnic cleansing of Palestine, One world publications, Oxford, (available on line: 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/36703781/Ilan-Pappe-The-Ethnic-Cleansing-of-Palestine-full-copy), (accessed 11 
May 2014).  
PCBS (2011), Area and Production of Field Crops in Palestine by Type of Irrigation and Governorate, 
2010/2011, (available on line: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Agri.2010-2011,19E.htm), 
(accessed in 19 Oct. 2013).  
PCBS (2007), Agricultural Statistics, (available on line: 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1506.pdf), (accessed 17 Oct. 2013).  
Peck J. N., Theodore, N. Brenner (2010), “Post-neoliberalism and its malcontents”, Antipode, v.41, n.1, pp. 94-
116. 
PENGON (2003), Stop the Wall in Palestine: Facts, Testimonies, Analysis and Call to Action, PENGON (The 
Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network), Jerusalem. 
Pløger J. (2008), “Foucault's Dispositif and the City”, Planning Theory, v. 7, n. 1, pp. 51-70.  
Purcell M. (2002), “Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and its urban politics of the Inhabitant”, 
GeoJournal, v.58, pp.99–108. 
Purinton J., Potteiger M. (2002), “Landscape Narratives”, in S. Swaffield (eds.), “Theory in Landscape 
Architecture”, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, pp. 136-144. 
Ramzy N. S. (2013), “Visual language in Mamluk Architecture: a Semiotic Analysis of the Funerary Complex 
of Sultan Qaitbay in Cairo”, Frontiers of Architectural Research, v.2, pp.338–353.  
Rouyer A. (2000), Turning Water into Politics: the Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, Macmillan 
press, London.  
Rossi U., Vanolo A. (2012), Urban Political Geographies: a Global Perspective, Sage, Los Angeles.  
Said E. (2002), “Invention, Memory, and Place”, in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed.), “Landscape and Power”, 2th ed., the 
University of Chicago press, Chicago, pp.241-259. 
Said E. (1993), Culture and Imperialism, Knopf/ Random House, New York, USA. 
 Bibliography     
 
195 
 
Said E. (1992) (2
nd
 edition), The Question of Palestine, Vintage, London. 
Said E. (1977), Orientalism, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London.  
Salabi A. (2001), The Ottoman State, (available on line (in Arabic): http://files.books.elebda3.net/elebda3.net-
wq-4068.pdf), (accessed 30 Oct. 2014).  
Schmitt C. (2008), The Nomos of the Earth: in the International law of the Jus Publicum Europaem, Talos Press 
Publishing, New York.  
Sen S. (2010), “Between Dominance, Dependence, Negotiation, and Compromise: European Architecture and 
Urban Planning Practices in Colonial India”, Journal of Planning History, v.9, n.4, pp.203-231. 
Shalev N. (2009), The Hidden Agenda, the Establishment and Expansion plans of Ma'ale Adummim and their 
Human Rights Ramification, B'tselem, Jerusalem.    
Shalev N., Cohen-Lifshitz A. (2008), The Prohibited zone: Israeli planning policy in the Palestinian villages in 
Area C, Bimkom, Jerusalem.  
Shaw M. (2004), “New Wars of the City: Relationships of "Urbicide" and "Genocide"”, in S. Graham (ed.), 
“Cities, War, Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics”, Blackwell Publishing, pp.141-153. 
Sklair L. (2002), Globalization. Capitalism and its Altematives, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Sklair L. (2005), “The Transnational Capitalist Class and Contemporary Architecture in Globalizing Cities”, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, v.29, n. 3, pp.485-500. 
Soja E. (2000), Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions, Blackwell Publisher, Oxford.  
Soja E. (1996), Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places, Wiley, Cambridge.  
Soja E. (1989), Postmodern Geographies: the Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory, Verso, London.     
Steiner F. (2008), The Living Landscape: an Ecological Approach to Landscape Planning, Island press, 
Washington.   
Swaffield S. (2002) (eds.), Theory in Landscape Architecture, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. 
 Bibliography     
 
196 
 
Tamari S. (1999), Jerusalem 1948: the Arab Neighborhoods and their Fate in the War, Institute of Jerusalem 
Studies, Jerusalem. 
Teyssot G. (1998), “Heterotopias and the History of Spaces”, in K. M. Hays (ed.), “Architecture Theory since 
1968”, Colombia Books of Architecture.  
UNWRA & UNOCHA, (10 July 2008), The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier: Four Years After the Advisory 
Opinion of the ICJ on the Barrier, (available online: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/barrier_report_july_2008 .pdf), (accessed 4 May 2013).   
UNRWA (2010), West Bank & Gaza Strip: Population Census of 2007, (available on line:  
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2010091595334.pdf), (accessed in 16 Oct. 2013).  
UNSO (1998), The Wye River Memorandum, (available on line: 
http://www.unsco.org/Documents/Key/The%20Wye%20 River%20Memorandum.pdf), (Accessed in 20 Oct. 
2013).  
USAID (2002), Sector Report: Agriculture in West Bank/Gaza, (available on line:  
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACU074.pdf), (accessed 1 Oct. 2013).  
Yiftachel O. (2012), “Naqab Bedouins and the (Internal) Colonial Paradigm”, in Amara, I. Abu-Saad, O.  
Yiftachel (eds.), “Indigenous (In)Justice: Law and Human Rights among the Bedouins in the Naqab/Negev”, 
Harvard Human Rights Press, pp. 281-310. 
Yiftachel O. (2006a), Ethnocracy: Land and Identity in Israel/Palestine, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Pennsylvania. 
Yiftachel O. (2006b), “Re-engaging planning theory? Toward "south-eastern" perspectives”, Planning Theory, 
v.5, n.3, pp. 211-222.  
Yiftachel O. (1998), “Planning and Social Control: Exploring the Dark Side”, Journal of Planning Literature, 
v.12, n.4, pp. 395-406. 
Yiftachel O. (1995), “Planning as Control: Policy and Resistance in a Deeply Divided Society”, Progress in 
Planning, v.44, pp. 115-184.  
Weber M. (1947), The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (A. M. Henderson, T. Parsons, trans.), 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
 Bibliography     
 
197 
 
Weizman E. (2007), Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation, Verso, New York. 
World Bank (Oct., 2013), Palestinians Access to Area C Key to Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth, 
(available on line: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/10/07/palestinians-access-area-c-
economic-recovery-sustainable-growth), (accessed in 18 Oct. 2013).   
Zeitoun M., Messerchmid C., Attlili S. (2009), “Asymmetric Abstraction and Allocation: The Israeli-Palestinian 
Water Pumping Record”, Ground Water, v. 47, n.1. pp. 146–160.  
Zukin S. (1993), Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World, University of Californian press, 
California. 
Zube E. (1986), “Landscape planning education in America: retrospect and prospect”, Landscape and Planning, 
v. 13, pp.367-378. 
News Paper and Media  
BBC  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20552391. 
 
International Middle East Media Centre, 30 Sept. 2013, 
http://www.imemc.org/article/66194, (accessed 8 Nov. 2013).  
 
The Guardian, 20 Jan. 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jan/20/oxfam-85-richest-people-half-of-the-world.  
 
Le monde-diplomatique (especial report) (1998), 
The Socio-economic Impact of Settlements on Land, Water, and The Palestinian Economy, http://www.monde 
diplomatique.fr/cahier/proche-orient/colonies-2, (accessed 19 Oct. 2013).  
 
Haaretz Newspaper, 22 Jan. 2003,   
Hass A., “you can drive long and never see an Arab”, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/you-can-
drive-along-and-never-see-an-arab-1.21522, (accessed 8 May 2012).     
 
Haaretz Newspaper, 27 June 2012,   
Israel weighs demolition of flagship EU sustainability project in West Bank village of Susya, 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.532369, (accessed 7-11-2013).   
 Bibliography     
 
198 
 
 
Jerusalem Post Newspaper, 27 Aug. 2012,  
Sussiya demolition orders not simply law enforcement issue, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-
Contributors/Sussiya-demolition-orders-not-simply-law-enforcement-issue, (accessed 7-11-2013).  
 
New York Times, 2 Aug. 1988,  
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/02/opinion/l-fate-of-deir-yassin-spurred-palestinians-to-flee-507288.html, 
(accessed 5 Dec. 2014).  
 
Web Sites 
 
B’Tselem web site, 6 Apr. 2008, 
Demolition of Houses near the Separation Barrier, Far’un Village, Tulkarm District, 
http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier/20080406_farun_house_demolitions, (accessed 8 Oct. 2014).   
 
B’Tselem web site, 29 Aug. 2012, 
Susiya Demolition Orders not Simply a Law Enforcement Issue, 
http://www.btselem.org/south_hebron_hills/20120829_susiya_demolition_orders_jp_article, (accessed 7 Nov. 
2013). 
 
Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development 
http://www.mopad.pna.ps/en/, (accessed 8 May. 2012).  
 
Oxford Dictionary  
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/power, (accessed 20 May 2012).   
 
Oxford Dictionary 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/landscape, (accessed 17 June 2012).  
 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
 http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/, (accessed 8 May 2012).  
 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/default.aspx, (accessed 6 June 2013).  
 
www.peacenow.org, (accessed 11 May 2013). 
  
 Bibliography     
 
199 
 
Interview: Nakba survivor relives his last moments in ethnically-cleansed Saffuriyya, 
http://smpalestine.com/tag/saffuriyya/, (accessed 13 May, 2014). 
 
Photo of Saffuriyya (destroyed Palestinian village), 
http://www.palestineremembered.com/Nazareth/Saffuriyya/Picture1277.html, (accessed 3 Feb.  2014) 
 
http://www.jmeshel.com/109-daniel-zamir-shir-hashomer/#more-2487, (accessed 27 Oct. 2013).  
http://cmewonline.com/2012/04/04/why-all-the-fuss-about-an-outpost-called-migron, (accessed 29 Oct. 2013). 
http://www.lifesource.ps/english/water-in-palestine/the-wall, (accessed 2 Sept. 2014). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
